Muslims, markets, and the meaning of a "good" education in Pakistan

Asian Survey

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 699-720

  Nelson, Matthew J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Educational reform; Islam; Pakistan; Religious education

Indexed keywords

EDUCATION; ISLAMISM; REFORM PROCESS;

ASIA; EURASIA; PAKISTAN; PUNJAB [PAKISTAN]; RAWALPINDI; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 33751433388     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2006.46.5.699     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. An excellent illustration of this point appears in Marshall Sahlins, "Cosmologies of Capitalism: The Trans-Pacific Sector of the World System" in Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 412-55.
2. Also see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
3. One rather well-known example of this perspective appears in the work of Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966). He concluded that, country-specific cultural differences notwithstanding, the origins of "democracy" lay in the emergence of a national bourgeoisie.
4. In essence, he argued that a democracy could not emerge without a bourgeoisie. The most common expression of this perspective, however, surfaces in the rationalchoice tradition, much of which seeks to illuminate the relationship between carefully defined incentive structures and patterns of change that are not "culturally specific." See, for example, Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965)
5. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
6. and David Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
7. See Jarmo Houtsonen, "Traditional Qur'anic Education in a Southern Moroccan Village," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26:3 (1994), p. 489.
8. See also Patricia Horvatich, "Ways of Knowing Islam," American Ethnologist 21:4 (1994), pp. 811-26 (regarding the Philippines)
9. and John Damis, "The Free-School Phenomenon: The Cases of Tunisia and Algeria," International Journal of Middle East Studies 5:4 (1974), pp. 434-49.
10. Kevin B. Smith, "Review of Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society," Perspectives on Politics 1:3 (2003), pp. 593-94.
11. Kevin B. Smith and Kenneth J. Meier, "Public Choice in Education: Markets and the Demand for Quality Education," Political Research Quarterly 48:3 (1995), p. 462.
12. See "Private and Public Initiatives Working Together in Health and Education," World Bank Group, .
13. Also see "Public-Private Partnerships in Education" (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank, May 29-June 7, 2000), pp. 1-19, .
14. Mark Chaves, Peter J. Schraeder, and Mario Sprindys, "State Regulation of Religion and Muslim Religious Vitality in the Industrialized West," Journal of Politics 56:4 (1994), pp. 1087-97.
15. Above all, Chaves explains that one of the central insights of rational choice theory in the context of religion is that "religious markets ought to function like economic markets." More specifically, competition for adherents in the religious "marketplace" should lead to the production of religious services tailored to meet local consumer "demands." "In a non-regulated 'free market'," Chaves notes, "religious consumption forces religious firms to produce efficiently [the] goods and services that are more likely to be the religious goods and services desired by consumers." "Hence," he concludes, "religious consumption_[defined in terms of] beliefs and participation - will be higher in [a] non-regulated market than in a market where certain religious institutions enjoy monopolistic or oligopolistic privileges." Ibid., pp. 1088-89.
16. Ibid., p. 1090.
17. See Harold Alderman, Peter F. Orazem, and Elizabeth M. Paterno, "School Quality, School Cost, and the Public/Private School Choices of Low-Income Households in Pakistan," Journal of Human Resources 36 (Spring 2001) (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison), pp. 304-26.
18. Aristotle, The Politics (Book 8, Ch. 2) (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 454.
19. John Meyer, "Globalization and the Curriculum: Problems for Theory in the Sociology of Education" (1999), .
20. Ibid., p. 13.
21. Fiona Adamson, "Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," International Studies Review 7:4 (2005), pp. 547-69.
22. Houtsonen, "Traditional Qur'anic Education," p. 489.
23. Ibid., p. 491.
24. Ibid., pp. 491-92.
25. Ibid., p. 493.
26. According to Houtsonen, "The goals and significance of modern education seem to be instrumental in encouraging individualism and competition ... whereas the goals and significance of Qur'anic education seem to be expressive and normative in encouraging a common identity and beliefs." As one elderly man pointed out, "Those who learn in [modern] schools ... concentrate more on salaries," whereas "a person learning in the timzkida ... reads a hizb and calls on God to save his parents and relatives." Ibid., p. 494.
