"The problem of political and social stability in urban Russia on the eve of war and revolution" revisited

Slavic Review

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 848-875

  Haimson, Leopold H ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33750845333     PISSN: 00376779     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2697422     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917," Slavic Review, (part 1) 23, no. 4 (December 1964): 619-42,
2. and Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917," Slavic Review, ((part 2) 24, no. 1 (March 1965): 1-22. Decades of archival research have enabled me to collect additional evidence about the topics that I scrutinized, and this evidence has shed a new and different light on many of these topics. But just as important was the opportunity that these years afforded me of seeking to devise appropriate conceptual schemes by which to analyze the issues that this archival evidence raised. Obviously, my reflections in this regard were shaped in a process of interaction with Russian and western colleagues who shared similar interests and concerns about various aspects of the Russian prerevolutionary period.
3. See Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability," (part 2), 17.
4. For presentations and analyses of die quantitative data used on labor unrest among workers in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate during the prewar period, see the article by Leopold H. Haimson and Ronald Petrusha, "Two Strike Waves in Imperial Russia, 1905-1907, 1912-1914,"
5. and the introduction to part 2 by Haimson and Eric Brian, in Haimson and Tilly, eds., Strikes, War, and Revolutions, 101-66 and 35-46 of the same volume.
6. For comparable presentations and analyses of the quantitative data on labor unrest in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate during the years of World War I, see Leopold H. Haimson and Eric Brian, "Labor Unrest in Imperial Russia during the First World War: A Quantitative Analysis and Interpretation," in Haimson and Sapelli, eds., Strikes, Social Conflict and the First World War, 389-452.
7. For the data on labor unrest in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate up to the February revolution and our quantitative analyses of them, see Haimson and Brian, "Labor Unrest," 389-452.
8. See Heather Hogan's admirable monograph on the subject, Forging Revolution: Metalworkers, Managers, and the State in St. Petersburg, 1890-1914 (Bloomington, 1993).
9. See also Leopold H. Haimson, "Structural Processes of Change and Changing Patterns of Labor Unrest: The Case of the Metal-Processing Industry in Imperial Russia, 1890-1914," in Haimson and Tilly, eds., Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions, 380-401.
10. For a fuller comparison of these two censuses, see Leopold H. Haimson and Eric Brian, "Changements démographiques et grèves ouvrières, le cas de Saint-Pétersbourg à la veille de la Première Guerre Mondiale," Annales (Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations), no. 4 (July-August 1985).
11. For a further discussion of the findings of our quantitative analyses on the subject, see Haimson and Petrusha, "Two Strike Waves in Imperial Russia," 133-42.
12. See the discussions of the analysis conducted by Major General Ratnik of the various strata of the workforce employed at the Baltic shipyard after the turn of the century and of their attitudes and behavior during periods of labor unrest, including the strike at Baltic in May 1901 in Heather Hogan, "Scientific Management and the Changing Nature of Work in the St. Petersburg Metalworking Industry, 1900-1914,"
13. and Haimson, "Structural Processes," in Haimson and Tilly, eds., Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions, 356-401,
14. and Hogan, Forging Revolution.
15. The statistics recorded in this connection are impressive. The Gendarmerie reported that 41,000 workers, employed in 96 enterprises, participated in 1914 in the protest strikes in commemoration of the Lena Goldfield massacre, and 44,000 workers, employed in 104 enterprises, struck on May Day. Also recorded were detailed breakdowns of the number of participants in the sympathy strikes conducted by Riga's industrial workers in support of the St. Petersburg general strike of July 1914: 4,000 workers on July 7; 19,000 on July 8; and 38,000 on July 9. The report noted that on July 9 the participants in these protest strikes conducted revolutionary demonstrations-carrying red flags and singing revolutionary songs - before they were broken up by detachments of police and gendarmes. See Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. D.P. (D-4), d. 37, ch. 2 (1914).
16. The most interesting and candid reports of the strikes in the Baku oil fields that I examined were those I found in the local historical archives in Baku, including the archive of its Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. See Nauchnyi Arkhiv Instituta Istorii Azerbaidzhana, f. 1, op. 8, d. 4127 (1914). See also GARF, f. D.P. (D-4), d. 5, ch. 11 (1914, reports of the Gendarmerie on the strike in the Baku oil fields); f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 5, ch. 6 (reports on the activities of Social Democrats in Baku - including background information on the members of the original strike committee organized in the oil fields); and f. D.P. (O.O.), dd. 54-55 (Adjutant General Dzhunkovskii's recollections of his activities in the course of his mission to Baku).
17. See RGIA, f. 1276, op. 2, d. 179 (1914, discussions of the strike in the Council of Ministers).
18. See GARF, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 5, ch. 35 (1914); and f. D-4, d. 30 (1914).
19. See GARF, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 5, ch. 35 (1914); and f. D-4, d. 30 (1914).
20. See GARF, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 307 (June 1914); and f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 5, ch. 35 (1914); and f. D-4, d. 30 (1914).
