The hidden Arab: A critical reading of the notion of 'Turkish Islam'

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 551-570

  Özdalga, Elisabeth ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARAB WORLD; ISLAMISM;

EURASIA; TURKEY;

EID: 33750122399     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: 17437881     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263200600642217     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. Ş. Hanioǧlu, Preparation for a Revolution. The Young Turks 1902-1908 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.306.
2. Ibid., p.298.
3. For this argument, see A. Khalid: 'Pan-Islamism in Practice. The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses', in E. Özdalga (ed.), Late Ottoman Society. The Intellectual Legacy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, Oxford, 2005), pp.201-2.
4. Atatürk was regarded as a freethinker and has been quoted as saying: 'I have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at the bottom of the sea. He is a weak ruler who needs religion to uphold his government; it is as if he would catch his people in a trap'. See G. Ellison, Turkey Today (London: Hutchinson, 1928), p.24,
5. quoted in A. Mango, The Turks Today (New York: The Overlook Press, 2004), p.463. Lord Kinross paraphrases Atatürk as having despised the caliphate as 'an Arab institution adopted by a former Turkish Sultan', a 'tumour of the Middle Ages', which would have to be cut out.
6. See Lord Kinross, Atatürk. A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), p.438.
7. The official claims concerning the history of the Turks were embarrassingly fictitious. According to the Turkish History Thesis, which was declared and defended by historians such as Afet Inan (one of Atatürk's adopted daughters) at the First Turkish History Congress in Ankara in 1932, many great civilizations, from the Chinese, to the Sumerian and the Egyptian originated with the Turks. For a critique of this and the notorious Sun-Language Theory (all languages turned like planets around the Turkish sun) see Ismail Beşikçi, 'Türk-Tarih Tezi' 'Güneş - Dil Teorisi' ve Kürt Sorunu (Istanbul: Komal, 1977). Beşikçi is well known for his blunt critique of official misinformation, which resulted in many court cases and long prison sentences.
8. A note of caution: In spite of the fact that decisive changes were brought about during the early republic, the achievements should not be exaggerated, because important reforms had already been initiated during the late Ottoman era, a process which had been interrupted by the decade-long period of wars, from the Balkan Wars starting in 1912 until the end of the War of Independence in 1922.
9. 'The sense of the past as a collective continuity of experience remains surprisingly important'. See E. Hobsbawm, On History (New York: The New Press, 1997), p.20.
10. G. Göksu-Özdoǧan, 'Turan'dan 'Bozkurt'a. Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946) (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2001).
11. Ibid., p.190.
12. Ibid., pp.187-201.
13. E. Güngör et al. (eds.), Atsiz Armaǧan (Istanbul: Ötüken Yaynevi, 1976), p.xix.
14. Göksu-Özdoǧan: 'Turan'dan 'Bozkurt'a, pp.227-8.
15. Ibid., pp.247-57.
16. E. Özdalga: 'Necip Fazil Kisakürek: Heroic Nationalist in the Garden of Mysticism', Meddelanden, No.19 (1994), Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Stockholm.
17. Göksu-Özdoǧan, 'Turan'dan 'Bozkurt'a, p.278.
18. Ibid., p.279. More exactly, the number of founders was 56, of which 31 were academicians.
19. See also S. Yalçin, 'Aydinlar Ocaǧive Türk İslam Sentezi', Tercüman, 1-6 February 1988, reprinted in
20. B. Güvenç et al. (eds.), Türk-İslam Sentezi (Istanbul: Sarmal, 1991), pp.313-40.
21. 'It is as if a human being cannot be both "religious", "nationalistic", and "modern" [medeniyetçi]. By making these values parts of opposite programs, they are, for no reason at all, turned into "struggling forces".' S.A. Arvasi, Türk-İslam Ülküsü (Istanbul: Türk Kültür Yayini, 1979), Vol.1, p.9.
22. This congress addressed 8 different themes, included 82 presentations and around 250 participants. See Yalçin: 'Aydinlar Ocaǧive Türk İslam Sentezi'. For the above quotation
23. see Yeni Bir Yüzyila Girerken Türk-Islâm Sentezi Göruşünde Meselelerimiz (Aydinlar Ocaǧi) (Istanbul: Beyhan Ajans, 1988), p.23.
24. Arvasi, Türk-İslam Ülküsü, Vol.1, pp.93-4.
25. See the Preface, written by S. Yalčin in I. Kafesoǧlu, Türk/İslam Sentezi (Istanbul: Aydinlar Ocaǧi Yayinlari, 1985), pp.ix-xiii.
