Welfare work requirements with paternalistic government preferences

Economic Journal

Volumn 116, Issue 515, 2006, Pages F441-F458

  Moffitt, Robert ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NUMERICAL MODEL; OPTIMIZATION; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 33751229340     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01131.x     Document Type: Article

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