21. For the discussions of the Chkheidze affair in the Council of Ministers, see RGIA, f. 1276, op. 10, d. 7 (1914).
22. See Padenie tsarskogo rezhima (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926), 5:199-200. (These volumes reproduced in printed form the records of the depositions to the extraordinary commission organized by the Provisional Government in 1917.)
23. See RGIA, f. 1276, op. 20, d. 68, 11. 160-65; and f. 1276, op. 9, d. 69, 11. 25-27. These intrigues are discussed extensively by V. S. Diakin in Krizis samodenhaviia v Rossii, 1895-1917 gg. (Leningrad, 1984), 525-27.
24. In January 1914, following Kokovtscv's replacement by that old roué Goremykin, it appeared that Maklakov's proposals might receive a more favorable hearing by the Council of Ministers. Indeed, rumors to this effect were widely circulated among the deputies of the State Duma. See GARF, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 307-a (1914).
25. See Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, 2:437-38,
26. and Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, 3:133-35.
27. For the rationale presented by the Council of Ministers for the declaration of this state of "extreme vigilance" in the capital, see RGIA, f. 1276, d. 125, 11. 37-38. A copy of the ukaz issued by the tsar to this effect is presented in 1. 39.
28. At the time, this appeared to be a clever decision that would avoid confrontation, but it would backfire badly, as we shall see, when the State Duma was called back into session late in the summer of 1915.
29. For Miliukov's presentation of his proposal regarding these new tactics of "declarative opposition" and the debates that it set off in the Kadet Party's Central Committee, beginning in the fall of 1912, and at the party's biannual conference during the spring of 1913, see GARF, f. 523, dd. 30 and 16.
30. Ibid.
31. See GARF, f. 115, op. 2, d. 836 (the text of Guchkov's speech presenting his platform at this conference and the texts of the resolutions adopted by the conference). Notably, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 47 (1913), provides an extensive presentation of Guchkov's speech and of the discussions held at this supposedly closed conference.
32. See GARF, f. 119, op. 2, d. 5; and f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 47 (fall 1913).
33. See GARF, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 307-a (1914).
34. For an almost verbatim presentation of the debates that unfolded over the radical proposals of the Left Kadets within the Kadet Central Committee (recorded as usual by the eminent historian, A. A. Kornilov, who was one of its members), see GARF, f. 523, d. 31 (1914). The debate on these issues at the biannual conference of the local organizations of the Kadet Party, which also unfolded in the spring of 1914, is recorded in GARF, f. 523, d. 17 (March 1914).
35. See GARF, f. 523, dd. 31 and 17.
36. See GARF, f. 63, op. 50, d. 49 (1914).
37. It is worth noting, however, that the workers in some of the industrial villages in Kostroma province wanted to launch a protest strike against the outbreak of the war but were dissuaded from doing so by their labor deputy, N. A. Shagov, who persuaded them to wait until the Social Democratic deputies in the State Duma had the opportunity to pronounce themselves on this issue. In fact, Shagov was animated at this moment by defensist sentiments. This did not keep the Department of Police from arresting and deporting him to Siberia, along with the other Bolshevik deputies, before the end of 1914.
38. For a presentation and analysis of the quantitative data recorded in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate from the outbreak of the war up to the February revolution of 1917, see Haimson and Brian, "Labor Unrest," 381-451.
39. To cite a few of the most impressive data in this regard: in the first half of 1916, 77.1 percent of the total number of participants in political strikes in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate in the country as a whole were metalworkers of the capital; in the second half of the year, metalworkers represented only a slightly lower 73.6 percent. In the first half of 1916 (the only year for which we could calculate these data), 59.8 percent of the total number of participants in political strikes recorded in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate in the country as a whole, were metalworkers employed in the Vyborg district; in the second half of 1916, this extraordinary concentration was reduced to 35.9 percent. These are truly extraordinary figures, when we consider that of the total number of workers employed at that time in enterprises under the Factory Inspectorate, the 30,000-odd metalworkers of the Vyborg district accounted for only 6.3 percent! For a further discussion of these quantitative data, see Haimson and Brian, "Labor Unrest," 402-21; the data on the Vyborg district are analyzed on 415-20.
40. For the presentation of these conflicting arguments in the protocols of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party, see GARF, f. 523, d. 32 (1915). This debate also unfolded at the biannual conference of the party's local organization held in the fall of 1915; see GARF, f. 523, d. 18 (1915).
