The French path to jihad

Policy Review

Volumn , Issue 139, 2006, Pages 39-59

  Rosenthal, John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33750555091     PISSN: 01465945     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (20)

1. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Quand Al-Q-Sep-aida parle: Témoignages derrière les barreaux (Grasset, 2006), 136-137. Ail translations from the French are the author's.
2. Trial Transcript, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (February 14, 2006).
3. Trial Transcript, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (April 13, 2006).
4. Khosrokhavar presents the four supplementary interviews under the heading "French Islamists." This heading is, however, doubly misleading. On the one hand, although they all express approval for jihad, the relationship to Islam of three of the four inmates in question is more or less casual or even superficial. Only the convert practices a rigorist form of Islam, and only he clearly merits the designation "Islamist." On the other hand, and more important for our purposes, several of the other ten "al Qaeda" interviewees also have French citizenship, and some appear to have been born in France. They too, then, are French Islamists. Moreover, for the reasons just outlined in the main text, even if they have not acquired citizenship, still other of the suspected al Qaeda could also be reasonably described as such.
5. Thus Qaradawi: "Allah willing, Islam will return to Europe and the Europeans will convert to Islam. They will then be in a position to propagate Islam throughout the world, in a better position than us, the old Muslims." Al Jazeera (November 30, 2.000). Cited from Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran: Tariq Ramadan et les Frères musulmans à lu conquête de l'Europe (Éditions du Rocher, 2005), 205. For other citations from Qaradawi and Ramadan in the same vein, see chapter 12 of Landau's study.
6. See, for instance, "Les djihadistes de banlieues s'apprêtaient à partir en Irak," Le Figaro (September 20, 2005),
7. and "L'isolement de Peter Cherif," Le Monde (February 14, 2006).
8. Much of the established media, following the lead of Moussaoui's court-appointed attorneys - and in perfect harmony with Osama Bin Laden -has attempted to minimize Moussaoui's role in the 9/11 plot. It has been suggested, in particular, that Moussaoui lied when he claimed under oath that he had been assigned to fly a plane into the White House on 9/1 r : a lie that is supposed to have been an expression of his desire to die a martyr's death in the electric chair. But during his testimony, Moussaoui made clear that he considered himself to be testifying under an Islamic oath and that while it would be permissible to lie in order to further the cause of jihad - i.e., to gain a tactical advantage - it would not be permissible to lie under such circumstances merely for vanity's sake. See Trial Transcript, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (April 13, 2.006). Furthermore, from the beginning of court proceedings in 2002., Moussaoui left no doubt that he considered that he can still be of use to the jihad by staying alive and that he was committed, in his own words, to "saving his life."
9. Hearing Transcript, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (April 22, 2002).
10. Abd Samad Moussaoui and Florence Bouquillat, Zacarias Moussaoui, mon frère (Éditions Denoël, 2002), 76, 94.
11. In a helpful glossary of Arabic terms that is appended to his volume, Khosrokhavar explains that this term is often applied to Shiites.
12. Khosrokhavar's own commentary on his interview with Ahsen suggests much the same conclusion. Thus, he notes that in Islamic tradition "each believer did not consider himself to be the direct interpreter of the Quranic text," and he warns against "the dangers of radicalization tied to a literal interpretation of the text that is not placed within a corpus where the common sense or wisdom of generations would have provided moderating influences" (82).
13. Hearing Transcript, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (April 22, 2002).
14. The irrational, ideologically driven character of such identification is especially obvious with respect to the Corsican nationalists. Official statistics show incidents of anti-Arab racism to be far more widespread in Corsica than anywhere else in France. Corsican nationalist groups frequently claim responsibility for the incidents, including physical attacks against both persons and property.
15. Le Figaro (January 27, 2005). I have made available a dossier of materials on the Al-Dura/France 2 affair, including extensive translations from the relevant French sources, on the Transatlantic Intelligencer website at http://www.trans-int.com/news/categories/I 5-Al-DuraFrance2-Affair.
16. See also, Richard Landes's "The Second Draft" website (http://www.seconddraft.org/), which is largely dedicated to the affair and makes available a large selection of raw footage shot by other film crews at Netzarim Junction on September 30, 2000.
17. Trial Transcript, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (April 13, 2006).
18. For a detailed discussion of cognate anti-American phantasms in the French press just before and in the aftermath of 9/11, see my "The Myth of 'Squandered Sympathy'," Opinion Journal (October 14, 2004).
19. It should be kept in mind in this connection, however, that among the European nations the role played by Germany in the development of Islamic radicalism represents a special case. This is notably so in light of the direct support that Nazi Germany provided to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements in the 19305 and 19405. See, for instance, Matthias Kũntzel, "National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World," Jewish Political Studies Review 17:1-2. (Spring 2005).
20. Bin Laden's "Letter to America," Observer (November 14, 2002).