Subsidiarity, federalism and the best constitution: Thomas aquinas on city, province and empire

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 161-228

  Aroney, Nicholas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

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EID: 33750510056     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10982-006-0005-9     Document Type: Article

References (545)

1. Andreas Fllesdal, 'Survey Article: Subsidiarity', Journal of Political Philosophy 6(2) (1998): 190.
2. Neil MacCormick, 'Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth"', Law and Philosophy 16(4) (1997): 331.
3. Gráinne de Búrca, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor', Journal of Common Market Studies 36(2) (1998): 217;
4. Derrick Wyatt, 'Subsidiarity: Is It Too Vague to be Effective As A Legal Principle?', in Kalypso Nicolaidis and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), Whose Europe? National Models and the Constitution of the European Union (European Studies, Oxford University, 2003).
5. Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Preamble.
6. Treaty establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version), Art. 5;
7. Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Preamble, Art. 2.
8. See also Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), Art. 9.
9. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (1997).
10. Compare Marlene Wind, Sovereignty and European Integration: Towards a Post-Hohbesian Order (London, 2001)
11. and Thomas Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999).
12. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (May 1, 1991), paras 13, 48.
13. See, in particular, Russell Hittinger, 'Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine', Annales Theologici 16 (2002): 385;
14. Kenneth Grasso, 'The Subsidiary State: Society, the State and the Principle of Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Thought', in Jeanne Heffernan (ed.), Christianity and Civil Society: Catholic and Neo-Calvinixt Perspectives (Lanham: Lexington Books, forthcoming).
15. Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1891), paras 12-14;
16. Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (May 15, 1931), paras 78-80;
17. Centesimus Annus, para 48.
18. Chantal Millon-Delsol, L'Etat Subsidiaire (Paris: Presses Universtaires de France, 1992), chapters 1, 3.
19. Federalism, long an underlying theme, has recently re-emerged very prominently in the debate over the nature and future of the European Union. See Joschka Fischer, "From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration', Speech at Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000 and the discussion in C. Joerges, Y. Mény, and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity?: Responses to Joschka Fischer (Florence, 2000).
20. See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 35.
21. Elazar considered the principle of subsidiarity to be an attempt to 'moderate' the 'pronounced hierarchical tendencies' of Catholic social theory: see Daniel J. Elazar, 'The United States and the European Union: Models for Their Epochs' in Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 42, 45.
22. See also Paul J. Weithman, 'Complementarity and Equality in the Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas', Theological Studies 59(2) (1998): 277.
23. Samuel Beer, 'The Rule of the Wise and Holy: Hierarchy in the Thomistic System'. Political Theory 14(3) (1986): 391, 394.
24. See, also, Samuel Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1993), chapter 1.
25. Beer, 'Rule of the Wise and Holy', 395-398.
26. Beer, 'Rule of the Wise and Holy', 398-402.
27. Beer, 'Rule of the Wise and Holy', 400, 402-406.
28. Beer, 'Rule of the Wise and Holy', 407-411.
29. Beer, 'Rule of the Wise and Holy', 417-418.
30. For a brief but trenchant criticism of Beer's arguments, see Brian Tierney, 'Hierarchy, Consent, and the "Western Tradition'", Political Theory 15(4) (1987): 646.
31. For a wide-ranging account of the theological, legal, social and philosophical context in which Aquinas worked, see Thomas Gilby, The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), chapters I-1V.
32. For the argument that Aquinas was considerably motivated by contemporary practical politics, see Jeremy Catto, 'Ideas and Experience in the Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas', Past and Present 71 (1976): 3.
33. Fora contrary view, see John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-3.
34. Johannes Althusius, Politica methodice digesta at que exemplis sacris & profanes illustrata (3rd edn. Herborn, 1614).
35. For a translation, see Frederick Carney (trans.), Politica: An Abridged Translation (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995).
36. According to Carl Friedrich, it was when Althusius 'transformed' the medieval idea of a 'feudal hierarchy of successive levels of lords and vassals' into a thoroughly covenantal and federal model, that a truly modern, federal theory of politics emerged. See Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 12.
37. See Part IV below.
38. See text at notes 153-154 below.
39. Compare Etienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 11-22;
40. Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy: Volume II: Augustine to Scotus (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1985), pp. 306, 322-323;
41. Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, E.I. Watkin (trans.), (New York: Sheed & Ward, n.d.), pp. 98-99;
42. Thomas Gilby, Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), pp. 22-33;
43. Finnis, Aquinas, pp. 10-14, 294-298, 320-331.
44. See also Leo XIII, Æterni Patris (August 4, 1879), para. 18;
45. Paul VI, Lumen Ecclesiae (November 20, 1974), para. 8;
46. John Paul II, Fides et ratio (September 14, 1998), para. 43.
47. On the noetic effects of sin, however, see Russell Hittinger. The First Grace: Rediscovering The Natural Law in a Post-Christian World (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), pp. 10-11.
48. Among them, Siger of Brabant (c 1240-1281/4), against whose views Aquinas wrote De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (1270).
49. On Averroës' actual teaching, however, see Richard C. Taylor, "'Truth Does Not Contradict Truth": Averroës and the Unity of Truth', Topoi 19 (2000): 3.
50. Summa contra Gentiles (1259-1265) ['5HF], 1.9.1:
51. This truth of things divine I do not call twofold on the part of God, who is one simple Truth, but on the part of our knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine things.' I have here used Joseph Rickaby (ed.), Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (with Some Abridgement) of the Summa contra Gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas (London: Burns and Oates, 1905) and
52. consulted P. Marc, C. Pera, and P. Caramello (eds.), Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Errores Infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles,
53. in the 'Leonine Edition' of Aquinas's works: Opera Onmia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici ['Opera'], t. 2-3 (Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1961).
54. ScG, 1.3.2, 4: 'Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason. ... There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason, and other points that altogether transcend the power of human reason.
55. See ScG, 1.7.3, where Aquinas refers to the "knowledge of principles naturally known' which are "put into us by God' and compares them to those things divinely revealed in the books of the Old and New Testament. Implicit in Aquinas's reasoning is the important distinction between what is first in the order of being, and what is first in the order of human cognition.
56. ScG, 2.4.1.
57. Aquinas explains that philosophy begins with 'creatures in themselves' and from them progresses to 'the knowledge of God', whereas the 'system of faith' begins with God and progresses to the knowledge of creatures 'in relation to God': ScG, 2.4.2.
58. ScG, 2.4.1, 5.
59. For translations of Aquinas's political and legal writings generally, see A.P. D'Entreves (ed.), Thomas Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, translated by J.G. Dawson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959);
60. R.J. Regan and W.P. Baumgarth (eds.), St. Thomas Aquinas: On Amy, Morality and Politics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988);
61. R.W. Dyson (ed.), Aquinas: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
62. and Dino Bigongiari (ed.), The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas: Representative Selections (New York: Hafner, 1953).
63. Politics, I.1, 1252a.
64. have here used Stephen Everson (ed.), Aristotle: The Politics and The Constitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
65. and consulted W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887, rep. 1950).
66. The fact that Aristotle referred specifically to the polis, and Aquinas refers interchangeably to the civitas, regnum and provincia, is a matter taken up below.
67. Sententia Libri Ethicorum (1271-1272) ['Eth.'].
68. have used C.I. Litzinger, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993)
69. and consulted Sententia Libri Ethicorum, in Opera, t. 47 (Romae: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971).
70. Eth., I.2.13 [31].
71. Eth., 1.2.13 [31].
72. See, e.g., ScG, 3.17,
73. and compare Edgar Scully, 'The Place of the State in Society According to Aquinas', The Thomist 45 (1981): 407, 415.
74. On the status of religion and philosophy in Aristotle, compare Robert Bartlett, 'Aristotle's Science of the Best Regime', American Political Science Review 88(1) (1994): 143
75. and Mary Nichols, 'Aristotle's Science of the Best Regime', American Political Science Review 89(1) (1995): 152.
