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Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 245-251

Incentive oriented reimbursement of hospitals with a prospective payment system;Anreizorientierte krankenhausvergütung mit fallpauschalen

Author keywords

Agency theory; Hospital reimbursement; Prospective payment system; Quality of treatment; Risk selection

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HOSPITAL COST; HUMAN; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT; REIMBURSEMENT; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 33750620062     PISSN: 14322625     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1055/s-2006-926700     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (3)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.