On negligence rules and self-selection

Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 349-361

  Miceli, Thomas J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750798350     PISSN: 15555879     EISSN: 15555879     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1085     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Bar-Gill, Oren, and Omri Ben-Shahar. 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," 5 American Law and Economics Review 433-469.
2. Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. Brown, John. 1973. "Towards an Economic Theory of Liability," 2 Journal of Legal Studies 323-349.
4. Cooper, Russell. 1984. "On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection," 15 Rand Journal of Economics 568-577.
5. Grady, Mark. 1983. "A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence," 92 Yale Law Journal 799-829.
6. Kahan, Marcel. 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," 18 Journal of Legal Studies 427-447.
7. Keeton, W. Page, Dan Dobbs, Robert Keeton, and David Owen. 1984. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.
8. Landes, William, and Richard Posner. 1987. The Economic Structure of Tort Law. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
9. Rubinfeld, Daniel. 1987. "The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence," 16 Journal of Legal Studies 375-394.
10. Schwartz, Warren. 1998. "Legal Standards of Care," in Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics of the Law. New York: Stockton Press.
11. Shavell, Steven. 1987. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.