76. j9 Scriptum super Sententiis (1253-1257) ['Sent.'].
77. have used the translation in Michael Molloy, Civil Authority in Medieval Philosophy: Lombard, Aquinas and Bonaventura (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985),
78. and consulted Commentum in quartum librum Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera, t. 7/2 (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1858).
79. Sent., 11.44 ex. ad 4.
80. Curiously, Aquinas adds that this distinction does not apply where 'the spiritual and temporal power are identified in one person as in the Pope, whose power is supreme in matters both temporal and spiritual'. A possible interpretation is that Aquinas has in mind those territories in central Italy where the Pope was both supreme pontiff and temporal lord as a matter of positive law. However, Aquinas specifically relates the power of the Pope to the dispensation of Jesus Christ who is both priest and king: 'a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech' and 'King of kings in Lord of lords'. Compare I. T. Eschmann, 'St. Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers', Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958): 107;
81. Leonard Boyle, 'The De Regno and the Two Powers' in J. Reginald O'Donnell (ed.), Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 237-247;
82. Brian Tierney, 'Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Ideal Constitution', Proceedings of the PMR Conference 4 (1979): 1;
83. Finnis, Aquinas, 324.
84. Summa Theologiae (1265-1268, 1271-1273) ['ST'].
85. have relied principally on the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns & Oates, 1947-1948) and the Blackfriars translation (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964-1976), and have consulted Summae Theologiae, in Opera, t. 4-12 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta SC de Propaganda Fide, 1888-1906).
86. ST, I-II, 98.1.
87. Temporal and spiritual jurisdiction is also discussed, e.g., in ST, I-II, 105.1, 108.2; II-II, 10.9, 42.1, 60.6, 99.4, 147.3, 186.3.
88. See, generally, Finnis, Aquinas, chapter 7.
89. De Regno ad regem Cypri (c. 1265) ['De Regno'].
90. have used James Blythe (trans.), On the Government of Rulers: De Regimine Principum: Ptolemy of Lucca With Portions Attributed to Thomas Aquinas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997)
91. and consulted Gerald Phelan and I. Th. Eschmann (trans.), On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949)
92. as well as the Latin edition in Opuscula philosophlca (Spiazzi, ed.) (2nd edn. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1954).
93. On the problems of authorship, structure and text, see the 'Introductions' by Blythe and Eschmann, as well as the references in Thomas Osborne, 'Dominium Regale et Politicum: Sir John Fortescue's Response to the Problem of Tyranny as presented by Thomas Aquinas and Ptolemy of Lucca' Mediaeval Studies 62 (2000): 161, 163, note 9.
94. De Regno, 1.16.2 [115].
95. Compare John Finnis, 'Public Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas' in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez (Washington. D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 1998);
96. Finnis. Aquinas. chapter 7;
97. A. S. McGrade, 'What Aquinas should have said? Finnis's Reconstruction of Social and Political Thomism'. American Journal of Jurisprudence 44 (1999): 125
98. and Lawrence Dewan, 'St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Common Good', The Thomist 64 (2000): 337.
99. Compare Aristotle's conception of the priesthood as merely one among the many offices needed in a political community: Politics, Bk. IV, 1299a3-19, 1322b18-29; Bk. VII, 1329a27-34.
100. See James Schall, The Uniqueness of the Political Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas', Perspectives in Political Science 26 (1997): 85.
101. See text at notes 84-86 below.
102. Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et Religionem, in Opera, t. 41 (Romae: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1970), ['Impugn.'], II.2, ad 9.
103. have here used John Proctor, An Apology for the Religious Orders (London: Sands & Co, 1902), 1.3, p. 94.
104. See Finnis, Aquinas, 226, note 31,
105. who points out that the church, like the state, is a community whose good exceeds the good of families and individuals. See, e.g., ST, II-II, 31.3 ad 3 (the common good of the church or the state [communis utilitas Ecclesiae vel reipublicae] may override the good of a family); 43.8 (the goods of the church and the state require special treatment compared to those of individuals).
106. But compare McGrade, 'What Aquinas should have said', 128.
107. Politics, I.I, 1252a30-31.
108. Sententia libri Politicorum (1269-1272) ['Pol.'].
109. have here used Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (eds.). Medieval Political Philosophy: A Source Book (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, New York, 1963), pp. 298-334
110. and consulted Sententia libri Politicorum, in Opera, t. 48 (Romae: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971).
111. On Aquinas's authorship of Books I, II and (part of) III of the Commentary, see Conor Martin, 'The Vulgate Text of Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Polities', Dominican Studies 5 (1952): 35.
112. Pol., pro. 3.
113. Pol., pro. 4.
114. Pol., pro. 7.
115. See likewise ST, II-II, 47.11;
116. Eth., 1.2.7-11 [25-29], VI.7.1-3 [1195-1197], X.I6.2 [2165].
117. On the architectonic arts generally, see ScG, 1.1.2;
118. Sententia super Physicam ['Phys.'], II.4.8 [173];
119. Sententia super Metaphysicam ['Meta.'], I.1.25 [25], I.2.15 [50], V.1. 10 [758].
120. have used Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath and W. Edmund Thirlkel (trans.), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics by St. Thomas Aquinas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963)
121. and John P. Rowan (trans.), Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (Chicago: Regnery, 1961).
122. See Eth., 1.2.13 [31] , discussed in the text at notes 34-38 above.
123. Compare Gilby, Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas. 229-230.
124. See Sent., II, 44.1.2, s.c.
125. Sent., II, 44.1.2, co.
126. Sent., II, 44.2.2, s.c.,
127. citing Romans 13:2.
128. Sent., II, 44.2.2, co. and ad 4, 5.
129. For a further discussion of resistance to tyranny, see the text at notes 177, 194-195 below. For an interpretation which emphasises the 'development' in Aquinas's thought on these questions, see Gilby, Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas. 90-106, 146-158,
130. but compare Finnis, Aquinas, 287-291.
131. See, further, ST, II-II, 42.2, 66.8 ad 3, 69.4, 104.6 ad 3;
132. Raphael Cai (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura, t. 1: Super Epistolam ad Romanos, (8th edn. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1953), 13.1.
133. Politics, I.1-2, 1252a18-22, 1252b10-18, 28-31.
134. As Aristotle later put it, the polis is a community of households and clans, and a union of clans and villages: Politics, III.9, 1280b34-5, 1280b40.
135. Politics, 1.2, 1252b12-13, 16-17, 28-31.
136. Politics, 1.2, 1253a. 18-29.
137. Politics, 1.2, 1253a2-3; III.6, 1278b19-20.
138. Thus in Eth., 1.9.10-11 [112-113], Aquinas says that Aristotle's treatment of man's natural sociability 'must be understood within limits' - that Aristotle's discussion only pertains to 'happiness as it is attainable in this life, for happiness in a future life is entirely beyond the investigation of reason'.
139. Compare Ernest Fortin, "St. Thomas Aquinas,' in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Philosophy (3rd edn. University of Chicago Press, 1987).
140. See, likewise. Gilby, Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 251-256;
141. and compare Fortin, 'St. Thomas Aquinas', 258;
142. Eschmann, 'St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent IV, 27-28, 40-42;
143. Eschmann, 'Thomistic Social Philosophy and the Theology of Original Sin', Medieval Studies 9 (1947): 19, 29-34.
144. Eth., I.1.5 [5].
145. See the discussion in Finnis, Aquinas, 24-25.
146. Ethics, I.1, 1094al-18.
147. It should be noted, however, that Aristotle begins the Politics with an analysis of the city-state understood as a 'whole' which is a 'compound' of 'parts': Politics, I.1, 1252a17-23.
148. The idea that households have operations that are independent of the state is afRrmed by Aristotle. See Politics, I.2, 1252b15-16, 27-30, 1253a15-18; II.2, 1261b6-15.