27. Thus, Houtsonen notes that there are families who do not want to educate their children in modern schools even though they have the money to do so.
28. Ibid., pp. 497-98.
29. See also Dale F. Eickelman, "The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and Its Social Reproduction," Comparative Studies in Society and History 20:4 (1978), pp. 485-516.
30. Jay Matthews, "An Education Writer's Call for Assistance," Washington Post, February 4, 2003.
31. For average monthly income figures in Pakistan, see Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Labor Force Survey (2001-02), .
32. In particular, see Table 21, . In an average household, we rarely encountered more than two or three members who were employed. So, if the average income of an employee in the Punjab was Rs 3,014, the average household income would be Rs 3,000 (minimum) to Rs 9,000 (maximum).
33. All of my interviews with donor agencies were conducted in English, whereas the interviews with citizens were conducted in Urdu. I translated these interviews into English with occasional assistance from my research assistants.
34. Not surprisingly, wealthier and more highly educated respondents were somewhat more enthusiastic about the notion of "choice." It is interesting to note, however, that the strongest voices in opposition to choice did not come from the poorest citizens but rather from the lower-middle class.
35. In keeping with the conventional wisdom, wealthier and more highly educated respondents were less likely to believe that madrasas are "absolutely indispensable." In fact, those without a B.A. and a monthly household income below Rs 10,000 tended to believe that madrasas were "indispensable" at a rate that hovered around 60%. Among those with a B.A. and incomes above Rs 10,000, however, this figure dropped to roughly 20%. In addition, it is interesting to note that women were considerably less likely to believe that madrasas were "absolutely indispensable" than men.
36. We found that, as a "first priority," religious education was especially important for (a) men and (b) those with lower levels of education. This is important, because, although our sample included "too many male respondents" (discounting the relatively secular views of female respondents), it also included "too few illiterate/uneducated respondents" (in effect, exaggerating the secular views of those with higher levels of education). In other words, what our sample lost in terms of the (relatively) secular views of women, it gained in terms of the (relatively) secular views of those with higher levels of education.
37. Ultimately, we found that this commitment to "alternative ends" was reinforced by local perceptions about the link between education and employment. Indeed, a number of citizens drew attention to the disturbing plight of "the educated unemployed," noting that, even if education is regarded as an important credential, it is no longer an automatic guarantee of gainful employment. In fact, citizens were only too familiar with the plight of those who received a solid education only to find that they were unsuccessful in the job market for various reasons beyond their control including helpful family connections and kinship networks. In the end, therefore, we found that, even if citizens understood (theoretically) the link between education and "employment," they were inclined to focus (practically) on the link between education and "good citizenship," noting that good citizenship and virtue would be valuable even in the context of unemployment. In this context, it is worth pointing out that, according to census figures compiled by the Government of Pakistan in 1998, literate citizens make up 55.1% of Pakistan's unemployed, while illiterate citizens comprised just 44.9%. See Table 34, Labor Force Survey (2001-02), .
38. Tariq Rahman, "Tolerance and Militancy among Schoolchildren," Friday Times (Lahore).
39. Overall, we noticed that as education levels increased, "vocational" education became less and less popular. "Civic" education and "liberal" education, on the other hand, become more popular. This was hardly surprising. The relationship between "liberal" education and "religious" education, however, was more interesting. In both cases, we noticed a significant difference between those with a university-level education and those without. In fact, the relatively secular views of the former - that is, those with a university-level education - seemed to depart, rather dramatically, from the norm.
40. Susan B. Glasser, "Qatar Reshapes Its Schools, Putting English over Islam," Washington Post, February 2, 2003.
41. In general, those with higher levels of education and higher incomes were more likely to favor an "English Only" policy in their children's schools. Even among those with a university education and a monthly income of Rs 20,000 (or more), however, this figure never rose above 20% or 30%.
42. Not surprisingly, the bias in favor of Urdu was particularly strong among older citizens, male citizens, citizens earning less than Rs 10,000/month, and citizens with less than an "intermediate" (F.A./F.Sc.) degree.
