Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: A mechanism design model

Management Science

Volumn 52, Issue 11, 2006, Pages 1647-1660

  Su, Xuanming ^a   Zenios, Stefanos A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Achievable regions; Efficiency equity trade off; Fluid queues; Hidden information; Kidney allocation; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ACHIEVABLE REGIONS; FLUID QUEUES; HIDDEN INFORMATION; KIDNEY ALLOCATION; MECHANISM DESIGN;

BIOLOGICAL ORGANS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

QUEUEING THEORY;

EID: 33750704591     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0541     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Ahn, J., J. C. Hornberger. 1996. Involving patients in the cadaveric kidney transplant allocation process: A decision-theoretic perspective. Management Sci. 42 629-641.
2. Bryan, C. F., K. M. Harrell, S. I. Mitchell, B. A. Warady, M. I. Aeder, A. M. Luger, D. Murillo, N. A. Muruve, P. W. Nelson, C. F. Shield III. 2003. HLA points assigned in cadaveric kidney allocation should be revisited: An analysis of HLA Class II molecularly typed patients and donors. Amer. J. Transplantation 3 459-464.
3. Cox, D. R., D. Oakes. 1984. Analysis of Survival Data. Chapman and Hall, London, UK.
4. David, I., U. Yechiali. 1990. Sequential assignment match processes with arrivals of candidates and offers. Probab. Engrg. Inform. Sci. 4 413-430.
5. Delmonico, F. L., P. E. Morrissey, G. S. Lipkowitz, J. S. Stoff, J. Himmelfarb, W. Harmon, M. Pavlakis, H. Mah, J. Goguen, R. Luskin, E. Milford, G. Basadona, M. Chobanian, B. Bouthot, M. Lorber, R. J. Rohrer. 2004. Donor kidney exchanges. Amer. J. Transplantation 4 1628-1634.
6. de Wit, G. A., M. P. Merkus, R. T. Krediet, F. T. de Charro. 2002. Health profiles and health preferences of dialysis patients. Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation 17 86-92.
7. Edmonds, J. 1970. Submodular functions, matroids and certain polyhedra. Proc. Internat. Conf. Combinatorics (Calgary). Gordon and Breach, New York, 69-87.
8. Federgruen, A., H. Groenevelt. 1988. Characterization and optimization of achievable performance in queueing systems. Oper. Res. 36 733-741.
9. Fritsche, L., J. Hörstrup, K. Budde, P. Reinke, M. Giessing, S. Tullius, S. Loening, P. Neuhaus, H. Neumayer, U. Frei. 2003. Old-for-old kidney allocation allows successful expansion of the donor and recipient pool. Amer, J. Transplantation 3 1434-1439.
10. Groves, T. 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41(4) 617-631.
11. Hart, O. 1983. Optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information: An introduction. Rev. Econom. Stud. 50 3-35.
12. Howard, D. H. 2002. Why do transplant surgeons turn down organs? A model of the accept/reject decision. J. Health Econom. 21 957-969.
13. Israel, D., U. Yechiali. 1985. A time-dependent stopping problem with application to live organ transplants. Oper. Res. 33 491-504.
14. Maskin, E., J. Riley. 1984. Monopoly with incomplete information. RAND J. Econom. 15 171-196.
15. Mirrlees, J. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 38 175-208.
16. Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
17. Rockafellar, R. T. 1970. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
18. Rochet, J.-C, P. Chone. 1998. Ironing, sweeping, and multidimensional screening. Econometrica 66(4) 783-826.
19. Ross, L. F., X. Su, J. R. Thistlethwaite, S. Zenios. Shared decision making in deceased donor transplantation. Working paper, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
20. Roth, A. E., S. Tayfun, M. S. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quart. J. Econom. 119(2) 457-188.
21. Schnitzler, M. A., J. F. Whiting, D. C. Brennan, G. Lin, W. Chapman, J. Lowell, S. Boxerman, K. L. Hardinger, Z. Kalo. 2003. The expanded criteria donor dilemma in cadaveric renal transplantation. Transplantation 75(12) 1940-1945.
22. Shanthikumar, J. G., D. D. Yao. 1992. Multiclass queueing systems: Polymatroidal structure and optimal scheduling control. Oper. Res. 40 S293-S299.
23. Su, X. 2004. Essays on patient choice. Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
24. Su, X., S. A. Zenios. 2004. Patient choice in kidney allocation: The role of the queueing discipline. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 6(4) 280-301.
25. Su, X., S. A. Zenios. 2005. Patient choice in kidney allocation: A sequential stochastic assignment model. Oper. Res. 53(3) 443-455.
26. Su, X., S. A. Zenios, G. M. Chertow. 2004a. Incorporating recipient choice in kidney transplantation. J. Amer. Soc. Nephrology 4 1501-1508.
27. Su, X., S. A. Zenios, H. Chakkera, E. L. Milford, G. M. Chertow. 2004b. Diminishing significance of immunologic risk factors in kidney transplantation. Amer. J. Transplantation 48 549-569.
28. UNOS. 1997. Report on center-specific organ acceptance rates. Richmond, VA.
29. UNOS. 2004. United Network for organ sharing. Retrieved December 1, 2004, http://www.unos.org.
30. USRDS. 2004. Annual data report: Atlas of end-stage renal disease in the United States. National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, Bethesda, MD.
31. Votruba, M. 2002. Efficiency-equity tradeoffs in the allocation of cadaveric kidneys. Working paper, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
32. Whiting, J. F., R. S. Woodward, E. Y. Zavala, D. S. Cohen, J. E. Martin, G. G. Singer, J. A. Lowell, M. R. First, D. C. Brennan, M. A. Schnitzler. 2000. Economic cost of expanded criteria donors in cadaveric renal transplantation: Analysis of Medicare payments. Transplantation 70 755-760.
33. Zenios, S. A. 1999. Modeling the transplant waiting list: A queueing model with reneging. Queueing Systems 31 239-251.
34. Zenios, S. A., G. M. Chertow, L. M. Wein. 2000. Dynamic allocation of kidneys to candidates on the transplant waiting list. Oper. Res. 48 549-569.