Optimal bidding for tender offers

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 323-342

  Khanna, Naveen ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750955705     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1997.tb00252.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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13. Israel, R., 1991, Capital structure and the market for corporate control: The defensive role of debt financing, Journal of Finance 46, 1391–1409.
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