Relations without polyadic properties: Albert the Great on the nature and ontological status of relations

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie

Volumn 83, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 225-257

  Brower, Jeffrey E ^a  

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EID: 33751073047     PISSN: 00039101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/agph.2001.001     Document Type: Review

References (62)

1. In this paper I ignore complications that arise in connection with reflexive relations such as identity
2. For a brief survey of Albert's life, works, and historical significance see Alain de Libera, "Albert the Great", in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998)
3. and James A. Weisheipl, "Life and Works of St. Albert the Great", in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. James A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980), 13-51
4. For a more extensive discussion, see Alain de Libera, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1990), which has come to be regarded as the standard work of reference on Albert's philosophy
5. In the contexts on which I shall be focusing, Albert speaks as if every relational predicate introduces a special type of monadic property, one which exists in extramental reality. As we shall see, however, all that he is strictly committed to saying here is that at least some relational predicates introduce such properties. In other contexts, therefore, he is free to maintain that, while some relational predicates introduce sui generis monadic properties, yet others introduce ordinary monadic properties, or just individuals, or nothing in extramental reality at all. For a discussion of the sorts of considerations that preoccupy Albert in all of his discussions of relations, see Crescentino Marinozzi, "La realtà delle relazioni secondo S. Alberto Magno" in Laurentianum 6 (1965), 31-72
6. For an analysis of the distinction between real (or extramental) vs. merely conceptual relations in one of Albert's early theological works, see Scott MacDonald, "The Metaphysics of Goodness and the Doctrine of Transcendentals" in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 31-55, esp. 42 f
7. Finally, for a discussion of Albert's views on the so-called transcendental relations, see Crescentino Marinozzi, "La relazione trascendentale in S. Alberto M." in Laurentianum 5 (1964), 71-113
8. Categories 1a25
9. Boethius sets the precedent here. In his commentary on the Categories, which introduced medieval philosophers to all three terms, he not only alternates among them but explicitly denies that there is any difference in meaning between two of them, namely, "toward something" and "relative": "Sive autem relativa dicamus, sive ad aliquid, nihil interest." See Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, in Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus, ed. Jacques Paul Migne (Paris: Vivès, 1860), vol. 64, 217a
10. Medieval philosophers use the same terms to refer to predicates and the entities signified by them
11. The medieval distinction between absolute and relative terms corresponds, therefore, to the contemporary distinction between monadic and polyadic predicates. It must not be inferred from this, however, that what medieval philosophers call "absolute" and "relative forms" corresponds to what we call "monadic" and "polyadic properties" (respectively). An absolute form is just an entity that is signified by an absolute term, and a relative form (or relation) is an entity signified by a relative term. Since one and the same entity can, however, be signified by both types of terms, it is possible for one and the same thing to be both absolute and relative (though, of course, nothing could be both monadic and polyadic). Indeed, the possibility of a relative form's being absolute was exploited by number of philosophers during the Middle Ages, namely, all those who claimed that relations are identical with their absolute foundations. I discuss the view of one such philosopher in "Abelard's Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition", The Review of Metaphysics (1998) 51: 605-631
12. Cf. also Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)
13. In the end, Albert thinks that this characterization of relations won't quite do. Like other medieval philosophers, he thinks that it provides a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for being a relation, and so requires further refinement. We can ignore these complications here, but for further discussion see my "Medieval Theories of Relations before Aquinas: Categories Commentaries, 510-1250 A. D.", 2 vols. (Ph. D. diss., University of Iowa, 1996), vol. 1, chaps. 2 and 5
14. This view is, of course, common among medieval philosophers, who trace it back to Aristotle's De interpretatione. For discussion of Albert's semantic views, see William E. McMahon, "Albert the Great on the Semantics of the Categories of Substance, Quantity, and Quality", in Historiographia Linguistica, VII (1980), 145-57
15. For further discussion and references, see E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy", in Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991), 39-67
16. and Gyula Klima, "The Semantic Principles Underlying St. Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Being", in Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996), 87-141
