Political constraints and public support for market reform

IMF Staff Papers

Volumn 53, Issue SPEC. ISS., 2006, Pages 92-114

  Desai, Raj M ^a   Olofsgård, Anders ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750242453     PISSN: 10207635     EISSN: 15645150     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (47)

1. Alesina, A., and A. Drazen, 1991, "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic Review, Vol. 81 (December), pp. 1170-88.
2. Anderson, C., 1995, Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe).
3. Åslund, A., 2000, "Why Has Ukraine Failed to Achieve Economic Growth?" in Economic Reform in Ukraine: The Unfinished Agenda, ed. by Åslund and G. de Ménil (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe).
4. Åslund, A., P. Boone, and S. Johnson, 2001, "Escaping the Under-Reform Trap," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 48 (Special Issue), pp. 88-108.
5. Beck, N., 2001, "Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?" Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, pp. 271-93.
6. Cabanero-Vervosa, C., and P. Mitchell, 2003, "Communicating Economic Reform" (unpublished; Washington:World Bank).
7. Camdessus, M., 1997, "Camdessus Calls for 'Second Generation' of Reform in Argentina," IMF Survey, Vol. 26 (June 9), pp. 175-76.
8. Corrales, J., 2002, Presidents without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press).
9. De Melo, M., C. Denizer, and A. Gelb, 1996, "Patterns of Transition from Plan to Market," World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 397-424.
10. Diaz-Cayeros, A., and B. Magaloni, 2003, "The Politics of Public Spending_Part II. The Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) in Mexico," background paper to the World Development Report 2004 (Washington: World Bank).
11. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 1999, Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition (London: EBRD).
12. Fearon, J. D., 1999, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance," in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy No. 2, ed. by A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes, and B. Manin (New York: Cambridge University Press).
13. Ferejohn, J., 1986, "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," Public Choice, Vol. 50 (January), pp. 5-25.
14. Gonzalez, M., 2002, "Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico," Review of Development Economics, Vol. 6 (June), pp. 204-24.
15. Harrington, J. E., Jr., 1993, "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, Vol. 83 (March), pp. 27-42.
16. Hellman, J. S., 1998, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," World Politics, Vol. 50 (January), pp. 203-34.
17. Henisz, W. J., 2000, "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Vol. 12 (March), pp. 1-32.
18. Johnson, S., and others, 2000, "Tunneling," American Economic Review,Vol. 90 (May), pp. 22-27.
19. Kim, B.-Y., and J. Pirttilä, 2003, "The Political Economy of Reforms: Empirical Evidence from Post-Communist Transition in the 1990s," BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 4 (Helsinki: Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland).
20. Krueger, A. O., ed., 2000, Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
21. Kuczynski, P.-P., 2003, "Reforming the State," in After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, ed. by Kuczynski and J. Williamson (Washington: Institute for International Economics).
22. Kurtz, M. J., 2004, "The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America," World Politics, Vol. 56 (January), pp. 262-302.
23. Laban, R., and F. Sturzenegger, 1994, "Distributional Conflict, Financial Adaptation and Delayed Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 257-76.
24. Lora, E., and M. Olivera, 2005, "The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus," Economía, Vol. 5 (Spring).
25. Lora, E., U. Panizza, and M. Quispe-Agnoli, 2004, "Reform Fatigue: Symptoms, Reasons, and Implications," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, Vol. 89 (Second Quarter), pp. 1-28.
26. Manin, B., 1997, The Principles of Representative Government (New York: Cambridge University Press).
27. Marshall, M. G., and K. Jaggers, 2001, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. Available via the Internet: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity
28. Mejía Reyes, P., 2003, "Business Cycles and Economic Growth in Latin America: A Survey," Documentos de Investigación No. 71 (Mexico City: Colegio Mexiquense).
29. Naím, M., 1994, "Latin America: The Second Stage of Reform," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5 (October), pp. 32-48.
30. O'Donnell, G. A., 1994, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5 (January), pp. 55-69.
31. Ortiz, G., 2003, "Latin America and the Washington Consensus: Overcoming Reform Fatigue," Finance and Development, Vol. 40 (September), pp. 14-17.
32. Plattner, M. F., 1999, "From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10 (July), pp. 121-34.
33. Political Risk Services, 2005, International Country Risk Guide (East Syracuse, New York: The PRS Group, Inc.). Available via the Internet: http://www.countrydata.com
34. Przeworski, A., 1991, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press).
35. Rodrik, D., 1993, "Positive Economics of Policy Reform," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 83 (May), pp. 356-61.
36. Schady, N. R., 2000, "The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES) 1991-95," American Political Science Review, Vol. 94 (June), pp. 289-304.
37. Schuknecht, L., 2000, "Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries," Public Choice, Vol. 102 (January), pp. 113-28.
38. Shleifer, A., and D. Treisman, 2000, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
39. Stokes, S. C., 2001a, "Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Fujimori's Peru," in Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, ed. by Stokes (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press).
40. Stokes, S. C., 2001b, Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press).
41. Tommasi, M., and A. Velasco, 1996, "Where Are We in the Political Economy of Reform?" Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 187-238.
42. Tsebelis, G., 2002, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
43. Velasco, A., 1997, "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Working Paper No. 6336 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
44. Warner, A. M., 2001, "Is Economic Reform Popular at the Polls? Russia 1995," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 29 (September), pp. 448-65.
45. Williamson, J., ed., 1994, The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington: Institute for International Economics).
46. World Bank, 2004a, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (New York: Oxford University Press).
47. World Bank, 2004b, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract (Washington: World Bank).