26. See also Yalcin, 'Aydinlar Ocaǧi ve Türk İslam Sentezi'.
27. Arvasi, Türk-İslam Ülküsü, Vol.1, p.238.
28. M. Şeker, Fetihlerle Anadolu'nun Türkleşmesi ve Islâmlaşmasi (Ankara: DIB Yayinlari, 1985), p.153.
29. Ibid., p.154.
30. K. Göde, Türk-Islâm. Kültür ve Medeniyet Tarihi (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 1992), p.211.
31. Şeker, Fetihlerle Anadolu'nun Türkleşmesi ve İslâmlaşmasi, p.138.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p.139.
34. Ibid., p.64.
35. Kafesoǧlu, Türk/İslam Sentezi, p.167.
36. Şeker, Fetihlerle Anadolu'nun Türkleşmesi ve İslâmlaşmasi, pp.136-7.
37. Ibid., p.137.
38. Ibid., pp.124, 157-8.
39. Ibid., p.157.
40. See also Kafesoǧlu, Türk/İslam Sentezi, p.192. Kafesoǧlu contended that as long as the institutions for higher learning, medreseler, did not oppose the state and did not press for political influence, they were allowed space for free discussion.
41. The title of the report was: 'A survey of the methods and responsibilities to consider, when deciding on basic cultural elements and a cultural policy'.
42. The report and the above-mentioned letter have been reproduced in B. Güvenç et al. (eds.), Türk-İslam Sentezi, pp.69-111, 269-89.
43. The standard work on Said Nursi is Ş. Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York, 1989).
44. For further references, see the various articles in H. Yavuz and J.L. Esposito (eds.), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003).
45. B. Aras and Ö. Çaha, 'Fethullah Gülen and his Liberal "Turkish Islam" Movement', Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.4, No.4 (2000), pp.30-31.
46. F. Gülen, Fasildan Fasila (Izmir: Nil Yayinlari, 1995), Vol.1, pp.174-5. The 'greater' (inner) versus the 'smaller' (warfaring) jihad.
47. F. Gülen: 'Asker Millet', Sizinti, No.5 (1979). 'Then there are people (nations), who are born to be soldiers. They are soldiers by birth, they grow up listening to soldiers' lullabies, and die as soldiers. They love their military duties; they love the sacrificing, the commando-raids, and the battles. In their endless and impatient struggles they become a call, which reaches from one continent to the other. They roar like the open sea. They engage in contest with the mountains and conquer the steps, and make the Chinese wall bow in front of them [kiss their feet]', http://tr.fgulen.com/a.page/eserleri/ eserlerine.kategorik.bakis/ulke.ve.milletimiz/milletimizin.askeri.yonu/ a7478.html
48. Aras and Çaha, 'Fethullah Gülen and his Liberal "Turkish Islam" Movement', p.31.
49. A. Ünal, M. Fethullah Gülen. Bir Portre Denemesi (Istanbul: Nil Yayinlari, 2002).
50. Similar discussions are found in a special issue on 'Türk(iye) Dindarliǧi' in İslamiyat (Faculty of Theology, Ankara University), Vol.5, No.4 (2002).
51. Ibid., p.147, 152.
52. Ünal, M. Fethullah Gülen. Bir Portre Denemesi, p.151.
53. Ibid., p.172. Expressions more blunt than the tempered language in Ünal's biography can be found in Gülen's own earlier writings, such as Fasyldan Fasyla. See, for example, the description of the Ottoman Empire as 'the only superpower in the world' (Vol.1, p.13), or Iran as Islam's 'constantly sick limb' (Vol.1, p.17), or Turkey as the 'the indestructible, holy nation, which for centuries has been Islam's standard bearer, and was the last sentinel of the whole Islamic world' (Vol.1, pp.242-3), or 'tolerance (hoşgörü), the rose decorating the hillsides of our world [Turkish nation] . . . Yes, persons like Ahmet Yesevi, Yunus Emre, Mevlana, Haci Bektaş, who have brought this thinking to culmination, are people from our world' (Vol.3, p.102).
54. Gülen solves the potential contradiction between nationalism and Islam by means of drawing a line between racist and non-racist nationalism. On the one hand his strong nationalistic feelings, expressed inter alia in his admiration for the Ottoman heritage: 'The most important thing about the Ottomans is the Muslimhood they developed, which was of so high quality', Fasildan Fasila, Vol.3, p.9. On the other hand, his dissociation from racism, which, according to his interpretation, is not approved by the Koran and the sacred traditions (sünnet) while moderate (müsbet, positive, here: Non-racial) forms of nationalism are (ibid., Vol.2, p.5). Since cultural differences among Muslim groups are inevitable, there must be room for 'group feelings', something that is also accepted by the Koran. See Ünal, M. Fethullah Gülen, p.147. In this way Gülen, reconciles nationalism with Islam.
55. Türkiye'de İlk ve Orta Öǧrenim Düzeyinde Tarih Öǧretiminin Yeniden Yapilandirlmasi (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 2000), p.8. This publication is the result of a conference held at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara in December 2000, aiming at solutions to the currently deficient history education.
