Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 111-125

  Bochet, Olivier ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751080348     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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13. Sjöström T (1991) On the necessary and sufficient conditions for nash implementation. Soc Choice Welfare 8:333-340
14. Vartiainen H (2003) Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization and applications to voting. Manuscript. University of Helsinki