149. See, e.g., ST, I-II, 72.4;
150. Commentarium in Libros Perihermeneias (1270-1271), ['Peri.'], 1.2.2 [2].
151. Also 'social and political' in De Regno, I.1.3 [4]
152. and 'political or social' in ScG, III.85.11.
153. have here used Jean T. Oesterle (trans.), Aristotle on Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1962).
154. ?' See, e.g., ST, I, 96.4; I-II, 61.5, 95.4; II-II, 109.3, 114.2, 129.6, 188.8; III, 65.1;
155. ScG, III.117.4, 128.1, 129.5, 131.4, 147.2;
156. Eth., 1.1.4 [4]), VII.6.7 [1391];
157. De Regno, I.13.2 [94].
158. Pol., I.1.24, 26, 28 [32, 34, 36]; III.5 [387]).
159. See also Eth., I.9.10 [112], VIII.12 [1719-1720], IX.10.7 [1891]
160. (note: the translation in Litzinger at [1891] incorrectly gives 'social'); Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (1256-1259) ['De Veritate'], 12.3 arg. 11;
161. Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate (1257-1259), II.3.1 s.c. 3.
162. For the latter works, I have used Robert W. Mulligan, S. J., St. Thomas Auinas: Truth (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952)
163. and Armand Maurer (trans.), St. Thomas Aquinas: Faith, R Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius (Toronto, Ontario: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987).
164. See the references at notes 70-71 above.
165. E.g., ST, I-II, 72.4 ('political and social' animal); I-II, 95.4, II-II, 188.8 ('social' animal).
166. ST, I 96.4. Aquinas's argument is that human beings are naturally 'social', so that even before the fall they would have lived in "society", although they would not have been subject to 'political' coercion. Aquinas's tendency to refer to the 'social' nature of human beings may possibly reflect his endeavour to synthesise the Augustinian account of the origin of human dominion in original sin with the Aristotelian idea that politics is natural to humanity.
167. See, however, Sent., II, 44.1.3, where Aquinas distinguishes two modes of sovereignty (duplex est praelationis modus), one for guidance (ad regimen ordinales), the other for domination (ad dominandum). The former, he says, would have existed in the state of innocence, but the not the latter. For interpretations,
168. compare R. A. Markus, 'Two Conceptions of Political Authority: Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX. 14-15, and Some Thirteenth-Century Interpretations', Journal of Theological Studies, New Series 16 (1965): 68
169. and Paul J. Weithman, 'Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority', Journal of the History of Philosophy 30(3) (1992): 353.
170. Pol., 1.1.29 [37].
171. See also Eth., VIII.12.18 (1719-1720),
172. where the conjugal (conjugale) nature of human beings is said to be more fundamental than our political nature. It is true that Aristotle likewise compares the household to the polis. Both are forms of 'community' (koinonia), he says, and both are 'natural' (Politics, Bk. 1.1-2).
173. Aristotle also says that human beings are 'naturally inclined to form couples - even more than to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city': Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.12, 1162a17-19. However, Aristotle never actually defines humankind specifically as a 'domestic animal'; human nature, according to him, is definitively 'political'.
174. For an analysis of Aquinas's conception of the 'political and social animal', see Scully, 'The Place of the State in Society According to Aquinas'.
175. Compare Walter Ullmann's emphasis on the 'political' aspect of Aquinas's thought (A History of Political Thought, 175)
176. with Hannah Arendt's emphasis on the 'social' (The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), chapters 4-10).
177. For a critique of Ullmann's interpretation of Aquinas, see Francis Oakley, 'Celestial Hierarchies Revisited: Walter Ullmann's Vision of Medieval Polities', Past and Present 60 (1973): 3, 32-44.
178. For a critique of Arendt's interpretation of Aristotle (with implications for her interpretation of Aquinas), see Stephen Salkever, Finding the Mean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), chapter 4.
179. Gilby, Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 188-189,
180. contrasts Aquinas's respect for social groups with the 'well nigh all-inclusive' nature of Aristotle's polis, but suggests, at 214, that Aquinas's respect for the free association of social groups was Aristotelian in inspiration. Scully, 'The Place of the State in Society According to Aquinas,'
181. underscores the interdependence of the social and the political. Finnis, Aquinas, chapter VII,
182. limits the political to the provision of a specifically political common good, public and limited, strictly supplemental to the distinctive contribution to the common good provided by other social groups, such as families and private associations. Against this, Dewan, 'St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Common Good', 339, 357-361, argues for the primacy of the political. My point, simply, is that Aquinas placed greater emphasis on society than did Aristotle, as suggested by his repeated references to the 'social' nature of human beings.
183. Politics, I.1, 1252b28-30.
184. De Regno, 1.2.4 [14].
185. William of Moerbeke's translation of the Politics, which Aquinas uses, translated Aristotle's polis (city-state) as civitas, oikia (household) as damns or familias, and kôrnê (village) as viens. See Franciscus Susemihl (ed.). Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione guilelmi de moerbeke (Leipzig, 1872).
186. For the translation of the Ethics by Robert Grosseteste, as revised by an anonymous redactor, probably William of Moerbeke, see Carolus Zell (ed.), Ethicorum nichomacheorum libri decem, 2 vols (Heidelberg: Mohr and Winter, 1820).
187. Pol., I.1.3 [11], I.1.7-9 [15-17], I.1.23-25 [31-33], I.1.30-32 [38-40];
188. ST, I-II, 90.3 ad 3, II-II, 47.11, 50.1.
189. De Regno, 1.2.4 [14].
190. See Finnis, Aquinas, 52,
191. note f. For a list of medieval (and Thomistic) terms for various kinds of 'community', see I. Th. Eschmann, 'St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent IV Romana Ecclesia: Ceterum, Medieval Studies 8 (1946): 1, 9. They include: universitas, communitas, societas. consociatio, collegium, corpus, congregatio, collectio, multitudo, respublica, regnum, gens, populus, civitas, villa, viens, hurgum, castrum, castellum, familia, ecclesia, capitulum and inonasterium.
192. ST, I-II, 91.1, 21.4, 100.5;
193. ScG, I.42, 70 71, 78, 85 86, 93, 102, II.39, 42, III.64, 98.
194. Pol., I.1.3 [11].
195. Aquinas repeatedly refers to the 'falsity' of the equation of household and city, comparing this false view with the 'true relationship' of the household and the city: Pol., 1.1.7-9 [15-17].
196. However, see Quaestiones de qiiodlibet, II, 5.1 res., where Aquinas compares the authority of a father over a family and a king over a realm: 'Since obedience is due a superior, the duty of obedience is extended as far as his authority. Now a father of the flesh first has authority over a child with regard to domestic life, for the head of the family is related to the home as a king to a realm; hence just as the king's subjects are bound to obey him in those matters which pertain to the government of the realm, so are children and other domestic members bound to obey the head of the family in those matters which pertain to the management of the home.'
197. have here used Sandra Edwards (trans.), St. Thomas Aquinas: Quodlibetal Questions I and 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983)
198. and consulted Quaestiones quodlibetales (Spiazzi ed.) (9th edn. Taurino: Marietti, 1956).
199. Pol., I.1.23-5, 30-32 [31-3, 38-40]. Moreover, when expositing Aristotle's views relating to the superiority of the polis over the household, Aquinas does not hesitate to repeat the Aristotelian dictum that it is in politics that one must determine the instruction of children and women.
200. See Pol., I:11.6.
201. However, also to be considered is the discussion in Contra impugnantes, II.2, ad 10
202. (Proctor, Apology, I.3, p. 94),
203. where Aquinas affirms that education is a responsibility of the republic, but adds that for this reason within the church education must be subject to the authority of the Apostolic See. Compare, also. Quaestiones de quodlibetes, II, 5.1 res., affirming the authority of a father in respect of the moral education (morum disciplinant) of his children.
204. S T, I-II, 90-114.
205. ST, I-II, 90.3 ad 3. The translation of civitas as 'state' (or 'political community') seems to be warranted by the context, although in other contexts it is better translated 'city' in order to distinguish it from the 'province' (provincia) or 'kingdom' (regnum). See the text at notes 144-152 below.
206. ST, II-II, 47-122.
207. ST, II-II, 47.11; 50.1.
208. ST, II-II, 50.1.
209. ST, II-II, 50.1.
210. De Regna, I.2.4 [14].
211. De Regno, 1.2.4 [14].
212. Compare Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, Frederick Maitland (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 96: The polis or civitas ... was discovered by medieval Philosophy in a medieval town, and, by virtue of the ideal of the organic structure of the whole Human Race, the community of this polis or civitas was subordinated to a regnum and the to the Imperium ... Thus, no sooner has the medieval thinker given his definition [of the civitas], than he is withdrawing it without the slightest embarrassment: his superlative becomes a comparative, and the absolute becomes relative.'
213. In Contra Impugnantes, II.3, ad 6
214. (Proctor, Apology, 1.4, p. 128), Aquinas refers to "cities', 'villages' and "hamlets' (civitas, vieux, villis).
215. See Eschmann, On Kingship, 9, note 22;
216. Blythe, On the Government of Rulers, 64-65, note 19.
217. "[I]n one [vieux], the weaver's, in another the smith's', he says. See Pol., 1.1.23 [31].
218. See Antony Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present (London: Methuen, 1984),
219. interacting critically with Otto von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 1 (1868 repr.; Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1954).
220. See also Harold Herman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 390-92.
221. Moreover, craftsmen and merchants traded on the basis of a developing lex mercatoria, which had its origin in the practices and expectations of traders, and not simply in the positive laws of the cities and realms in which they lived. On the autonomy of the law of merchants, see Berman, Law and Revolution, 333-356.
222. Gerard Malynes, in the Preface to his Consuetudo vel Lex Mercatoria, or the Ancient Law Merchant (London, 1622) (quoted in Berman, 342), considered that the lex mercatoria 'is customary law approved by the authority of all kingdoms and commonweals, and not a law established by the sovereignty of any prince'.
223. Althusius, Politica methodice digesta, chapters IV-V.
224. See Black, Guilds and Civil Society, 132-142, who (at 132) describes Althusius's theory as 'perhaps the most substantial exposition of guild ideas ever known'.
225. See the discussion of the reforms of Cleisthenes in the Constitution of Athens (Everson, ed.), XX-XXII. In fact, the demes and phulai of Athens possessed significant powers of self-government. See David Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, 508/7-ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
226. See Black, Guilds and Civil Society, 76-85, who remarks at 84: '[P]hilosophers saw social personality only in terms of family and state, domesticity and formal politics. A whole range of actual socio-political life vanishes into the air whenever we look at a work of political theory. Was this gulf a price paid for the classical heritage?'
227. However, compare Martin, 'The Vulgate Text of Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Politics,' 62, who draws attention to Aquinas's familiarity with guild organisation and its impact on the Commentary on the Politics.
228. Impugn., II.2
229. (Proctor. Apology, 1.3).
230. Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.
231. Impugn., II.2, co
232. (Proctor, Apology, 1.3, p. 88).
233. Impugn., II.2, co
234. (Proctor, Apology, 1.3, p. 87).
235. Impugn., II.2, ad 1
236. (Proctor, Apology, 1.3, pp. 88-9).
237. Impugn., II.2, ad 2
238. (Proctor, Apology, 1.3, pp. 89-90).
239. Impugn., 11.2, ad 3
240. (Proctor, Apology, 1.3, p. 90).
241. Even though the idea of dual citizenship existed in classical Greece, Aristotle treats citizenship as an exclusive relationship between an individual and his city-state. See Politics, II.2, III.9
242. and compare J. A. O. Larsen, Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), xi.
243. More precisely, Aquinas represents Aristotle as holding this view: De Veritate, 5.3 co. While Aristotle certainly understood the Hellenic nation (for example) to be a much wider category than the individual city-state of Ancient Greece, he certainly did not elevate the good of the nation over and above the good of the city-state. See Ethics, I.2, 1094b7-11.
244. De Regno, I.14.5 [100].
245. See, likewise, ScG, II.15.4, where Aquinas compares the universal governance of a king within his kingdom to the subordinate role of the king's wardens within each city.
246. See, similarly, De Malo, I.1 res.: 'the ruler of a city intends a particular good which is the good of the city, but the king, who is his superior, intends a universal good, the peace of the whole kingdom'. I have here used Jean Oesterle (trans.), St. Thomas Aquinas: On Evil (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993)
247. and consulted the Latin edition in Quaestiones disputatae, t. 2 (Bazzi. et al., eds.) (9th edn. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1953).
248. SeG, III.98.1.
249. Compare ST, II-II, 50.3 arg., stating that the household is part of a city or kingdom, thus treating city and kingdom as interchangeable, rather than the city as a constituent element of the kingdom.
250. See also ST, I, 22.1 res., discussing the government of an individual, a family, a city or a kingdom.
251. De Regno, 1.2.4-6 [14-15] (civitax vel provinda, etc.).
252. For further references, see De Regno, 1.2.3 [12]; 1.3.1 [16]; 1.3.5 [20]; 1.4.8 [28].
253. See, e.g., De Regno, 1.10.1 [68], 1.14.2 [98], 1.15.1 [102], 1.16.5 [119], 11.1.1 [123] (civ it as vel regnum, etc.)
254. Compare C.N.S. Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato: His Position in the Political Thought of his Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1913), pp. 274-275: 'we find in Aquinas the view that the Provincia is a more perfect community, because more self-sufficient, than the Civitas, as the Civitas is more self-sufficient than the Vicus... [I]t was only a small step further to see the culmination of this hierarchy of States in a universal Imperium, the finally most self-sufficient and perfect community.'
255. On the nascent national kingdoms of the thirteenth century, see Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 44ff.
256. De Regno, 1.10.1 [68], 1.14.2 [98], 1.15.1 [102], 1.16.5 [119], II.1.1 [123];
257. ST, I-II, 96.5 res.
258. George Long, 'Provincia,' in William Smith (ed.), A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: John Murray. 1875).
259. See, e.g., Stabo, Geography, Horace L. Jones (trans.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1932), XVII.3.25;
260. Isidore, Etymologiae Isidori Hispalensis episcopi Etymologiaruni sive Originum, Libri XX, W.M. Lindsay (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), XIV.
261. See Gratian, Decretum, Dist. III, Pt. 2; Dist. XVII. Pt. 1, Ord. G1.; Dist. XII, c. 13, §3; Dist. XVII, Pt. 2, §2; Dist. XVIII, Pt. 1, Ord. Gl.
262. have here used Aemilius Friedberg (ed.), Decretum Magistri Gratiani in Corpus luris Canonici, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1879-1881)
263. and Augustine Thomson and James Gordley (eds.), The Treatise on Laws: Decretum Dist. 1-20, with the Ordinary Gloss (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1993).
264. Aquinas's familiarity with canon law is amply displayed, e.g., in Contra impugnantes, II.2-3
265. (Proctor, Apology, 1.3-4).
266. Eschmann, On Kingship, 10, note 23, observes that 'nothing is very definite about this notion except that... a province is part of a greater and more comprehensive whole'.
267. On the involvement of Aquinas's own family in the historical confrontations between emperor and pope of his day, see Finnis, Aquinas, 1-3
268. and, generally, Catto, 'Ideas and Experience in the Political Theory of Thomas Aquinas'.
269. Notably, Eschmann, 'Thomistic Social Philosophy', 49, argues that for Aquinas, the only genuinely universal human community is the ecclesia.
270. ST, I-II, 19.5, 96.5; II-II, 69.3, 104.5.
271. Compare De Regno, II.3.12 [112]. For other examples of Aquinas's occasional references to the emperor, see Scriptum super Sententiis, II, 44.4.4
272. (see Dyson, Aquinas, 277-278);
273. De Veritate, II.17.4;
274. Impugn., II.3, co.
275. (Proctor, Apology, I.4).
276. ST, I-II, 96.5 res.
277. See, e.g., ScG, I.102 and III.98.
278. ST, I-II, 91.1.
279. Compare the references in ST, I-II, 21.4 (totius communitatis universi)
280. and ST, I-II, 100.5 (communitatem seu republicam homi num sub Deo);
281. and see ST, I, 103.1-8,
282. ScG, I.42, 70-71, 78, 85-86, 93, 102, II.39, 42, III.64, 98; Mem., II.12.12 [2663].
283. See ST, I, 108.1-8 and 112.1-4, where Aquinas describes a graded hierarchy of angels, fulfilling the will of God.
284. ST, I, 108.1;
285. cf. Impugn., 11.3
286. (Proctor, Apology, 1.4).
287. Note, also, Eschmann, Thomistic Social Philosophy', 37-38, 46-48, who argues that Aquinas deliberately refrains from concluding that Adam was in any sense created 'king' or 'head' of the entire human race.
288. Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 20-21. Compare Dante, De Monarchia, (c. 1312), I:3ff., discussing the government of the household, village, city, kingdom and empire.
289. have here used Donald Nicholl (trans.), Monarchy, and Three Political Letters (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), pp. 10-11.
290. As James Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 46, puts it, there was a need to adjust a theory that presupposed a relative wide and direct political participation (Aristotle) to a context in which monarchical rule was the norm and representative institutions were typical.
291. See, likewise, Paul Vinogradoff, 'Feudalism,' in Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924), Vol. III, p. 458.
292. For the relevant documents, see Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964).
293. See also Gratian, Decretum, Dist. X, c. 1, Ord. Gl.
294. See Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 11;
295. Gaines Post, 'Roman Law and Early Representation in Spain and Italy, 1150-1250', in Studies in Medieval Legal Thought, Public Law and the State, 1100-1322 (Philadelphia: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 61-62.
296. See, e.g., Gratian, Decretum, Dist. I, c. 12, Ord. Gl.; Dist. XI, Pt. 1, Ord. Gl.; Dist. XI, c. 2, Ord. Gl.; Dist. XI, c. 8; Dist. XII, c. 3 and c. 11; Dist. XVIII, Pt. 1, Ord. Gl.
297. See Berman, Law and Revolution, 205-215.
298. Gerd Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twentieth Century, Timothy Reuter (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 309.
299. Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age. 20-21;
300. Frederick Maitland, Roman Canon Law in the Church of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898), pp. 101-105;
301. Finnis, 'Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas,' 196, note 10.
302. On corporate representation generally, see James Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London: Longman, 1955), pp. 106-108, 110
303. and Frederick Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 363.
304. Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 90.
305. See also Antony Black, Council and Commune: The Conciliar Movement and the Fifteenth Century Heritage (London: Burns & Gates, 1979), chapter 1.
306. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, 47, 176-7;
307. Brian Tierney, 'A Conciliar Theory of the Thirteenth Century,' Catholic Historical Review 36 (1951-52) 415, 429-431;
308. Post, 'Roman Law and Early Representation', 88-89;
309. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Vol. I, pp. 128-129.
310. On the rise of cities in northern Italy in the context of the empire and the Church, see Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, I, chapter 1.
311. See Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, 28-29, 42-43, 107-108, 122-123;
312. R.W. Carlyle and A.J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1903-1938), Vol. VI, p. 166;
313. R. M. Helmholz, The Spirit of Classical Canon Law (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996), chapter 2;
314. Charles Reid, "Roots of a Democratic Church Polity in the History of Canon Law', CLSA Proceedings 60 (1998): 150;
315. Walter Ullmann, Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 320-323;
316. Kenneth Pennington, 'Bishops and their Dioceses', Folia canonica 5 (2002): 7;
317. Gaines Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation, 1200-1246,' in Studies in Medieval Legal Thought.
318. For examples, see Third Lateran Council (1179), c. 1
319. and Gratian, Decretum, Dist. XVII, Pt. 3, Ord. Gl.
320. Post, 'Roman Law and Early Representation', 61.
321. See Tierney, 'A Conciliar Theory of the Thirteenth Century', 420-438;
322. Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, Pts. I and II.
323. For examples, see Gratian, Decretum, Dist. XI c. 9, Dist. XVII c. 6, Dist. XV c. 2, Dist. IX c. 9 and Dist. XXIV c. 6.
324. See. generally, Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957);
325. Berman, Law and Revolution, chapters 2 and 4;
326. Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought;
327. Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
328. For an example, see John of Salisbury, Policraticus (1159), V.2, 6, 9.
329. have used Cary Nederman (ed.), Policraticus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
330. See Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 96.
331. See Eschmann, On Kingship, 9, note 21.
332. Thus, either a city, a kingdom or a province can constitute a perfect community: De Regno, I.2.4 [14];
333. see also ST, I-II, 90.3 ad 3.
334. Finnis, Aquinas, 219-222.
335. Compare Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, 271, note 235,
336. and Post, 'Status, id est, Magistratus: L'Etat, c'est Moi', in Studies in Medieval Legal Thought, 345-348.
337. See Finnis, Aquinas, 219,
338. referring to ST I-II, 21.4 ad 3, 96.1, 100.2;
339. Eth. V.2.4 [903];
340. Pol. 1.1.3, 33 [11, 41], 11.8.6 [259], 111.6.5 [395].
341. In ST, I-II, 100.2, Aquinas distinguishes various kinds of 'community' [diversu modu coinmunitatum] - first as between cities ruled either by a king, by the people, or by a few powerful men - and in turn between the civil community [communitates civilis] and 'men ... in community with God' [homines ... ad comtnunicationem cum Deo].
342. See Black, Guilds and Civil Society, 81.
343. Pol., III.1.3, 8 [350, 355],
344. See Aristotle, Politics, III.1 1274b38, 1275b20.
345. Pol., III.2.6 [362].
346. As noted earlier, see, e.g., De Regno, 1.2.3 [12]; 1.2.6 [15]; 1.3.1 [16]; 1.3.5 [20]; II.1.1-2 [123-4].
347. But see, also, 5T, I-II, 96.5; II-II, 47.11; 50.1, 3;
348. Pol., 1.1.21 [29]; III.5.4 [387],
349. and compare ST, II-II, 40.1 res. (civitatis vel regni seu provinciae).
350. It is notable that Ptolemy of Lucca, De Regimine Principum (Blythe ed.), II.8.1; II. 10.1 and II.15.1, takes the progression even further, identifying 'a region, province, city or town', 'any association, province, city or town' and 'a kingdom, province, city or any other rule' as the objects of his inquires. The terminological progression in De Regno is in this respect interesting.
351. The expression "city or province' is first used as it were accidentally in De Regno, I.2.3 [12] when Aquinas is discussing the 'polity' or the virtuous rule of the many.
352. In earlier passages, he tends to use relatively generic terms such as 'community' (communitas) 'multitude' (multitudinis) and 'people' (populus) - but it is in a section soon following 1.2.3 [12] that Aquinas differentiates household, neighborhood, city and province (De Regno, I.2.4 [14]). It might be conjectured whether the Greek term 'polity' suggested a reference to the city (civitas), together with a felt need to add the term province (provincia). One might then wonder whether this conjunction of thoughts precipitated the idea of adapting the idea of Aristotelian self-suffciency to the medieval household, neighbourhood, city and province.
353. Georges de Lagarde, La naissance de l'espirit laïque au déclin du moyen age, Tome II: Secteur Social de la Scolastique (Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1958), p. 80. I wish to thank Jean-Marc Berthoud for this translation.
354. Charles Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West: From the Greeks to the End of the Middle Ages (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 330-336.
355. Compare Paul Sigmund, 'Law and Polities', in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
356. Gilby, Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 292-300.
357. Compare Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 314-316.
358. See also Lord Acton, 'The History of Freedom in Christianity', in The History of Freedom and Other Essays (London: Macmillan and Co, 1907), pp. 36-37;
359. Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 457, note 4.
360. ST, I-II, 95.4 res.
361. Pol., III.5.4 [387].
362. ST, I-II, 105.1 res.
363. De Regno, 1.3.1 [16]; cf. II. 1.1-2 [123-4].
364. Pol., III.5.7 [390].
365. Pol., III.6.3 [393].
366. On the transliteration of these Greek terms into the Latin of William of Morebeke and Aquinas, see Martin, "The Vulgate Text of Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Politics,'' 39-40, 50-52.
367. Pol., III.6.4 [394].
368. Although see Pol., II.7.4 [245], discussed at notes 179 and 208 below.
369. Pol., III.6.4 [394].
370. Pol., III.6.6-8 [396-398].
371. ScG, IV.76.4.
372. Politics, III.13, 1284a4-7, 1284b32-34; III.17, 1288a 15-29.
373. De Regno, I.1.1-7 [2-9].
374. Aquinas is attracted to the metaphor of a pilot directing a ship towards its harbour: De Regno, I.1 [2]; I.3.1-3 [17-18]; I.15.2-3 [103-104].
375. De Regno, I.3.1-3 [15-18].
376. De Regno, I.2.1-3 [10-13].
377. De Regno, I.4.1-2 [21-23].
378. De Regno, I.4.3 [24].
379. De Regno, I.4.4 [25]. Individuals, he suggests, will prevent and impede one another from pursuing their own ends.
380. De Regno, I.3.4 [19]; I.4.4 [25].
381. De Regno, I.6.1-2 [36-38].
382. See also Aquinas's treatment of Ulpian's famous text, 'the prince is not bound by the laws' (princeps legibus solutus est) in ST, I-II, 96.5 ad 3. Aquinas argues that while the prince is not subject to the coercive force of his own laws because there is no one to pass sentence upon him, he remains subject to its directive power, in line with the teaching of Christ and the law of the Church.
383. E.g., Mcllwain, Growth of Political Thought, 330-336;
384. Beer, 'Rule of the Wise and Holy';
385. Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Theory, I, 54, 62.
386. See Tierney, 'Aristotle, Aquinas', 3-4;
387. Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 41-58;
388. Finnis, Aquinas, 255-274;
389. Gilby, Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 292-300;
390. Carlyle, History of Mediaeval Political Theory, V, 90-97.
391. De Regno, 1.7.10 [51].
392. The apparent inconsistency between what Aquinas says about monarchy and the mixed regime has long been the subject of controversy. See Francisco de Vitoria, Lectiones in ST, I-II 90-105 De Lege, in
393. Vitoria, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 198. Vitoria argued that when Aquinas and Aristotle conclude that monarchy is best they did so considering the matter 'per se', whereas when they later expressed a preference for a mixed regime they were taking into consideration 'circumstances and persons'. This explanation is not without merit. Aristotle was very explicit in distinguishing the question of what system of government is best in the abstract, what is best for most cities, and what is best for any particular city.
394. See Politics IV.1, 1288b21-39; IV.1, 1289b14-20; IV.11, 1295a25-31, 1296b3-11; IV.12, 1296b12-14; VII.4, 1325b34-37, 1334a.
395. Pol., II.7.4 [245], commenting on Politics, II.6 1265b34-40,
396. discussed in Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 49-50.
397. See also Finnis, Aquinas, 261-262.
398. Politics, I.1, 1252a.15-16.
399. See Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 19.
400. See also James Blythe, 'Family, Government, and the Medieval Aristotelians', History of Political Thought 10 (1989): 1;
401. James Blythe, The Mixed Constitution and the Distinction between Regal and Political Power in the Work of Thomas Aquinas', Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986): 547.
402. Politics, I.1, 1252a.15-16, translated by William of Moerbeke as: 'when according to the rules of the discipline one is in part both ruling and subject it is political'. Compare the translation of Jowett: 'when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he [the ruler] is called a statesman', with the more ambiguous translation of Lord: 'in political [rule] one who, on the basis of the precepts of this sort of science, rules and is ruled in turn'.
403. See Everson (ed.), Politics, 11;
404. Carnes Lord (trans.), The Politics (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 35;
405. Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 43.
406. See Blythe, Mixed Constitution, chapter 3.
407. For ease of expression, I will generally use the term 'democracy' in its modern sense to refer to simply to government by the many, without any necessary implication of corruption. Aquinas himself sometimes uses the term democratia, rather than politia, to designate the good form of government by the many. See ST, I-II, 105.1 res., discussed at notes 208-229 below.
408. See Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 41-68, and for a similar interpretation,
409. Finnis, Aquinas, 261-262.
410. Blythe points out that Aquinas's disciple. Peter of Auvergne, 'shows little sympathy for Thomas's distinction between regal and political rule.' and therefore seems 'to oscillate between support for a mixed constitution and support for a hereditary king': Blythe. Mixed Constitution, 78-79.
411. ScG, IV.76.4.
412. On Aquinas's ecclesiology, see Tierney, 'Aristotle. Aquinas', 5-8;
413. Yves Congar. 'Aspects Ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre Mendicants et Séculiers dans la Seconde Moité du XIIIe Siécle et le Début du XIVe', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 36 (1961): 35;
414. Ch. Zuckerman. 'Aquinas' Conception of the Papal Primacy in Ecclesiastical Government', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 40 (1973): 97.
415. Compare Cyprian, De catholicae ecclesiae unitate (c 251), 5:
416. 'The Church is a unity; yet by her fruitful increase she is extended far and wide to form a plurality ...'. I have here used the translation in Henry Bettenson (ed.), Documents of the Christian Church (2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 71-73.
417. E.g., De Regno, I.1.3 [4]; II.1.1 [123].
418. De Regno, I.2.4 [14].
419. E.g., De Regno, I.2.5-6 [14-15]; I.3.1 [17]; I.3.5 [20].
420. ScG, IV.76.4.
421. The constitutional structure of Aquinas's own Dominican Order supports this interpretation. The order consisted of convents and provinces, governed, respectively, by conventual and provincial priors and a master-general, in conjunction with representative provincial chapters and a general chapter of the entire order. See Pierre Mandonnet, St. Dominic and His Work, Mary Larkin (trans.) (St. Louis: Herder, 1948), chapter 6;
422. Pierre Mandonnet, 'Order of Preachers,' in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Appleton, 1907-1912);
423. Proctor, 'Introduction', Apology for the Religious Orders, 14-18;
424. Barker, Dominican Order and Convocation, chapter 1, especially 14-18;
425. Gilby. Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 66-72, 289-292.
426. Consider, likewise, the constitutional structure of the University of Paris, on which, see Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation'.
427. See D'Entreves, Thomas Aquinas, xxix.
428. De Regno, I.4.7 [27].
429. De Regno, I.7.1-12 [41-52],
430. As noted earlier, if no human remedy is available, the only recourse left for private individuals is to entreat the intervention of God: De Regno I.7.10-12 [51].
431. Notably, the examples of divine intervention in the Bible that Aquinas cites involve the kings of Egypt, Babylon and Persia - paradigms of tyrannical government far removed the biblical ideal. See, also. Finnis, Aquinas, 275-279, 287-291. who discerns in Aquinas a private right of resistance, in at least some circumstances.
432. Osborne, 'Fortescue's Response to the Problem of Tyranny', 167.
433. Compare Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 48, 56-57;
434. Richard Regan, 'Aquinas on Political Obedience and Disobedience', Thought 56 (1981): 77, 84.
435. De Regno, I.7.6-9 [47-50].
436. See. likewise, De Virtutibus in Communi, 4,
437. res. I have here used John Patrick Reid (trans.), St. Thomas Aquinas On the Virtues in General (Providence: Providence College Press, 1951)
438. and consulted the Latin edition in Quaestiones disputatae, t. 2 (Bazzi, et al., eds.) (9th edn. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1953).
439. Frederick Wilhelmsen, Christianity and Political Philosophy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1978), p. 150:
440. 'The legitimate power of the [medieval] king was the fruit of a hundred pacts solemnly entered upon by princes and subjects, themselves represented by a thicket of institutions which were the work of generations and even centuries of common experience.' On this question, compare M. J. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 129-134;
441. Charles Zuckerman, 'The Relationship of Theories of Universals to Theories of Church Government in the Middle Ages: A Critique of Previous Views'. Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (1975): 579;
442. and George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London: George Harrap & Co, 1948), p. 220.
443. ST, I-II, 95.4 and 105.1.
444. Isidore, Etymologiae, W. M. Lindsay (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), V.4-10.
445. Ethics, VIII.9-10 1060a30-1161b10;
446. Politics, IV.3-4 1294a30-b41.
447. ST, I-II, 95.4 res.
448. Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 50.
449. That is, without reading it in the context of ST, I-II, 105.1, discussed below.
450. See Politics, IV.8, 1293b33-37, 1294a15-25; V.7, 1307a5-14.
451. Compare Henry de Bracton, De Legibus Et Consuetudinibus Angliæ (c 1220s-1250s),
452. 'Introductio', II, p. 19: 'it will not be absurd to call English laws leges, though they are unwritten, since whatever has been rightly decided and approved with the counsel and consent of the magnates and the general agreement of the res publica, the authority of the king or prince having first been added thereto, has the force of law'. (Sednon erit absurdum leges Anglicanas licet non scriptas leges appellare, cum legis vigorem habeat quidquid de consilio et consensu magnatum et rei publicæ communi sponsione, auctoritate regis sive principle præcedente, iuste fuerit definitum et approbatum.)
453. ST I-II 105.1
454. See, likewise, Pol. II.74 [245], describing a mixed regime in which rule is shared among the people, the powerful and the king (puta si in aliquot dominetur populus, in aliquot potentes, in aliquot rex).
455. See James Schall. 'The Right Order of Polity and Economy: Reflections on St. Thomas and the "Old Law"', Cultural Dynamics 5(7) (1995): 427.
456. In ST, I-II, 105.1, Aquinas cites or alludes to no less than 21 biblical texts. On the use of the Bible in medieval political theory,
457. see J. N. Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius 1414-1625 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 18-19.
458. See Pol., pro. 7
459. and Eth., I.2.13 [31] discussed in the text at notes 36-37 and 54 above.
460. In ST, I-II, 105.1, Aristotle is cited on four occasions.
461. Politics, II.6 1270b17.
462. Politics, III.5 1279a32.
463. ST, I-II, 105.1 res.
464. Although note that in ST, I-II, 105.1 ad 3, Aquinas accepts the proposition that a divided kingdom leads to destruction.
465. For a similar interpretation, see Blythe. Mixed Constitution. 52.
466. ST, I-II, 105.1 res.
467. See Aristotle, Politics, IV.15, 1300a34-7: '
468. that all should ... appoint from all ... is characteristic of a polity'. Dewan, 'St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Common Good', 356, note 27, points out that while the term 'king' suggests to us a hereditary office, Aquinas has an elected office in mind. The idea of a 'choice' or 'election' of the ruler is made explicit in De Regno and the Summa Theologiae, and in the Summa Contra Gentiles, where Aquinas is discussing the Pope, he is by definition writing about an elected office, albeit an office chosen by a 'few' (the college of cardinals). The office of Emperor, as well as many offices within the religious orders and universities, was also elective.
469. Compare De Regno, I.3.4 [19], I.4.4 [25], discussed in the text at note 173 above.
470. ST, I-II, 105.1 ad 2, emphasis added.
471. ST, I-II, 105.1 ad 2.
472. According to Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 53,
473. it 'seems indisputable' that Aquinas is 'recommending this form of government as best absolutely, and not just as one suited only to the Jews.' This, however, seems to overstate the case. Aquinas's primary concern in ST, I-II, 98-105, is theological, not political. The wider issue he is grappling with has to do with the status of the Old Law after the coming of Christ and the Gospel. Of the Old Law, Aquinas has said that it consists of moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts (Q.99.1-5). He has affirmed that the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature (Q.100.1), that they concern acts of virtue (Q.100.2) and that they are not dispensable (Q.100.8). On the other hand, Aquinas has said that the ceremonial and judicial precepts are divinely inspired 'determinations' (cf Q.95.2 and 95.4) of the moral precepts, whereby man is directed to God and to his neighbour (Q.99.4). The ceremonial and judicial precepts, each being figurative (Q.102.2, Q.104.2), have ceased or been annulled at the coming of Christ (Q.103:3, Q.104:3). Nevertheless, the judicial precepts are figurative in a different sense and have been annulled in a different way, so that while the observance of the ceremonial precepts is a mortal sin (Q.103.4), the observance of the judicial precepts is not deadly, if understood as a determination of the natural and moral law - and not 'as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law' (Q.104.2). Aquinas also explains that the determinations of the law must be different according to the different 'states of mankind' or different 'forms of government' under which people may live (Q.104:3). (It would of course be anomalous to seek to apply this last distinction - viz 'forms of government' - to the very question of whether the constitution of Israel embodied the best form of government) Aquinas's discussion in Q.105 must be understood in this context. The constitution of Israel is set forth by Aquinas as an 'ideal polity' strictly in the sense of a divinely inspired determinatio. The application of the enduring principles of natural law to Aquinas's own circumstances will depend, therefore, on the extent to which the different 'states of mankind' call for different 'determinations'. Interestingly, while in other areas (e.g., Q.105.2 ad 1-4, 10) Aquinas points to relevant differences in the states of mankind, he makes no such observation in respect of the constitution of Israel in Q.105.1.
474. See Schall. 'The Right Order of Polity and Economy', who argues that Aquinas understood the revelation contained in the Old Law to provide an illumination of philosophical questions which could not be completely addressed by philosophers on the basis of reason alone.
475. ST, I-II, 105.1 res.
476. John Kayser and Ronald Lettieri, 'Aquinas's Regimen Bene Commixtum and the Medieval Critique of Classical Republicanism', The Thomist 46 (1982): 195, 212-214 point out that in looking to biblical Israel, rather than the Roman republic, Aquinas made a decisive break with the Polybian tradition. However, their argument is overstated in one important particular: while Aquinas is certainly dismissive of the Roman republic in
477. De Regno, I.5.1-5 [30-33], he undertakes a similar diagnosis of the Hebrew polity in I.5.6 [34].
478. The Vulgate translation of the text from Deuteronomy 1:15 quoted by Aquinas in ST, I-II, 105.1 res., reads: 'tuli de vestries tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles, et constitui eos princepes'.
479. Some manuscripts refer to 70, rather than 72, elders - a fact which Aquinas recognizes (ST I-II, 105.1 arg. 1: 'congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel').
480. See Exodus 24:1, 9;
481. Numbers 11:16, 24-5;
482. and compare Luke 10:1.
483. On the idea of representation of the tribes, see Joseph Baumgarten, 'The Doudecimal Courts of Qumran, Revelation, and the Sanhedrin', Journal of Biblical Literature 95 (1976): 59, 75-76, citing various rabbinic interpretations of the relevant texts.
484. The biblical texts also refer to rulers over 'thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens' (tribunos et centuriones et quinquagenarios et decanos). See Exodus 18:21;
485. Deuteronomy 1:15
486. Exodus 18:21-22
487. is cited by Ptolemy of Lucca, De Regimine Principum (Blythe ed.), IV.27.5 and compared to the division of the Jews under Judas Maccabeus into groups led by 'tribunes, centurions, pentacontarchs, and decurions' (I Maccabees 3:55). For the idea of Israel as a kind of tribal confederation,
488. see John Bright, A History of Israel (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1959), 42;
489. Martin Noth, 'Israel as the Confederation of the Twelve Tribes,' in The History of Israel (New York: Harper and Row, 1958);
490. Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995).
491. In St. Luke 10:1 there is again a textual variation between the numbers 70 and 72, but Aquinas refers only to 72.
492. Expositio in Lucam, A. Guarenti (ed.), (2nd edn. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1953), X.1.
493. Impugn., II.3, arg. 5, contra, ad 5
494. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, pp. 98, 112, 127).
495. Impugn., II.3, arg. 10, 18-20, 25, contra, ad 10, 18, 20-22, 25
496. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, pp. 99, 102-4, 106-25, 129, 134, 136-7, 139).
497. Compare ST, III (Supplement), 26.3, 35.5, 37.1, 40.6.
498. Impugn., II.3, contra, ad 5
499. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, pp. 106-25, 127).
500. Impugn., II.3, ad 24
501. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, p. 139).
502. Impugn., II.3, ad 23
503. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, p. 138).
504. Impugn, II.3, arg. 28, ad 28
505. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, pp. 106, 141). However, Aquinas affirms, of course, the power of the pope to institute a special order of preachers that is not part of the regular hierarchy.
506. Thus in Catholic social thought, the principle of subsidiarity applies not simply to 'political' institutions and relationships - such as the relationship between the European Union and its Member States - but also to the many other 'social' institutions and associations which constitute the 'pluriform' nature of human community. As such, Catholic social theory presupposes 'an organically pluralistic society of hierarchically ordered communities': Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, 'Subsidiarity and Political Authority in Theological Perspective', in Oliver O'Donovan and Joan Lockwood O'Donovan (eds.), Bonds of Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past and Present (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), p. 228.
507. For a similar argument, comparing the 'singular and indivisible' city-state of Aristotle to the 'plurality' of jurisdictions recognized by Marsiglio of Padua, see Gary Nederman, 'Aristotle as Authority: Alternative Aristotelian Sources of Late Medieval Political Theory', History of European Ideas 8(1) (1987): 31.
508. De potestate regia et papali (c. 1302).
509. have used J. A. Watt (trans.), John of Paris: On Royal and Papal Power (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971).
510. John distinguishes the characteristic diversity of secular kingdoms and the fundamental unity that characterises the Church (despite the variety of dioceses and communities of which the Church composed): De potestate regia et papali, III, 84-87.
511. '[I]t is better', he says, 'that many should rule in many kingdoms than one alone should rule the whole world': De potestate regia et papali, XXI, 227.
512. See Aquinas, Impugn., II.3, contra
513. (Proctor, Apology, I.4).
514. See also Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 115-117,
515. who points out that in Ptolemy of Lucca's Determinatio Compendiosa, 'church and state are seen as completely analogous with respect to their organization' - continuing, he says, a 'process of assimilation' begun by Thomas Aquinas and the canonists, and extended by John of Paris and William of Ockham.
516. De potestate regia et papali, XXV, 255.
517. In distinguishing between ordination to priesthood, and the grant of jurisdiction, John recognizes 'degrees of jurisdiction going with the episcopate: an archbishop in his province, a primate in a kingdom, a pope in the whole church'. Ordination to priesthood cannot be taken away, he says, but the jurisdiction of an archbishop or pope can be removed: De potestate regia et papali, XXV, 251.
518. De potentate regia et papali, X, 119.
519. Compare Aquinas, Impugn., II.3, arg. 10, 18-20, 25, contra, ad 10, 18, 20-22, 25
520. (Proctor, Apology, I.4, pp. 99, 102-4, 106-25, 129, 134, 136-7, 139).
521. De potestate regia et papali, XIX, 205-207.
522. John says that God gave the Israelites a mixed constitution because too much power in the king leads to tyranny. However, God gave them a monarchy when they requested one 'as if in displeasure', 'because they were rejecting a constitution more beneficial to them': De potestate regia et papali, XIX, 207.
523. De potestate regia et papali, XIX, 207 (emphasis added).
524. The Latin is emphatic about the role of the provinces: 'eligerentur plures ab omni provincia et de omni provincia' (F. Bleienstein (ed.), Tractatus de Potestate Regia ei Papali (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1969), XIX, 175,
525. cited in Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 150).
526. Compare Pierre D'Ailly, Tractatus de Ecclesiae, Concilii Generalis, Romani pontificis, et Cardinalium Auctoritate, col. 946, who, having drawn attention to the 72 elders chosen from among the people (septuginta duo seniors eligebantur de omni populo), says that in the Church many should be chosen from and by each province (quod esset optimum regimen Ecclesiae, si sub uno Papa eligerentur plures de omni, et ab omni Provincia), and that these elders should correspond to the cardinals, whose function is to temper the power of the pope (et tales deberent esse Cardinales, qui cum Papa et sub eo Ecclesiam regerent, et usum plentitudinis Potestatis temperarent)
527. (cited in Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 246).
528. See, likewise, Jean Gerson, De Potestate Ecclesiastica (Oeuvres Complétes (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1973), VI, 224-225),
529. who underscores the idea that the rectors were chosen from the people and from single tribes (Maneat ecclesiastica politia optima regimine; quale fuit sub Moyse gubernata; quoniam mixta fuit ac triplici politia: regali in Moyse, aristocratica in txxii senioribus. et timocratica dum de populo et singulis tribubus sub Moyse redores sumebantur) (cited in Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 251 and in
530. Carlyle, History of Mediaeval Political Theory, VI, 162).
531. De Concordantia Catholica (1433).
532. See Paul Sigmund (ed.), A Catholic Concordance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
533. Paul Sigmund, Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963);
534. Blythe, Mixed Constitution, 253-258.
535. Politica Methodice Digesta et exemplis sacris et profanis illustrata (1603), cited at note 20 above.
536. See also Otto von Gierke, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien (Breslau, 1880),
537. translated by Bernard Freyd as The Development of Political Theory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939).
538. Concordantia Catholica, II.1.71.
539. Concordantia Catholica, III.1.292; III.7:350; III.12:377-8; III.25.469-72; III:35.527. Although see III.28.491.
540. Concordantia Catholica, II.18.163-5.
541. Concordantia Catholica, III.4:325, 332, 338. Nicolas simultaneously follows the classical classification of the types of government into monarchical, aristocratic and democratic (III, Preface, 279).
542. However, relying principally on canon law, as well as glosses on the election of deacons recorded in the Acts of the Apostles (II:32.234), he argues that a well 'tempered' monarchy is one in which the king is elected by 'nobles who represent everyone with their consent' (III, Preface, 283). Indeed, tyranny, for Nicolas, is usurped rule, and usurpers are those 'who are neither asked to rule nor elected': III.4:330. Election by corporate representatives is the critical factor.
543. Althusius, Politica, chapters II-VIII.
544. Althusius, Politica, chapter XXXIX.
545. See, likewise, Junius Brutus (pseudonym), Vindiciae contra tyrannos (c. 1579), I, 32: 'such were the 70 ancients in the kingdom of Israel, amongst whom the high priest was as it were president, those seventy being first chosen by six out of each tribe ... then the heads or governors of provinces. In like manner the judges and provosts of towns, captains of thousands, the centurions and others ... Of this rank there are in every well governed kingdom, the princes, the officers of the crown, the peers, the greatest and most notable lords, the deputies of provinces, of whom the ordinary body of the estate is composed, or the parliament or the diet, or other assembly ... .'