41. See RGIA, f. 1276, op. 10, d. 1217 (1915).
42. The fullest and most authoritative presentation of this and other aspects of what would come to be known as the "ministerial crisis" of the summer of 1915 as well as of other aspects of the functioning of the Council of Ministers during the war (aside from the files of the council itself, deposited in RGIA, f. 1276) is to be found in the notes dictated by A. N. Iakhontov to his wife, during the war years, when he served as secretary to the council. An invaluable scholarly edition of these notes, which have been preserved in the Bakhmeteff archive of Columbia University, has been published recently by R. S. Ganelin, of the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, under the title, Sovet ministrov Rossiiskoi imperii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (zapiski zasedanii i perepiska) (St. Petersburg, 1999). Ganelin has also included in this edition the correspondence that Iakhontov conducted in the emigration, between 1922 and 1936, with former ministers and other officials of the tsarist government about the character and causes of the downfall of the tsarist regime.
43. For the most authoritative treatment of Witte's initiative in transforming the Council of Ministers into a system of "united government," see B. B. Anan'ich and R. Sh. Ganelin, Sergei Nikolaevich Vitte i ego vremia (St. Petersburg, 1999), pt. 4: 231.
44. It is indicative of the importance the government attached to Purishkevich's speech that it included a copy of the text in the files of the Council of Ministers. See RGIA, f. 1276, op. 10, d. 7, 11. 375-81.
45. The most informative and authoritative account of the involvement of the grand dukes of the imperial family in the successful efforts to protect Iusupov and his fellow conspirators in Rasputin's assassination from retribution, as well as other aspects of the attitudes that these members of the imperial family displayed during the years leading up to the downfall of the tsarist regime, is to be found in the letters addressed by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to the French academician Frédéric Masson, which were published by the Bibliothèque Slave de Paris, where they were deposited after Masson's death, under the title Grand-Duc Nicolas Mikhailovitch, la fin du tsarisme: Lettres inédites à Frédéric Masson (1914-1918) (Paris, 1968). The ties between the grand duke and Masson, a member of the French Academy, had originated on the basis of their common interest in the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte! After the beginning of the war, however, the letters of the grand duke, which were uncensored as they were sent via the French diplomatic pouch, gave the grand duke the opportunity to communicate to Masson in the most candid manner political information and impressions about political developments in Russia.
46. See, among others, V. S. Diakin, Russkaia burzhuaziia i tsarizm v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914-1917) (Leningrad, 1967);
47. and Lewis Siegelbaum's The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914-1917: A Study of the War-Industries Committees (New York, 1983).
48. For a fuller discussion of the evolving attitudes of the leaders of the CWIC and of the members of its Labor Group during these months, see RGIA, f. 1546, op. 1, d. 22 (1916).
49. See GARF, f. D.P. (O.O.), d. 307-a; and f. 111 (O.O.), d. 658 (1917).
50. A somewhat fuller discussion is provided in Haimson and Brian, "Labor Unrest," 421.
51. have also published the following articles on the various topics addressed in this essay in Russian: "Rossiiskoe rabochee dvizhenie nakanune Pervoi Mirovoi Voiny," in Rabochii klass kapitalisticheskoi Rossii (Moscow, 1992);
52. "Opyt matematiko-statisticheskogo issledovaniia dannykh svodov otchetov fabrichnoi inspektsii o stachkakh rabochikh v Rossii v 1912-14 gg.," in Matematicheskie metody i EVM v istoricheskikh issledovaniiakh: Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1985);
53. "Rabochee dvizhenie i istoricheskoe proiskhozhdenie i kharakter Fevral'skoi revoliutsii 1917 g.," in Reformy ili revoliutsii: Rossiia 1861-1917: Materialy mezhdunarodnogo kollokviuma istorikov (St. Petersburg, 1992);
54. "Istoricheskie korni Fevral'skoi revoliutsii," in Anatomiia revoliutsii, 1917 god v Rossii: Massy, partit, vlast' (St. Petersburg, 1994);
55. "K voprosu o politicheskoi i sotsial'noi identifikatsii rabochikh Rossii v kontse XIX-nachale XX v.: Rol' obshchestvennykh predstavlenii v otnosheniiakh uchastnikov rabochego dvizheniia s sotsial-demokraticheskoi intelligentsiei," in Rabochie i intelligentsiia Rossii v epokhu reform i revoliutsii (1861-fevral' 1917) (St. Petersburg, 1997);
56. "Razvitie politicheskogo i sotsial'nogo krizisa v Rossii v period ot kanuna Pervoi Mirovoi voiny do Fevral'skoi revoliutsii," in Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma (St. Petersburg, 1999);
57. "Politicheskii i sotsial'nyi krizis v Rossii," in Rossiia XXI, nos. 9-10 (1998);
58. and in Otechestvennaia istorii (Fall 1998).
59. Finally, see "Men'sheviki i bol'sheviki v oktiabr'skie dni 1917 g." Akademiia nauk, istitut rossiiskoi istorii: Sbornik statei v chest' A. A. Fursenko (St. Petersburg, 2000), 310-21.