Market access for sale

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 79-94

  Kee, Hiau Looi ^a   Olarreaga, Marcelo ^a   Silva, Peri ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Lobby; Political economy; Tariff preferences

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS; ESTIMATION METHOD; MARKET DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TARIFF STRUCTURE;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33751087190     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.11.001     Document Type: Article

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