International public goods and agency problems in treaty organizations

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 319-336

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency problems; Effectiveness of treaty organizations; Environmental treaties; GEF; Globalization of politics; International organizations; Political economy; Public choice; Treaty organizations

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750810902     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-0236-4     Document Type: Article

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