Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

Economic Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 373-384

  Schulteis, Tim ^a   Perea, Andres ^a   Peters, Hans ^a   Vermeulen, Dries ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Preference conjecture equilibrium; Signaling games; Utility revision

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845345237     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0061-7     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Banks, J., Sobel, J.: Equilibrium selection in signaling games. Econometrica 55, 647-661 (1987)
2. Cho, I.-K., Kreps, D.M.: Signaling games and stable equilibria. Q J Econ 102, 179-221 (1987)
3. Grossman, S., Perry, M.: Perfect sequential equilibria. J Econ Theory 39, 97-119 (1986)
4. Kreps, D., Wilson, R.: Sequential equilibria. Econometrica 50, 863-894 (1982)
5. Perea, A.: Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games. Revised version, University of Maastricht (2005)