Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 212-230

  Liski, Matti ^a   Montero, Juan Pablo ^b  

^a HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Finland)

^b PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Bertrand competition; Collusion; Cournot competition; Forward markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750010928     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.002     Document Type: Article

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