Fear and greed: The evolution of double liability in American banking, 1865-1930

Explorations in Economic History

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 59-80

  Grossman, Richard S ^a,b  

^a WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Banking; Double liability; Regulation; US economic history 19th and 20th centuries

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751426411     PISSN: 00144983     EISSN: 10902457     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2005.09.003     Document Type: Article

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