Transitional rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders in the Post-Mao Reform period: Dilemmas and strategies

Quarterly Journal of Speech

Volumn 92, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 262-286

  Lu, Xing ^a   Simons, Herbert W ^b  

^a DEPAUL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Chinese Communist Party; Putting People First; Socialism with Chinese Characteristics; Three Represents; Transitional Rhetoric

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750423280     PISSN: 00335630     EISSN: 14795779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00335630600938674     Document Type: Review

References (129)

1. The "opening to the West," signified by the famous handshake between Premier Chou En-Lai and President Richard Nixon in 1972, took on added meaning with the normalization of relations, undertaken by President Jimmy Carter in 1979.
2. Alan R. Kluver, Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1996), 2.
3. Kluver, 121. Robert Oliver said of rhetoric that it was considered so important in the West that it merited separate disciplinary treatment. But precisely because of its centrality in the East "it could not be separated from the rest of human knowledge." See Robert Oliver, Communication and Culture in Ancient China and India (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 10. In relation to policy, East and West, rhetorical analysis points us to the ways policy debates are framed, decisions defended, and outcomes interpreted.
4. The year 1978 is considered the beginning of a new historic era in China, marked by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which officially endorsed a shift in the Party's agenda from emphasis on ideological correctness to economic reform and adoption of an open-door policy.
5. Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 1-11.
6. The theoretical framework has since been extended in various ways. See, for example, Herbert W. Simons, "A Dilemma-Centered Analysis of Clinton's August 17th Apologia: Implications for Theory and Method," Quarterly Journal of Speech 86 (2000): 438-53.
7. See Kenneth Burke, Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 161-63.
8. See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003);
9. Andrew J. Nathan, China's Transition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997);
10. Tang Tsou., The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986);
11. C. B. David and Herbert S. Yee, eds, China in Transition: Issues and Politics (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999);
12. Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987).
13. See D. Ray Heisey, Chinese Perspectives in Rhetoric and Communication, ed. D. Ray Heisey (Stamford, CT: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 2000);
14. Randy Kluver and John H. Powers, eds, Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities (Stamford, CT: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1999);
15. Shaorong Huang, To Rebel Is Justified: A Rhetorical Study of China's Cultural Revolution Movement 1966-1969 (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1996);
16. Xing Lu, Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004).
17. Kenneth Burke turns to Machiavelli's The Prince for support. It says, in effect, "Here is the kind of act proper to such-and-such a scene." Machiavelli acknowledges that people "may also act in accordance with their own natures, or temperaments," but he underscores the importance for rulers of acting "in accordance with the requirements set them by scenic conditions." In Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 162-63.
18. See, for example, Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
19. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997);
20. Bill Gertz, China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000);
21. Herbert S. Yee, China Threat Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London: Routledge, 2002);
22. M. Sieff, "What Chinese Don't Know about America," United Press International 4 (2003): 1-2.
23. Tang Tsou, Cultural Revolution , xxi.
24. D. Ray Heisey, "Cultural Influences in Political Communication," in Politics, Communication, and Culture , ed. Alberto Gonzales and Dolores V. Tanno (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), 23.
25. A desperately impoverished country boy who rose from peasant to union leader to celebrated firebrand to President of Brazil, Lula, finally in power, says Bearak, "now has to contend with the many forbidding obstacles in the sightline of a genuinely egalitarian vision .... This is everywhere the case for leftist leaders in developing countries. Their urge for reform is most often constrained by a dependence on international creditors. Default would be a debacle. Investor confidence would plummet, capital would flee, the poor would take an abrupt beating." Barry Bearak, "Poor Man's Burden," New York Times, June 27, 2004, 1-3.
26. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History (New York: New Republic, 1937), 3-5.
27. Nathan, China's Transition, 62.
28. See Willy Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1999);
29. Jan Wong, Red China Blues (New York: Anchor, 1996).
30. The slogans "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy" were advocated during the New Culture Movement (1910s-1920s) by Chinese intellectuals. The movement aimed to reject completely traditional Chinese culture and introduce Western science and democracy to China. Even though the CCP endorsed the discourse of science, this was not based on the interpretation of Western scientific reasoning characterized by induction. Kexue, the Chinese word for science, is loosely used to refer to the truthfulness of Marxist theory on social change. Also, the term minzhu (democracy) is used in a limited sense of seeking the opinions of the majority as opposed to a political system and free speech.
31. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives.
32. Sang-chul Lee and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Korean President Roh Tae-woo's 1988 Inaugural Address: Campaigning for Investiture," Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994): 37-52;
33. D. Ray Heisey, George Bush and Operation Desert Shield: Peace by Force, American Style, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association (Atlanta, 1991);
34. Mei Zhong and D. Ray Heisey, China's Apologia on the Human Rights Issue: An Intercultural Conflict with the United States, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association (New Orleans, 1994).
35. D. Ray Heisey, "Cultural Influences," 14.
36. Mei Zhong and D. Ray Heisey, "China's Apologia";
37. John Powers, "Civic Discourse with the International Community: China's White Papers on Human Rights," in Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities, ed. Randy Kluver and John Powers (Stamford, CT: Ablex Publishing, 1999), 237-50.
38. Kluver.
39. Kluver, 73.
40. Interestingly enough, this strategy of "renaming and redefining the environment" was also employed by Mussolini in his transformation from a socialist agitator to a fascist dictator, evident in his appropriation of the rhetoric of struggle for the purpose of instilling social order and a new sense of Italian identity. Elizabeth Jean Nelson, "Nothing Ever Goes Well Enough: Mussolini and the Rhetoric of Perpetual Struggle," Communication Studies 42 (1991): 22-42.
41. Culture-specific rhetorical repertoires are probably variants of structural possibilities, inherent in the pragmatics of symbol use. See, for example, Burke's introduction to the Grammar of Motives.
42. Also see Michael Billig, Ideology and Opinions (London: Sage, 1989);
43. Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion in Society (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), ch. 6.
44. See Xing Lu, Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B. C. E.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998). Many of the strategies in Sunzi Bing Fa and Gui Guzi have been applied to statecraft, trading and business negotiation, and interpersonal relationships.
45. For an English translation and studies of these texts, see Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. James Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983);
46. W. K. Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu (London: Arthur Probsthan, 1939);
47. Daniel Coyle, "Guiguizi: On the Cosmological Axes of Chinese Persuasion" (diss., University of Hawaii, 1999).
48. Sinologists have noted striking similarities between Maoism and Confucianism in that both emphasize the role of ideological conformity and the moral integrity of the individual. For example, Mao appropriated the Confucian concept of self-examination as a process of cultivation and moral perfection in the endless communist campaign of thought reform from 1942. See John Fairbanks, "The Chinese Pattern," in Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models, compiled by Gary B. Bertsch and Thomas W. Ganschow (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976), 51-64.
49. Also see Godwin C. Chu, Radical Change through Communication in Mao's China (Honolulu, HI: The University Press of Hawaii, 1977);
50. Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics.
51. Confucius (551-479 B. C. E.), The Analects of Confucius, trans. Simon Leys (New York; London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997). The famous quote regarding the concept of zheng ming is: "If the names are not correct, language is without an object. When language is without an object, no affairs can be effected. When no affairs can be effected ...." (13.3. p. 60).
52. See Michael C. McGee, "The 'Ideograph:' A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 1-16.
53. Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992).
54. Chinese history has been laced with slogans and memorable sayings from peasant rebellions to classic Chinese writings.
55. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives.
56. How is the rhetorical analyst to know what the rhetor intends, let alone to assess what has been said? The answer is that others' intentions are notoriously difficult to ascertain, and perhaps never fully knowable, but still subject to better and worse "readings." By "readings" we refer to assessments not just of the text, but also of its context, and we advise assessments of "grand" strategies such as are reflected in major policy pronouncements and microanalyses of seemingly innocuous details that add nuance and meaning to the "grand" pronouncement. Such is the work necessary to discern rhetorical intentions and assess consequences, and it also applies to rhetoric addressed to domestic audiences.
57. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 61.
58. A number of regional strikes and peasant uprising have been staged in China in the last few years, demanding fair treatment and salary compensation. However, some are not reported as the media are still controlled by the government.
59. Kluver, 8.
60. Mao labeled Deng "a rightist," yet considered him "a rare talent," "softness melded with toughness," and invited him back to office in charge of China's economy and state affairs in 1973. According to Dr. Li's account, Mao appointed Deng as the Vice Premier of China, assisting Premier Zhou Enlai, who was seriously ill, in state affairs. China's economy collapsed due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. After two years in office, Deng was denounced again for not following Mao's revolutionary path and was forced to step down. After Mao's death, Hua Guofeng, Mao's appointed successor, become the interim CCP Chairman. Hua resigned in 1978 and was replaced by Hu Yaobang (1978-1987). During this time, Deng Xiaoping was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the most powerful position in China, and Vice Chairman of the CCP. See Zhisui Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (Taiwan: China Times Publishing Company, 1994).
