Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union

North American Journal of Economics and Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 375-387

  Kane, Edward J ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Banking regulation; Basel II; Capital requirements; Cross country policy coordination; Value at risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750438820     PISSN: 10629408     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2006.06.002     Document Type: Article

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