Protection and social order

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 691-709

  Wilhite, Allen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent based modeling; Club theory; Computational economics; Protection

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751513388     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.010     Document Type: Article

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