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Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 95-119

Who gains from non-collusive corruption?

Author keywords

Corruption; Credit market imperfections; Development; Income inequality

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; ENTREPRENEUR; MACROECONOMICS;

EID: 33750948797     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.10.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (43)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.