Self-locating belief in big worlds: Cosmology's missing link to observation

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 99, Issue 12, 2002, Pages 607-623

  Bostrom, Nick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750197018     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3655771     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. That is, that space is simply connected. There has been a recent burst of interest in the possibility that our universe might be multiply connected, in which case it could be both finite and hyperbolic. A multiply connected space could lead to a telltale pattern consisting of a superposition of multiple images of the night sky seen at varying distances from Earth (roughly, one image for each lap around the universe that the light has traveled). Such a pattern has not been found, although the search continues. For an introduction to multiply connected topologies in cosmology, see M. Lachièze-Rey and J.-P. Luminet, "Cosmic Topology," Physics Reports, CCLIV, 3 (1995): 135-214.
2. A widespread misconception is that the open universe in the standard Big Bang model becomes spatially infinite only in the temporal limit. The observable universe is finite, but only a small part of the whole is observable (by us). One fallacious intuition that might be responsible for this misconception is that the universe came into existence at some spatial point in the Big Bang. A better way of picturing things is to imagine space as an infinite rubber sheet, and gravitationally bound groupings (such as stars and galaxies) as buttons glued on to it. As we move forward in time, the sheet is stretched in all directions so that the separation between the buttons increases. Going backward in time, we imagine the buttons coming closer together until, at "time zero," the density of the (still spatially infinite) universe becomes infinite everywhere. See, for example, J. L. Martin, General Relativity (New York: Prentice Hall, 1995).
3. For example, John Earman, "The SAP Also Rises: A Critical Examination of the Anthropic Principle," Philosophical Quarterly, XXIV, 4 (1987): 307-17;
4. John Leslie, Universes (New York: Routledge, 1989).
5. For example, Quentin Smith, "Anthropic Explanations in Cosmology," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXXII, 3 (1994): 371-82;
6. Ian Hacking, "The Inverse Gambler's Fallacy: The Argument from Design: The Anthropic Principle Applied to Wheeler Universes," Mind, LXXVI (1987): 331-40.
7. For example, Ernan McMullin, "Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, XXIV, 3 (1993): 359-89.
8. For example, Richard Swinburne, "Argument from the Fine-tuning of the Universe," in Leslie, ed., Physical Cosmology and Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 154-73.
9. See, for example, S. W. Hawking and W. Israel, eds., General Relativity: An Einstein Centenary Survey (New York: Cambridge, 1979): "[I]t is possible for a black hole to emit a television set or Charles Darwin" (p. 19).
10. To avoid making a controversial claim about personal identity, Hawking and Israel ought to have weakened this to "an exact replica of Charles Darwin." But see also Gordon J. Belot et al., "The Hawking Information Loss Paradox: The Anatomy of a Controversy," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, L, 2 (1999): 189-229.
11. Some cosmologists are recently becoming aware of the problematic that this paper describes - for example, A. Vilenkin, "Unambiguous Probabilities in an Eternally Inflating Universe," Physical Review Letters, LXXXI (1998): 5501-04;
12. A. Linde and A. Mezhlumian, "On Regularization Scheme Dependence of Predictions in Inflationary Cosmology," Physical Review D, LIII (1996): 4267-74.
13. See also Leslie, "Time and the Anthropic Principle," Mind, CI, 403 (1992): 521-40.
14. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Philip P. Wiener, trans. (Princeton: University Press, 1955);
15. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Philosophical Review, LX (1951): 20-43.
16. We may also note that there are some (speculative) theories according to which even the largest structures that we see are not large enough to escape the problem (for example, M. Tegmark, "Does the Universe in Fact Contain Almost No Information?" Foundations of Physics Letters, IX, 1 (1996): 25-42).
17. Moreover, there are many much less extreme theories, such as chaotic inflation theory (see, for example, A. Linde, "Inflation with Variable Omega," Physics Letters B, CCCLI (1995): 99-104), according to which observers are observing a wide range of different values of some physical constant and parameters, not because the observers have illusions or live in habitats that originate from black holes or the like, but because the "constants" and parameters vary over vast cosmic distances or epochs.
18. Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford, 1986)
19. and "Humean Supervenience Debugged," Mind, CIII, 412 (1994): 473-90.
20. A similar principle had earlier been introduced by Hugh Mellor in The Matter of Chance (New York: Cambridge, 1971).
21. "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology," in M. S. Longair, ed., Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Data (Boston: Reidel, 1973), pp. 291-98;
22. "The Anthropic Selection Principle and the Ultra-Darwinian Synthesis," in F. Bertola and U. Curi, eds., The Anthropic Principle (Nets' York: Cambridge, 1989), pp. 33-63.
23. "The Anthropic Principle and Its Implications for Biological Evolution," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, CCCX (1983): 347-63.
24. See, for example, D. N. Page, "Can Quantum Cosmology Give Observational Consequences of Many-Worlds Quantum Theory?" in C. P. Burgess and R. C. Myers, eds., General Relativity and Relativistic Astrophysics, Eighth Canadian Conference, Montreal, Quebec (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1999), pp. 225-32.
25. My "Cars in the Next Lane Really Do Go Faster," PLUS, XVII (2001).
26. See, for example, Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behaviour, XX (1997): 3-24;
27. Robert J. Aumann, Sergiu Hart, and Motty Perry, "The Forgetful Passenger," Games and Economic Behaviour, XX (1997): 117-20.
28. For example, Adam Elga, "Self-locating Belief and the Sleeping-Beauty Problem," Analysis, LX, 266 (2001): 143-47;
29. Lewis, "Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga," Analysis, LXI, 271 (2001): 171-75.
30. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2002). A theory of observation selection effects must walk a fine line in order to cater to legitimate scientific needs while avoiding philosophical paradoxes, of which a great number lie in ambush. Incidentally, the self-sampling assumption is, in my view, a mere derivative of a more powerful principle, and it is only valid in special cases.