Leading for the long term

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-19

  Hermalin, Benjamin E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Leadership; Signaling in repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845566451     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.005     Document Type: Article

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