Institutional determinants of the judicialisation of policy in Brazil and Mexico

Journal of Latin American Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 739-766

  Rios Figueroa, Julio ^a,b   Taylor, Matthew M ^c  

^a CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y DOCENCIA ECONÓMICAS   (Mexico)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; INSTITUTIONAL REFORM; POLICY REFORM; POLITICAL REFORM; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

BRAZIL; MEXICO [NORTH AMERICA]; NORTH AMERICA; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 33750426881     PISSN: 0022216X     EISSN: 1469767X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X06001593     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. For useful country case studies on the increasing post-transition role of courts in policy debates across Latin America, see Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan Angell (eds.), The Judicialisation of Politics in Latin America (New York, 2006)
2. and Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies (London, 2004).
3. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), p. 2.
4. Austin Ranney, 'The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice' in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago, 1968),
5. cited in Daniel C. McCool, Public Policy Theories, Models, and Concepts: An Anthology (Englewood Cliffs, 1995).
6. For further definition of 'judicialisation', see C. Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York, 1995), p. 5.
7. For a bibliography on judicialisation, see Pilar Domingo, 'Judicialisation of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary: Recent Trends in Latin America', Democratization vol. 11, no. 1 (February 2004): 107, fn. 4.
8. John A. Ferejohn, 'Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law.' Law and Contemporary Problems 65, no. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 45.
9. The list we rely upon is necessarily partial, as there are numerous other factors that may affect the generation of the 'raw material' facing the courts. Space here is too limited to do these justice here, but a few stand out as subjects for future research: The fragmentation of power between the executive and legislative branches; the strength and independence of the prosecutorial body; the political engagement of civil society; the history of court institutionalisation; the degree to which the courts use a political doctrine question, which might limit their involvement in some cases; a country's tradition of judicial activism; and the prevalence or acceptability of corruption.
10. Christopher M. Larkins, 'Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis,' American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 44 (1996), pp. 605-625.
11. For example, Gretchen Helmke, 'The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Democracy and Dictatorship,' American Political Science Review, vol. 96, no.2 (June 2002), pp. 291-303
12. Matias Iaryczower, Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi, 'Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998,' American Journal of Political Science vol. 46, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 699-716.
13. For example, Lars P. Feld and Stephen Voigt, 'Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators,' European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 19 (2003), pp. 497-527
14. and Rafael La Porta et al., 'Judicial Checks and Balances', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, no. 2 (2004).
15. For example, S. Burbank and B. Friedman, 'Reconsidering Judicial Independence,' in Stephen B. Burbank and Barry Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach (California: 2002), pp. 9-44
16. John Ferejohn, 'Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence,' Southern California Law Review, vol. 7 (1995), pp. 353-385
17. Linn Hammergren, 'Diagnosing Judicial Performance: Toward a Tool to Help Guide Judicial Reform Programs,' paper presented at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Durban, South Africa (1999)
18. and Owen Fiss, 'The Right Degree of Independence,' in Irwin Stotsky (ed.) Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary (Boulder: 1993), pp. 55-72.
19. Several recent scandals have raised questions about the judiciary's ability to police its own members effectively: In 2003, for example, a senior federal judge was found to have sold favourable sentences to criminals.
20. L. Sant'Anna, 'Gasto da União sobe 57% em uma década,' O Estado de São Paulo, 20 February 2005.
21. The number of federal judges in Brazil is tied to 'effective judicial demand and population' (Art. 93, 1988 Constitution) and although legislative approval and executive sanction is required to create new judgeships, once created, these are nearly impossible to eliminate. In practice, the expansion of judgeships has not been a serious concern vis-à-vis judicial autonomy.
22. It must be noted that the first delegation of authority to the judiciary over courts' structure and jurisdiction took place in 1987 during the administration of Miguel de la Madrid. Héctor Fix-Fierro, 'La reforma judicial en México, d¿e dónde viene? a¿ dónde va?' Reforma Judicial. Revista Mexicana de Justicia, no. 2 (July-Dec. 2003), p. 278.
23. Iaryczower et al., 'Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments,' p. 699.
24. Pilar Domingo, 'Rule of Law, Citizenship, and Access to Justice in Mexico,' Mexican Studies - Estudios Mexicanos, vol. 15, no. 1 (1999), pp. 151-191.
25. Julio Rios-Figueroa, 'The Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002,' Latin American Politics & Society, vol. 45, no. 1 (2007).