17. "Ex his et similibus rationibus moti fuerunt Antiqui et fere omnes praeter Platonem et Aristotelem [...] Nos autem Platoni et Aristoteli consentientes, dicimus ad aliquid esse generalissimum, et esse unum de primis generibus accidentis [...]" (De praedic., 223a)
18. "Nos autem dicimus ad hoc, quod in veritate secundum Peripateticorum sapientiam relatio habet esse, sed non habet esse nisi in relativo, quod est ad aliquid" (In Metaph., 266b)
19. Avicenna, for example, whom Albert frequently cites, endorses this conception of accidents explicitly, as does Albert's most famous student, Thomas Aquinas. (Compare Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima, sive Scientia Divina I-IV: Edition critique de la traduction latine médiévale, ed. S. Van Riet [Louvain and Leiden, 1977], 173
20. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, ed. Pierre Mandonnet [Paris: Léthielleux, 1929], I, d. 27, a. 1, ad. 2.) For Albert's endorsement of this conception of accidents see De praedic., 241b ad 1
21. In a medieval context, discussions of fatherhood and sonship almost always suggest the relations in the Trinity. It may be that Albert has the divine relations in mind here as well
22. "Item videtur filiatio et paternitas non differant nisi penes terminos, sicut via quae est a Thebis ad Athenas, et ab Athenis ad Thebas, quae eadem est, quamvis terminis differat" (De praedic., 241a). The example involving the road which runs from Thebes to Athens is a traditional one, and often comes up in medieval discussions of relations. Aristotle uses this example when he discusses motion in the Physics (see 202b11-15), but it may trace back even further to Heraclitus's claim that "the road up and the road down are one and the same"
23. "Et quod objicitur de eadem via quae est de Thebis ad Athenas, et e converso, dicendum quod omnino simile non est, nisi in terminis: medium autem extensum non habet" (De praedic., 241b)
24. Cf. also Julius R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 79-81
25. "Adhuc autem fortius objecerunt quidam posteriorum, sicut Avicenna et Alfarabius, dicentes quod nulla forma quae sit ens, est in re quae non sit absoluta secundum esse quod habet in ipsa, sicut patet inducendo de calido, frigido, albo, et nigro, et omnibus aliis: sed comparatio quae fit rerum ad invicem secundum formas quae sunt in rebus, fit actu rationis, quae dicit quod in quibus non est una qualitas sunt dissimilia, et in quibus est una sunt similia: comparationis ergo forma quae est in his quae sunt ad aliquid, non est res sed ratio, ut videtur, quia nihil est extra animam comparantis unum alteri" (De praedic., 222b-223a)
26. Nor can we merely check the relevant texts of Avicenna or Alfarabi, since it is unclear what texts of theirs (if any) Albert is relying upon here. Albert does not give us any specific references. Moreover, the texts of Avicenna and Alfarabi that he relied upon for his commentaries or paraphrases on the Organon are for the most part lost today
27. For Avicenna's view, see the discussion of relations in Philosophia Prima, tr. 3, chap. 10, 173-83
28. For some doubts about my realist interpretation of this discussion, as well as some interesting suggestions about Alfarabi's own view and its relation to Avicenna's, see M. E. Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter, 'On the Relative', in the Metaphysics of the Shifā" in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 83-99
29. Cf. also Julius R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three Essays in the History of Thought (University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 1-119, esp. 91 f
30. "[A]d aliquid autem non est ens ratum apud naturam extra, sed ens rationis" (De praedic., 223a)
31. Thus, in treating the very first anti-realist objection, Albert simply adopts his objectors' terminology, according to which "being toward something [or related] just consists in being compared" (ad aliquid consistit in comparatione). See De praedic., 222a
32. Albert's willingness to speak in this way may be explained in part by the fact that, although the term comparatio has psychological overtones in Latin, its original meaning is more objective than the English transliteration would suggest. The Latin infinitive comparare means to bring together or unite. Literally, therefore, a comparison is just that by virtue of which two or more things are united. For a helpful discussion of comparatio and various other terms used by medieval philosophers to signify relations, see Robert W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 133
33. For further discussion of this type of objection, see Panayot Butchvarov, Being qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 241 f
34. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) bk. ii, chap. 7, sect. 15
35. Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1903), sects. 212-14
36. Julius R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 63, n. 3
37. Reinhardt Grossmann, The Categorial Structure of the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 161 f
38. Fred Wilson combines both sorts of consideration, meaning and logical form, in "Weinberg's Refutation of Nominalism", Dialogue 8 (1969), 466-72
