The challenge of the security sector and security reform processes in democratic transitions: The case of Sierra Leone

Democratization

Volumn 13, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 791-810

  Ginifer, Jeremy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Democratization; Security; Security sector reform; Sierra Leone

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; DEMOCRATIZATION; ELECTION; POLITICAL REFORM; SECURITY;

AFRICA; SIERRA LEONE; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WEST AFRICA;

EID: 33845522945     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340601010693     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. Alfred B. Zack-Williams, 'The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1999), p. 143.
2. See Peter Albrecht, 'The Sierra Leonean State in 2005: Revisiting the Root Causes of the Conflict', KAIPTC Paper, No. 9, September 2005, p. 3.
3. Zack-Williams (note 1), p. 1 44.
4. Ibid., p. 145.
5. Ibid., p. 144. 6 Osman Gbla, 'Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2006), p. 79.
6. Osman Gbla, 'Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2006), p. 79.
7. Zack-Williams (note 1), p. 147.
8. Jimmy D. Kandeh, 'Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2003), p. 192.
9. Taylor's intervention was in retaliation for Sierra Leone's earlier rear-base support provided to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which deployed to Liberia's capital Monrovia in 1990 following Taylor's invasion of the country in 1989.
10. For an assessment of the impact of RUF violence on Sierra Leone see Jeremy Ginifer, 'Armed Violence and Poverty in Sierra Leone, A Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative' (CICS: Bradford, March 2005).
11. Zack-Williams (note 1), p. 148.
12. The extent to which this series of events constituted a coup is open to question. Following a march on State House by junior officers demanding the payment of wage arrears, Momoh fled the official residence. Strasser was invited to act as head of state.
13. US State Department, 'Background Note: Sierra Leone' (Bureau of African Affairs: Washington, May 2006), p. 3. Available at http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm
14. Zack-Williams (note 1), p. 151.
15. Ibid.
16. The term 'sobel' refers to a combination of solider and rebel (solider by day, rebel by night). Ibid., pp. 151-2.
17. Ibid., p. 152.
18. Ibid., p. 153.
19. US State Department (note 11), p. 3.
20. International Crisis Group, 'Sierra Leone after Elections: Politics as Usual?', Africa Report, No. 49 (ICG: Brussels, 12 July 2002), Executive Summary, p. 1.
21. Kandeh (note 8), p. 196.
22. International Crisis Group, 'Sierra Leone after Elections' (note 20), p. 1.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. p. 3.
25. International Crisis Group, 'Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty', Africa Report, No. 35 (ICG: Brussels, 24 October 2001), p. 18.
26. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines' (2000), p. 15. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R.pdf
27. Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide' (Germany: GTZ/NODEFIC/PPC/SNDC, 2004), p. 15.
28. M. Zongwe, 'Preliminary Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sierra Leone', UNAMSIL DDR Co-ordination Section Assessment, 6 April 2002, p. 2.
29. International Crisis Group, 'Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance', Africa Report, No. 67 (ICG: Brussels), p. 14.
30. SSR involves the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate, and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. The security sector is defined as including all organisations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force (or the threat of force) to protect the states and its citizens. This includes: The military, police and other security actors; civilian/security oversight bodies; justice/ law enforcement organisations; and informal/non-statutory security actors, such as guerrillas, liberation armies/movements, body guards, private security companies, and militias.
31. Lomé Peace Accord, 1999, see: http://www.sierra-leone.org/ lomeaccord.html.
32. For an evaluation of the UK's conflict prevention approach, including SSR, see Jeremy Ginifer (with input from Kaye Oliver), 'Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone', DFID Evaluation Report, EV 647, March 2004.
33. DFID, 'Sierra Leone: A Long-term Partnership for Development', The Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, February 2003.
34. United Nations, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone', October 2002.
35. Gbla (note 6), p. 84.
36. Ibid., p. 90.
37. Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence Mission Statement (accessed at www.daco-sl.org/ecyclopedia5_mov/5_2mod.htm), Cited in Gbla,'Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone' (note 6), p. 84.
38. The National Constitution of Sierra Leone. http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/ sierraleone.html
39. International Crisis Group (note 29), p. 8.
40. See Ginifer, 'Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone' (note 33), p. 17,
41. citing Roderick Evans, David Jones, and Graham Thompson, Defence Advisory Team, 'Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II; Output to Purpose Review', 25 June 5 July 2002.
42. Ibid., p. 18.
43. Bernadette Lahai, 'Parliamentary Oversight: The Sierra Leone Experience and Constraints', Paper presented at workshop to 'Strengthen Legislatures in Commonwealth West Africa', 22-25 February 2005, Kimbima Hotel, Aberdeen, Freetown, Sierra Leone (accessed at www.cpahq.org/ BernadetteLahaiSierraLeone_pdf_media_public.aspx), p. 7,
44. cited by Gbla (note 6).
45. Ibid.
46. International Crisis Group (note 29), p. 8.
47. Rod MacJohnson, 'Sierra Leone Polls Set for 2007', IoL News, p. 1. Available at www.iol.za/general/news
48. BBC News, 'Sierra Leone sets 2007 Poll Date', p. 1. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk
49. Rod MacJohnson, 'Sierra Leone Polls Set for 2007' (note 46), p. 1.
50. Alpha R. Jalloh, 'Bobby Traps in the Next Elections', Opinion, The Independent (Freetown), 17 August 2006, p. 1.
51. Ibid.
52. S.I. Kamara, 'The Arrogance of Power', Concord Times (Freetown), Opinion, 17 August 2006.
53. Angola Press, 'Sierra Leone Opposition Against Local Chiefs' Involvement in Politics'. Available at www.angolapress-angop.ao/ noticia-e.asp?ID=462177.
54. Margai has criticised the SLPP on a wide range of issues including the eligibility of Berewa to contest the presidency, to the latest presidential appointment of the chairman of the Political Parties Registration Commissioner (PPRC), and the recent Biriwa Paramount Chieftaincy election. David A. Jabati Jnr., 'PMDC Lashes Sierra Leone People's Party', Awareness Times, p. 1. Available at http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_20053378.shtml.
55. Standard Times (Freetown), 'Facing the Challenges', Column, 7 August 2006, p. 1. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/ 200608080996.html.
56. DFID spent US$2.27 million over two years on the Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme (PCRP) which supported the elections of chiefs for vacant seats, built or re-built chiefs' houses, and developed a code of practice.
57. For a particularly insightful analysis of chiefdom issues see Richard Fanthorpe, 'Humanitarian Aid in Post-War Sierra Leone: The Politics of Moral Economy', HPG Background Paper (Overseas Development Institute: London, February 2003), p. 8.
58. International Crisis Group, 'Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States', Africa Report, No. 87 (ICG: Brussels, 8 December 2004), p. 21.
59. See Ginifer (note 10), pp. 17-19.
60. For an analysis of DDR, SSR, and related programming linkages and coordination see Jeremy Ginifer (with Mike Bourne and Owen Greene), 'Considering Armed Violence in the Post-Conflict Transition: DDR and Small Arms and Light Weapons Reduction Initiatives', Briefing Paper (CICS: Bradford, September 2004);
61. and Jeremy Ginifer, 'Support for DDR and SSR after Conflicts in Africa: Lessons-Learnt and New Agendas in Africa', Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa Project, Paper 3 (Finnish Institute of International Affairs/CICS: Helsinki/Bradford, 2006).
62. See Paul Richards, 'The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone', Working Paper 21 (Clingendael, Netherlands, August 2003) p. 32.