Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders. Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1990, Pages 355-387

  Gilson, Stuart C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845629684     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90060-D     Document Type: Article

References (30)

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2. Compensation and incentives Practice vs theory
3. Term lending – A guide to negotiating term loan covenants and other financial restrictions
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5. Creditor liabilities resulting from improper interference with the management of a financially troubled debtor
6. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
7. Separation of ownership and control
8. An empirical test of the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate capital structure
9. Management turnover and financial distress
10. Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default
11. The determinants of board composition
12. Takeovers Their causes and consequences
13. Active investors LBOs and the privatization of bankruptcy
14. Eclipse of the public corporation
15. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
16. Outside directorships and corporate performance
17. Corporate bankruptcy and managers' self-serving behavior
18. Bondholders and corporate governance
19. Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers
20. The workout crew: Bankers who step in if loans go bad reveal lenders' other face
21. Todd's bondholders gird for a battle in court
22. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants
23. Stock prices and top management changes
24. Outside directors and CEO turnover
25. Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private equity financings