39. I call this form of realism "reductive" solely for the purpose of indicating that the properties grounding the applicability of relational concepts are identified by it with ordinary monadic properties, and not the members of some sui generis type of monadic property
40. For further discussion of the differences between these two sorts of view and the broader historical and semantic issues surrounding them, see Gyula Klima, "Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy", S-European Journal for Semiotic Studies (1991), 587-618
41. "Difficile est nobis loqui de ad aliquid et relatione, quoniam aliam penitus habet naturam et esse a generibus entis, quae sunt determinata" (In Metaph., 266a)
42. "[...] alium ab inductis generibus habet modum entitatis, quia alia genera dicunt ens absolutum, et ideo essentiae eorum sunt constantes ex suis principiis absque principiis subjecti, in quo sunt, sicut quantitas et qualitas. Istud autem non habet entitatem aliquam talem, sed ipse subjecti respectus est sibi entitas" (In Metaph., 266b)
43. This translation of respectus is admittedly somewhat awkward, but it serves to bring out the precise visual metaphor implied by Albert's use of this expression. As Albert is using the term, a respectus is just that in virtue of which a subject "looks out toward" (respicit ad) another - namely, its outward-looking-ness. The significance of this visual metaphor will become apparent in section 6, where I argue that it helps to explain why Albert refuses to reduce relations to ordinary monadic properties
44. See, e. g., In Metaph., 267
45. "Generalissimum autem in huius praedicabilis coordinatione est ad aliquid, vel relativum, vel minus proprie, ut dicunt quidam, relatio: sed notandum quod nullo nomine ita expresse significatur generalissimum sicut per hoc quod est ad aliquid, quod est praepositio cum casuali: hoc enim duo importat quae sunt in relativo, diversitatem scilicet per transitionem quam notat praepositio, et terminationem comparationis quam notat casus accusativus, cum dicitur ad aliquid" (De praedic., 225b)
46. "[...] et quod hoc esse semper est in eo quod respicit ad aliquid, et non est essentia quaedam absolute designabilis proprie loquendo. Et ideo genus huius entis proprie relativum est, et minus proprie relatio vocatur et convenientissime vocatur ad aliquid, quia hoc oppositum modum habet ad absolutum" (In Metaph., 267a)
47. Cf. De praedic., 241b ad 1
48. Cf. In Metaph., 266b
49. De praedic., 226a-226b
50. In Metaph., 266b. It is usually thought that there was no term in ancient Greek corresponding to the abstract word "relation"
51. (See, e. g., J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963], 78 and 98.) According to Albert, however, Plato invented the term "toward something" for the sake of avoiding the misleading connotations of "relation" and "relative", both of which he suggests were in common use at the time. Albert appeals here to the authority of Porphyry and Alexander, but unfortunately he does not refer to any specific texts
52. See De praedic., 226a
53. The Principles of Mathematics, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), sect. 94
54. The Problems of Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1984),126-7
55. Strictly speaking, this suggestion needs to be qualified so as to apply only to those relations that are sui generis monadic properties. Cf. note 3 above
56. See note 36 above
57. See the accompanying diagram in the appendix
58. According to Sellars, all talk about properties, whether monadic or polyadic, is metalinguistic - that is, a disguised way of talking about linguistic expressions. See Willfrid Sellars, "Abstract Entities", Review of Metaphysics (1963), 627-71
59. Strictly speaking, what I am here calling "Pure Conceptualism" should be called "Pure Moderate Conceptualism" and distinguished from "Pure Radical Conceptualism". See note 11 above. However, since no medieval philosopher I know of ever endorsed Radical Conceptualism, I do not take account of it in my taxonomy
60. In his Summa logicae, for example, Ockham says that nothing is to be placed in the category of relations except mental, spoken, and written terms. (See Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of Ockham's Summa Logicae, tr. Michael J. Loux, [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974], 158-77, esp. 171.) Although this certainly suggests a form of Impure Realism, it is clear from the text that when Ockham speaks of what is 'placed in the category (or genus) of relation' he is not speaking of the significata of all relational predicates, but only the significata of the term "relation" (and the other names for this category, namely, "relative" and "toward something"). Thus, although it is true that he thinks some relational predicates (namely, "relation", "relative", and "toward something") signify merely mental, spoken, and written terms, he nonetheless thinks that most others (such as "taller", "similar", etc.) signify things in extramental reality
61. See Mark G. Henninger, Relations:Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), esp. 174-86
62. I presented earlier versions of this paper at Calvin College, Cornell University, Loyola University of Chicago, and Purdue University. I am grateful to audiences on these occasions for useful comments and discussion. I am also grateful to Susan Brower-Toland