61. Wei-Ming Tu, "Introduction: Cultural Perspective," in China in Transformation, ed. Wei-Ming Tu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), xiii.
62. Following Mao's death, Hua Guofeng, the appointed successor of Mao, had declared himself in support of the so-called "double whatevers": "Whatever decisions Chairman Mao had made, we should firmly support, and whatever Chairman Mao had instructed, we should always observe." The slogan represents Mao's loyalists' attempt to adhere to the Maoist ideology of class struggle and continued revolution.
63. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. II (Beijing: The People's Press, 1983), 126.
64. Sujian Guo, Post-Mao China: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2000).
65. Tang Tsou, Cultural Revolution, 222.
66. D. Wen-Wei Chang, China under Deng Xiaoping: Political and Economic Reform (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 50.
67. Deng drew support from fellow victims of the Cultural Revolution, many of whom he had helped to resuscitate. Not insignificant were his close ties to the army. And Deng brought with him his reputation as a loyal comrade to Mao during the pre-1949 revolution.
68. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III (Beijing: The People's Press, 1993), 284.
69. Deng Xiaoping, Vol. II, 141. All the translations of Deng Xiaoping's speeches have been done by the first author.
70. Deng, Vol. II, 236.
71. Deng, Vol. II, 236; Vol. III, 149.
72. Deng, Vol. II, 167.
73. Deng, Vol. III, 63.
74. There was a power struggle within the Party between the more conservative revolutionary old guards trying to control the reform and the younger generation of party officials led by Deng Xiaoping trying to promote change. See Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, "Dynamic Economy, Declining Party-State," in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1-29;
75. Nathan, China's Transition; Harding, China's Second Revolution.
76. Deng, Vol. III, 265.
77. Deng, Vol. III, 265.
78. Two years after Deng regained power, China's GNP growth jumped from 1.4% in 1975 to 11.9% in 1976, a remarkable turnaround from the previous year. See Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political Biography (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 188.
79. Deng, Vol. III, 52. Deng endorsed the development of special economic zones in south China as sites for the "experiments." These experiments have proven to be successful in improving the average standard of living.
80. Ting Wai, "Sino-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," in China in Transition: Issues and Policies, ed. David Theather and Herbert Yee (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 93-115.
81. During the four years before Deng's death, the number of officially laid-off workers quadrupled. See Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, Transition Towards Post-Deng China (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001).
82. Counting superfluous hands in the countryside, writes Willy Lam (The Era of Jiang Zemin), more than 200 million Chinese were unemployed or underemployed. For China's corruption problem, see Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
83. According to a source from the Chinese government in 2001, there were 1.5 million private businesses and 31 million self-employed industrial and commercial households with a total of 130 million employers, contributing 50% of China's GDP in 2000. In east China's coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces, where the private economy is highly developed, the private sector contributes more than 60% to GDP (see hppt://www.chinagate. comcn/english/2345.htm).
84. The People's Daily, August 9, 2001. Available at http://www.people.com. cn/GB/paper464/ 7757/739402.html (Chinese version of Jiang's speech at the 16th Party Congress) http:// english.people.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106983.shtml (English version). All the sources cited from the People's Daily are from its overseas Chinese version. The major news, especially political messages, is the same in the overseas and inland versions.
85. The People's Daily, August 9, 2001.
86. Jiang, Zemin. Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 1, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2006.
87. The People's Daily, August 9, 2001.
88. In the petition, Jiang is also criticized for his failure to address economic disparities and for his promotion of a personality cult. However, after Jiang's July 1 speech, more than 100,000 private entrepreneurs submitted their applications to join the party. See John Wang and Zheng Yongnian, "Embracing the Capitalists: The Chinese Communist Party to Brace Itself for Far-Reaching Changes," in Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era, ed. Wang Gungwu and Yongnian Zheng (London: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), 365-76.
89. For Jiang's speech at the 80th anniversary of the CCP, see http:// app1.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/party16/leader.html
90. The People's Daily, November 18, 2004, 3. Available at http://appl.chinadaily.com.cn/ highlights/party16/leader.html (English version of Jiang's speech at the 80th anniversary of the CCP.)
91. Guoguang Wu, "From the July 1 Speech to the Sixteenth Party Congress: Ideology, Party Construction, and Leadership Transition," in China's Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 167-203.
92. China: Room at the top? The Economist, March 1, 2003, 39-40.