26. For the STF, the President nominates a candidate of his choosing for subsequent Senate confirmation; and for the STJ, the President nominates a judge from a list of three candidates proposed by the court itself.
27. Lisa Hilbink, 'An Exception to Chilean Exceptionalism?,' in Susan E. Eckstein and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley (eds.), What Justice? Whose Justice?: Fighting for Fairness in Latin America (Berkeley, 2003), pp. 64-97.
28. Rogerio B. Arantes, Judiciário e Política No Brasil, (São Paulo, 1997), p. 33.
29. A 1999 constitutional reform established Supreme Court control of the Council. Before this, the Council was filled by judges selected randomly from different levels of the judiciary. See Héctor Fix-Fierro, 'La reforma judicial en México'.
30. Patricio Navia and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, 'The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America,' Comparative Political Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (2005), pp. 189-217
31. Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate (eds.) Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (Westport, 1992).
32. The amparo suit is an instrument of individual constitutional complaint; although sometimes translated as habeas corpus, it encompasses more than what the term implies in English. Unlike countries like Spain or Germany where such complaints can be heard only by the Constitutional Tribunal, in Mexico an amparo can be filed in any federal court and then appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, provided it is deemed important enough to review. However, sentences in amparo suits only affect the particular plaintiff (unless there are five similar rulings on the same issue). An amparo can be filed only by the aggrieved party and only when 'an act or law of the authority' (Article 103, Mexican Constitution) has violated a constitutional right; thus, amparos cannot be filed against individuals. See Héctor Fix-Zamudio, Ensayos Sobre el Derecho de Amparo (Mexico, 1999). There is no equally ubiquitous Brazilian parallel to the amparo suit. The mandado de segurança is perhaps the most similar, in that it seeks to guarantee individual or collective rights against an illegal or unconstitutional act by an authority. But there is no similar rule regarding precedent setting, and while a successful filing in the STF would be likely to stop a policy or government activity in its tracks, the STF does not have original jurisdiction in these cases unless the case has been rejected by all other courts. Furthermore, mandados de segurança are proportionally seldom used, representing fewer than 0.5% of all STF cases heard per year, and there are a number of other legal instruments - ranging from the Ação Civil Pública to the ADIN - that permit similar legal contestation on a variety of grounds.
33. Matthew M. Taylor, 'Citizens against the State: The Riddle of High Impact, Low Functionality Courts in Brazil,' Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, vol. 25, no. 4 (October-December 2005).
34. In 2002, a bill was approved that gave cabinet ministers a special forum in the STF for suits against them as individuals. While suits against ministers often have a public policy motivation, we do not consider these here, given their relatively indirect effect on policy.
35. Patricio Navia and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, 'The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America.'
36. Matthew M. Taylor, 'Veto and Voice in the Courts: Policy Implications of Institutional Design in the Brazilian Judiciary,' Comparative Politics, vol. 38, no. 3 (April 2006).
37. Theodore Lowi, 'American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Science,' World Politics, vol. 16 (July): Pp. 677-715.
38. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton, 1995).
39. Matthew M. Taylor, 'Activating Judges: Courts, Institutional Structure, and the Judicialisation of Policy Reform in Brazil, 1988-2002,' unpubl. PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2004, pp. 188-246.
40. The pension deficit totalled 1.9% of GDP in 1996.
41. In 1996, 48% of pension spending went to 16.6 million private sector workers, while 52% went to 2.9 million public sector retirees. Public sector employees paid in contributions equivalent to only 17% of total public sector pension outlays in 1996, as compared to 94% in the INSS system. P. Godoy, 'SOS Previdência,' Folha de São Paulo, 2 January 1998, p. 2-2
42. Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social, Livro Branco da Previdência Social (Brasília, 1997).
43. I. G. Silva Martins, 'Decisão foi eminentemente técnica,' Folha de São Paulo, 13 April 1996, p. 1-5.
44. 'No Mínimo, Surpresa,' Folha de São Paulo, 13 April 1996, p. 1-2.
45. 'Busca Sindicato amparo a reforma de IMSS,' Reforma, 8 August 2004
46. 'Advierte SNTSS lucha contra ley del IMSS,' Reforma, 27 September 2004.
47. 'Desechan amparo contra reforma al IMSS', Reforma 29 Sept. 2005.
48. 'Tropieza el SNTSS en Cámara y Corte', Reforma 12 Oct. 2005.
49. 'Usa bien IMSS coutas - Corte', Reforma 26 May 2005. At the time of this writing the SNTSS is preparing another legal challenge.
50. C. Rossi, 'Fundo Soros vê 'tragicomedia','Folha de São Paulo, 8 May 1997, p. 1-8.
51. 'Encabeza Madrazo marcha azucarera,' Reforma, 9 March 2002, p
52. 'Afirman azucareros: Fracasa expropiación,' Reforma, 31 August 2004.
53. 'Machado, la óptica tras su expropiación,' Reforma, 12 December 2001.
54. 'Ilegal, la expropiación azucarera', Reforma, 16 January 2006.
55. 'Piden a Corte revise caso sobre ingenios', Reforma, 25 April 2004.
56. Matthew M. Taylor, 'El Partido De Los Trabajadores y El Uso Político Del Poder Judicial,' América Latina Hoy Vol. 37 (August 2004).