56. E. Copeaux, 'Hizmet: A Keyword in the Turkish Historical Narrative', New Perspectives on Turkey, No.14 (1996), p.108,
57. and by the same author Tarih Ders Kitaplarinda (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfy Yurt Yayynlary, 1998).
58. Copeaux, 'Hizmet: A keyword in the Turkish Historical Narrative', p.109.
59. Z. Kitapçi, 'Türklerin Müslüman Oluşu', in Türkler (Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu, 2002), Vol.4, p.263.
60. See http://www.alacati.com/turkey/faith.asp
61. Date for starting negotiations as of October 2005 was given at the EU summit in Brussels in December 2004.
62. The European Union, Turkey and Islam, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), p.46.
63. Ibid., p.52.
64. Ibid., pp.56-7.
65. Ibid., p.62.
66. Ibid., p.19 (emphasis added).
67. 'Turkish Islam has its own, unique characteristics and its extensive plurality is largely determined by Turkish history and context. This is also true of the political manifestations in Turkey'. Ibid., p.68.
68. The European Union, Turkey and Islam makes frequent references to a survey written by E.-J. Zürcher and H. van der Linden: 'Search for the Fault-Line. A Survey of the Role of Turkish Islam in the Accession of Turkey to the European Union in the Light of the "Clash of Civilizations"', which is published in the same volume as the Scientific Council report. It must be pointed out that these two contributions differ in their attitudes to the analyzed subject. While there is no doubt about the scholarly detachment of Zürcher and Linden's survey, the Scientific Council's report has absorbed much of the Turkish Islam discourse.
69. The Firestone Library is known for its exceptionally good coverage of publications in all major languages, including those of the Middle East.
70. These observations are partly confirmed by the historian Andrew Mango: 'There are many liberal academics in Turkey, particularly in the new prestige universities. There are also strongholds of nationalist feeling. Istanbul and Ankara universities are jealous guardians of Kemalist orthodoxy. The secularist and nationalist ethos shades into distrust of the outside world, seen as a source of plots against Turkey. This affects the attitudes of civil servants and judges trained in the Ankara faculty of political science and the Ankara and Istanbul law schools. Although, in theory, academics are supposed to be proficient in at least one foreign language, some lack linguistic skills, and as a result, their thinking has narrow - nativist - horizons'. See The Turks Today, p.165. My criticism goes a step further, since my contention is that liberal academicians, who are equally absent as experts on regions outside their own country, contribute to upholding exaggerated forms of nationalism.
71. 'Today the three major peoples of the Middle East, the Turks, Arabs and Persians, have become intellectually isolated from one another. Each is absorbed in its own dialogue with the West, and has little knowledge of the other two, or interest in them, beyond the surface movement of political events'. This was written in 1964, but still largely holds true. B. Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p.73.
72. For Turkey's diplomatic relationship with the Arab Middle East, see inter alia Ö. Kürkç üoǧlu, Türkiye'nin Orta Doǧusu'na Karşi Politikasi (1945-1970) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1972)
73. Ekmeleddin İhsanoǧlu, İki tarafin bakiicesaç isindan Türk-Arap münasebetleri (Istanbul: Islâm Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araş tirma Merkezi, IRCICA, 2000)
74. and M.B. Altunişik and Ö. Tür, Turkey. Challenges of Continuity and Change (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).
75. See I. Arsel, Arab Milliyetç iliǧi ve Türkler (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1973). The author is a well-known law professor who is a passionate secular nationalist, was active during the 1960 military coup, is also the author of Şeriat ve Kadin (1987, said to have sold in 60 000 copies over 10 years) and is a harsh critic of Arab nationalism. The alleged hatred against Turks by Arabs (Muslim or Christian) is said to have existed ever since these two peoples first encountered each other. However, the zeal with which Professor Arsel condemns the Arabs' hatred seems to reveal feelings at least as bad on his part.
76. H. Yavuz, 'Is there a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.24, No.2 (2004), pp.215-16.
77. That a causal relationship between Islam and democracy presents itself immediately in relation to the notion of Turkish Islam, i.e. that this notion builds on the assumption that Turkey's specific form of Islam has promoted democracy in Turkey, is brought to the fore by Zürcher and van der Linden: 'This survey may . . . leave the impression that religion is the all-determining factor in Turkey's development. That is simply not true. Turkey is in many respects a modern country, where the originally Western concepts of democracy and human rights have taken root. . . . this did not happen "thanks to Islam", nor however "in spite of Islam' " (ibid., p.166). The comment also seems to be occasioned by the fact that the authors presumably recognize that they are unintentionally drawn into the orbit of the discourse they are analyzing.
78. N. Elias, The Civilizing Process. State Formation and Civilization (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), p.312.
79. E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp.2-3.