43. The strongest preference for Islamic studies came from younger citizens, those with a religious education, and those who had completed their F.A. but not, for the most part, their B.A.
44. In general, citizens tended to believe that more than half of the curriculum in their local madrasa should be devoted to religious education. Yet, within this general trend, it is interesting to note that women once again tended to be somewhat less enthusiastic about religious education than men. Furthermore, we found that, without departing from the general trend in favor of a curriculum focused on religion in their local madrasa, highly educated citizens tended to accept the notion that madrasas should include both religious and non-religious education far more readily than less well-educated citizens.
45. See Peter W. Singer, "Analysis Paper No. 14: Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education, Not Jihad," Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, (2001).
46. Also see, Joe Stevens and David B. Ottaway, "From U.S., the ABCs of Jihad," Washington Post, March 23, 2002
47. Arif Jamal, "Redefining Madrassahs," The News on Sunday (Islamabad), July 7, 2002
48. John Lancaster, "Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth," Washington Post, July 14, 2002
49. David Rohde, "A Dead End for Afghan Children Adrift in Pakistan," New York Times, March 7, 2003
50. Khaled Ahmed, "Our Madrasas and Our World View," Friday Times (Lahore), March 14, 2003
51. Jane Perlez, "Leave No Madrasa Ahead: Enlisting Aid to Education in the War on Terror," New York Times, October 12, 2003
52. Maura Reynolds and Richard C. Paddock, "Muslim Leaders Confront Bush," Los Angeles Times, October 23, 2003
53. and Walter Pincus, "Idea of Influencing Schools Echoes '50s," Washington Post, November 1, 2003.
54. Pamela Constable, "Pakistani Children Add School to Workday," Washington Post, March 30, 2003.
55. Thomas Friedman, "Jihad 101 Taught in Pakistan," New York Times, November 13, 2001.
56. ICG, "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism, and the Military" (Brussels: ICG, 2003), .
57. When asked about the notion that madrasas were "centers of terrorism," historian and journalist Dr. Mubarak Ali was doubtful. "I must admit," he said, "much of this talk is exaggerated." "On the whole," he argued, "the madrasas create narrow-minded, sectarian students, but not terrorists." "Not all the Afghan Taliban were madrasa-educated," he noted. "They also included young people in modern schools or colleges." See Yoginder Sikand, "Pakistan Is Becoming More Fundamentalist by the Day: An Interview with Dr. Mubarak Ali," .
58. In fact, what Ali says about the Taliban, the ICG extends to Kashmir as well. "The credit for pioneering the campaign [in Kashmir]," it explains, "goes to the Jama'at-e Islami, the modernist ally of the military." As a matter of fact, it notes that "the Jama'at-e Islami was the only religious party that fully supported proposals to modernize madrasa education." And even today, "Its power base is in the big cities among the educated classes." And yet, as the ICG reports, there is a large billboard in the entrance of the Jama'at-e-Islami's headquarters near Lahore carrying the names of hundreds of fallen jihadis, and "very few had ever been to a traditional madrasa." ICG, "Pakistan," p. 12.
59. Ibid., p. 2.
60. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Myth," New York Times, June 14, 2005.
61. Apart from their basic religious duties, mullahs have a number of other duties as well. In particular, they deal with a greater proportion of the desperately poor than any other group or institution. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that madrasas are supported by the general public_including those who are not, themselves, desperately poor - precisely because they provide the poor with essential social services. In fact, for most Pakistanis criticizing a local madrasa would be like criticizing the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, or the local YMCA. As one news article explained, "Even critics of the system concede that madrasas perform a useful social function, providing basic free education as well as room and board to poor students who might otherwise not go to school." Lancaster, "Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth," Washington Post, p. A19.
62. Field notes, December 16, 2003.
63. ICG, "Pakistan," p. 29.
64. In addition, those with an interest in educational reform could look for ways to support scholars (ulema) who express an interest in offering their services to madrasas associated with more than one school of thought (maktab-i-fikr). This, along with a number of similar initiatives, would target the problem of sectarianism without, at the same time, departing from the substance of local educational demands. See Yoginder Sikand, "Madrasas and Intra-Muslim Conflict," .
65. Meyer, "Globalization and the Curriculum"
66. and Adamson, "Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam."