Afghanistan's post-Taliban transition: The state of state-building after war

Central Asian Survey

Volumn 25, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 1-26

  Johnson, Thomas H ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; POLITICAL CONFLICT; STATE BUILDING; WAR;

AFGHANISTAN; ASIA; EURASIA; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 33750462763     PISSN: 02634937     EISSN: 14653354     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02634930600902991     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. Gordon Cucullu and Paul Vallely, 'Stabilizing Afghanistan; a promising template for Iraq', The Washington Times, 9 January 2006.
2. John C. Bersia, 'Moves fall short of what's needed in Afghanistan', The Orlando Sentinel, 13 December 2005.
3. See: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Directorate, 'Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2004', November 2004. Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ crop_monitoring.html
4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Directorate, "Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2005," 7 November 2005.
5. United Nations Security Council, Agreement on the Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001, S/2001/1154. The text of the Bonn Agreement was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on 7 December 2001.
6. Key factions at Bonn were the Northern Alliance (primarily Tajik), the Rome Group (representing the former King, Mohammed Zahir Shah), the Cyprus Group (allegedly Iranian backed) and the Peshawar Group (primarily Pashtun).
7. The Bonn Agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1385, and an international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386.
8. United Nations Security Council, op cit, Ref 3, p 2.
9. Quoted in Sidney Blumenthal, 'Democracy was only an afterthought', The Guardian, 21 July 2005 Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/ 0,3858,5243844-103677,00.html (accessed 31 August 2006).
10. See Barnett Rubin, 'Afghanistan and threats to human security', an essay adapted from a speech delivered in Tokyo on 15 December 2001, at the International Symposium on Human Security: 'Human Security and Terrorism - Diversifying Threats under Globalization' - from Afghanistan to the Future of the World. Available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/ rubin.htm (accessed 31 August 2006).
11. Some of this section is drawn from Thomas H. Johnson, 'The Loya Jirga, ethnic rivalries and future afghan stability', Strategic Insights, Vol 1, No 6, 2002, pp 1-8.
12. United Nations Security Council, op cit, Ref 3, p 2.
13. 'Desperate call from the valley of death: Help us', The Observer, 28 October 2001. Available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/ story/0,1501,582247,00.html (accessed 31 August 2006).
14. Authors' interview of Senior US Government Official, December 2001.
15. United Nations Security Council, op cit, Ref 3, p 5.
16. Ibid, p 3.
17. Note that the total number of cabinet positions increased in the Transition Government as compared to the Interim Administration.
18. Currently Fahim controls a private militia of 10,000, most which are loyal, well equipped, and well paid. In his Panjshir Valley base of operations, he controls a vast heavy weapon's arsenal, to include BMPs, BTRs, and Scud missiles.
19. 'Karzai swears in the new Afghan Cabinet', Washington Post Foreign Service, 24 June 2002.
20. Ahmad Zia Massoud is the younger brother of the slain Northern Alliance leader and Afghan national hero, Ahmad Shah Massoud.
21. International Crisis Group, 'Afghanistan's flawed constitutional process', ICG Asia Report No 56, 12 June 2003, p 2.
22. Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p 5.
23. The Pashtuns, representing 42 per cent of the population, are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Ethnic Tajiks represent 27 per cent of the population. The Hazaras, represent another 9 per cent. Other groups, such as the Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluch, Uzbek, comprise the rest. The country is almost totally Muslim with the Sunni Muslims representing 80 per cent of the population and Shi's Muslims representing 19 per cent. See 'Afghanistan', The World Factbook 2004 (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004).
24. John C. Griffiths, Afghanistan: Key to a Continent (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p 78.
25. Rubin, op cit, Ref 20, p 11.
26. Ibid, p 46.
27. Ibid, p 47.
28. Pamela Constable, 'Cabinet is sworn in; intense negotiations yield greater ethnic, political balance', Washington Post Foreign Service, Tuesday 25 June 2002.
29. 'Pashtuns losing faith in Karzai', The Washington Post, 13 July 2002.
30. 'Warlord pushes for control of a corner of Afghanistan', New York Times, 6 August 2002.
31. Open Meeting of the Security Council, Briefing of Special Representative of the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi, 31 January 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/brahimi31jan03.htm (accessed 31 August 2006).
32. 'The constitution-making process in Afghanistan', Prepared by The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 10 March 2003.
33. International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref 19, pp 16-17.
34. Ibid. UNAMA coordinated international technical and financial support; UNDP provided financial management, administrative and operational support.
35. For the entire text of the constitution see: http://www.afghangovernment.com/2004constitution.htm (accessed 31 August 2006).
36. Two vice presidents would run on the same election ticket as the president and one succeeds him in the event of the president's death. Vice presidents were to serve a single five-year term. If no presidential candidate receives at least 50 per cent of the vote on Election Day, a run-off was to be held within two weeks.
37. One-third of the seats were to be appointed by the president, one-third were to be selected by provincial councils, and one third were to be selected by district councils.
38. This goal of women representation was to be met through election rules that will give the top two women vote getters in each province a seat in the Wolesi Jirga.
39. International Crisis Group, 'Political Parties in Afghanistan', Asia Briefing No. 39, 2 June 2005.
40. United Nations Security Council, op cit, Ref 3, p 3.
41. 'New Afghan election law endorsed', Kabul Radio, FBIS No. IAP20040527000095, 27 May 2004
42. 'Afghan Leader Karzai Endorses Election Law', Kabul Hindokosh News Agency, FBIS No. IAP20040527000099, 27 May 2004.
43. 4807 polling centres were eventually planned manned by a staff of approximately 120,000.
44. Craig Charney, 'Afghan success story', Washington Post, 30 July 2004, p A19.
45. Scott Baldauf, 'Afghans vote, ready or not', Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 2004. The lack of reliable census data makes judgments on registration corruption difficult.
46. Ibid.
47. Nicholas Kralev, 'U.S. backs intention to work with ex-Taliban', Washington Times, 15 June 2004.
48. For example, see 'Afghanistan: President Karzai accused of illegal electioneering', FBIS No IAP20040810000129, 10 August 2004.
49. M Nazif Shahrani, 'Afghanistan's presidential elections: Spreading democracy or a sham?', Middle East Report Online, 8 October 2004. Available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero100804.html.
50. 'Administrative reforms or settling accounts with Herat?', Kabul Arman-e Melli in Dari, FBIS No IAP20040912000048, 12 September 2004.
51. 'Afghan election body urges presidential candidates to register by 26 July', Kabul Radio Afghanistan in Pashto 1330 GMT, FBIS No. IAP20040725000113, 25 July 2004.
52. Camelia Entekhabi-Fard, 'Afghan President Karzai may rue dumping Fahim - presidential rival', Eurasia Insight, 28 July 2004. Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072804a.shtml (accessed 31 August 2006).
53. This section draws upon previous work. Thomas H. Johnson, 'Democratic nation building in the arc of crisis: The case of the presidential election in Afghanistan', pp. 125-146, in James Russell, ed., Critical Issues in Middle East Security: Stability after Saddam? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
54. See, International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref 37
55. and 'Final Report of the Impartial Panel Concerning Afghanistan Presidential Elections 2004', 1 November 2004. Available at http://www.elections-afghanistan.org.af/ (accessed November 2004).
56. Official Afghan election data was drawn from: Joint Electoral Management Body, 'Afghanistan Presidential Election Results-2004', http://www.elections-afghanistan.org.af/Election%20Results%20Website/ english/english.htm
57. Provincial Ethno-linguistic data came from: http://www.aims.org.af/
58. Ludwig W. Adamec, ed., Historical and Political Gazatteer of Afghanistan, 7 Vols, Vols 3-5 (London: HMSO, 1914; rev. and rep. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt)
59. Thomas H. Johnson et al., Afghanistan: The Northern Provinces (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1988), chap. 3
60. Thomas H. Johnson et al., Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces, (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1989), chap. 4,
61. and Thomas H. Johnson, dir., Afghanistan: The Western Hinterland Provinces (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1989), chap. 4, as well as expert judgements in some provinces.
62. William Maley, 'Executive, legislative, and electoral options for Afghanistan', http://www.cic.nyu.edu/pdf/ E9ExecLegisElectoralOptionsMaley.pdf (accessed 10 June 2005).
63. Anne Marie Goetz, Mary Kaldor and Robin Luckham, 'Democratic institutions and democratic politics', in Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham, eds, Can Democracy be Designed? (London: Zed Books 2003), p 42.
64. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), p 120.
65. Forty-five candidates were refused because of connections with armed groups or for not giving up their government jobs. Although an alleged 207 other militia leaders were legislative candidates.
66. During March 2005 it was announced that the District elections were postponed until 2006 (exact date to be determined) because of complications in the determination of individual district boundaries. This postponement means that these district councils cannot select their Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) representatives.
67. For an official Afghan Government views concerning the importance of these elections, see Afghanistan Votes, http://www.azadiradio.org/en/ specials/elections/ (accessed 31 August 2006).
68. International Crisis Group, 'Afghanistan Elections: Endgame Or New Beginning?', Asia Report No 101, 21 July 2005, p i.
69. In fact many Afghans associate the words hizb (party), harakat (movement) and tehrik (way) with the violent histories of former leftist and Islamist parties. See International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref 37, p 11.
70. International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref 59, p 3.
71. Ibid, p 10.
72. Barnett Rubin, 'Afghanistan: The wrong voting system', International Herald Tribune, 16 March 2005.
73. Andrew Reynolds and Andrew Wilder, 'Free, fair or flawed: Challenges for legitimate elections in Afghanistan', Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), September 2004, p 12.
74. Karzai received 91 per cent of the presidential vote in Kandahar.
75. 'A glass half full', The Economist, 15 September 2005.
76. 'Putting steel into Karzai', The Economist, 22 September 2005.
77. For full results of the election, see: Source: Joint Election Management Body (JEMB), http://www.results.jemb.org/home.asp (accessed 31 August 2006).
78. 'A place for warlords to meet', The Economist, 5 January 2006.
79. A Congressional Research Service Report to Congress posited that the election results 'The new parliament ... appears to have a slim majority of Karzai loyalists'. Kenneth Katzman, 'Afghanistan: Presidential and parliamentary elections', CRS Report for Congress, 16 November 2005, p 5.
80. The party was registered in August 2005 with the Justice Ministry by its new leader Khaled Faruqi, a former commander of Hekmatyar. Faruqi won a seat in the Wolsei Jirga.
81. The most prominent member of the ousted Taliban regime, former Foreign Minister Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, fared very poorly in his candidacy in Kandahar Province. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an ethnic Pashtun and a Karzai supporter who is an extreme Islamist and alleged war criminal as well as terrorist supporter, also won a parliament seat from Kabul with a bear minimum of votes.
82. The aggregated vote of all Wolesi Jirga winners was 2,225,068; 6,207,843 total votes were cast.
83. 'Warlords', The Economist, 5 January 2006.
84. Barnett R Rubin, '(Re)Building Afghanistan: The folly of stateless democracy', Current History, Vol 103 No 672, April 2004, pp 165-170.
85. International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref 19, p 6.