Being realistic: Why physicalism may entail panexperientialism

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 10-11, 2006, Pages 40-52

  Coleman, Sam ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750728898     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Coleman, S. (2006), In Spaceships They Won't Understand: The Knowledge Argument, Past, Present and Future (PhD Thesis, University of London).
2. Coleman, S. and Willemarck, F. (forthcoming), 'How many positions on the mind/body problem?'.
3. Loar, B. (1997), 'Phenomenal states (revised version)', in The Nature of Consciousness, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).
4. Nagel, T. (1986), The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press).
5. Papineau, D. (2002), Thinking About Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
6. Russell, B. (1927), The Analysis of Matter (London: Routledge).
7. Strawson, G. (2006), 'Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13 (10-11), pp. 3-31.