93. Wang and Zheng, "Embracing the Capitalists."
94. D. Ray Heisey, "China's President Hu Jintao's Rhetoric of Socialization," Intercultural Communication Studies 13, no. 3 (2004): 4-7.
95. Tim Johnson, "China's Premier Heads for U.S. in Era of Contradictions," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 27, 2003, A17.
96. Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, 2.
97. The People's Daily, September 9, 2000, 1.
98. The process by which the entire replacement team was selected is itself a measure of Jiang's contribution to the CCP's institutionalization. These leaders did not run for public office but they were considered carefully by their predecessors, who were able to draw upon detailed, confidential dossiers on each of them that had been compiled by the CCP's secretive, highly trusted Organization Department. They then got as close as China has ever come in the transition period to merit-based selection. See Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, Transition Toward Post-Deng China.
99. In a state of affairs report to the nation, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed "Five Balances" in economic development. They include: balancing urban and rural development, balancing development among regions, balancing economic and social development, balancing development of men and nature, and balancing domestic development and opening wider to the outside world. Wen Jiabao, Report on the Work of the Government, March 17, 2004. Available at http://www. chinaview.cn
100. See Jonathan Watts, "China's Growth Flickers to a Halt," The Observer, July 4, 2004, 1-4. Available at http//www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/ 0,7369,125345,00.html
101. Guili Chen and Tao Shun, An Investigative Report of China's Peasantry (Beijing: The People's Press, 2004).
102. Wenran Jiang reports that the biggest worry is the ever-growing tax burden placed on the rural population. While average agricultural income grew by 90% in the 1994-1997 period, the rural tax burden jumped 800%. More than 300 taxes and fees had been imposed by all levels of government. Some townships demanded 14 kinds of fee to register a marriage. Wenran Jiang, China's Silent Rural Revolution, Project Syndicate, April, 2004. Available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/article_print_text?mid=1529&lang=7 http:// www.project-syndicate.org/article_print_text?mid=1529&lang=7
103. Chen and Shun, Investigative Report.
104. The People's Daily, July 2, 2003, 1.
105. This statement has been labeled by Chinese scholars as the new "Three People Principles" (xin san min zhu yi ) as opposed to the "Three People Principles" (nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood) proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the 1911 revolution. See Shaorong Huang, Strive to Build a Modern Humane Government: A Study on China's President Hu Jintao's Rhetoric and Symbolic Actions, paper presented at the National Communication Association Convention (November, 2004).
106. Also see Heisey, "China's President."
107. The People's Daily, January 3, 2003, 4.
108. Huang, Strive to Build, 4.
109. Guo Xuezhi, The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 18.
110. See Chai Chan, "China Acknowledges First Rise in Poverty in 25 Years," U.N. Wire, July 20, 2004, 1-2, http://unwire.org/unwire/20040720/ 449_26017.asp;
111. "China's 'Putting People First' Development Model: Commentary," People's Daily Online, 2004, 1-3, http://english.-people.daily.co.cn/ 20040318_137814.
112. Wen Jiabao, Report.
113. Xinhua News Agency, "Hu Jintao and Top Party Leaders Go to Xibanpo." People's Daily, December 9, 2002, p. 1.
114. China's future: troubles ahead for the new leaders. Economist.com. November 14, 2002. Available at www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm? story-id=1444902.
115. People's Daily, December 9, 2002.
116. Confucius, Analectes, ch. 13, 64.
117. The Number One Decree issued by Hu and Wen's government has three major components: (1) eliminating taxation for peasants; (2) promoting urbanization in the rural area; and (3) improving the living standard of peasants. The document was not published, as of March 2004, but was circulated among government officials at all levels.
118. Luming Lin, Eulogy of the Unity's Strength: An account of the Anti-SARS Campaign of the Chinese People (Beijing: Xuexi Publisher, 2003), 34.
119. See Chen and Shun, Investigative Report, 217-24, on Wen's visits to rural areas.
120. See People's Daily Online, November 12, 2003, for the report of Wen Jiabao helping migrant workers getting delayed payments from their employers. Migrant workers are peasants working in cities. Employers tend to delay their wage payments and use the money for further expansion of their business. Available at http://www.people.com.cn/20031112.
121. See Watts, "China's Growth".
122. Yunhu Dong, "Renquan Ruxian: Zhonguo Renquan Fazhan de Zhongyao Licheng Bei" ("Including Human Rights in the Constitution: Important Development of Chinese Human Rights"), People's Daily, March 15, 2004.
123. Hu and Wen are much tougher on corruption than Jiang. Since they took over, a number of high ranking officials have been charged and imprisoned for corruption crimes.
124. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/15/content_568497.htm (Hu's speeches in US-China relations).
125. Lu, H., Ren, S., & W.R.J. "Premier Wen's Talk with President Bush." People's Daily, December 11, 2003.
126. Heisey, "China's President," 6.
127. John Chan, Chinese regime amends constitution to protect private ownership. World Socialist Web Site, April 2, 2004. http://www.WSWS.org/ articles/2004/apr2004/npc-a02. shtml
128. John Chan, The legacy of retiring Chinese premier: social equality and unrest. World Socialist Web Site. March 19, 2003. http://www.WSWS.org/articles/ 2003/mar2003 chin-m19_prn.shtml
129. Kluver, 123.