The fall of legal ethics and the rise of risk management

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 94, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1909-1955

  Alfieri, Anthony V ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33749854927     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (461)

1. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 368 (2004) (quoting David Goelzer, general counsel for the Bucyrus-Erie Corporation).
2. The Center emphasizes both faculty-student and student-to-student mentoring and leadership training tailored to encourage law reform initiatives and non-profit ventures. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 857-62 (2004) (describing the mission and history of the Center for Ethics & Public Service).
3. National conferences annually addressing risk management in the legal profession include the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility National Conference on Professional Responsibility, the Legal Malpractice & Risk Management Conference, and the Association for Professional Responsibility Lawyers Conferences.
4. For a discussion of current and previous corporate scandals, see generally LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL (2002);
5. KENNETH R. GRAY, LARRY A. FRIEDER & GEORGE W. CLARK, JR., CORPORATE SCANDALS: THE MANY FACES OF GREED (2005);
6. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
7. Here, the internal/external distinction turns on the source of the risk management technique. Internal sources stem from lawyer and law firm self-regulation. External sources spring from malpractice insurance carriers outside the firm.
8. For an overview of Regan's work on the large law firm and corporate practice, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931 (2002);
9. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Ethics, Law Firms, and Legal Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 363 (2003);
10. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Foreword: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000);
11. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155 (2002).
12. For Simon's recent writing on the ethics of corporate law practice, see William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2003);
13. William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2005).
14. See REGAN, supra note 1.
15. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998).
16. For appraisals, see Rob Atkinson, Lawyering in Law's Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1999)
17. (reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998));
18. Symposium, The Practice of Justice by William H. Simon, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999).
19. For the purposes of this Essay, large law firms will be defined broadly to include multi-office, multi-state, and multi-national firms in excess of 260 lawyers. See Am Law 200: A Guide to Our Methodology, AM. LAW., Aug. 1, 2005 (noting the average size of The Am Law 200's Second Hundred law firms at 260 lawyers).
20. For commentary on the prosecution, see Steven M. Biskupic, A Criminal Prosecution for Violating Bankruptcy Rule 2014: A Strong Standard or Simply Strong Proof?, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 301 (2000);
21. Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 685-86 (2005);
22. Charles W Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 73, 78 & n.16 (2001).
23. REGAN, supra note 1, at 12.
24. For helpful accounts of the federal investigation and punishment of Kaye Scholer, see Anthony E. Davis, The Long-Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law Firm Management - Risk Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 677 (1994);
25. Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kaye Scholer, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315 (1998);
26. William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998);
27. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993).
28. See also James O. Johnston, Jr. & Daniel Scott Schecter, Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the OTS - Did Anyone Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (1993);
29. Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639 (1994).
30. For evaluations of lawyer conduct in the Enron case, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002);
31. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethics Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143 (2002);
32. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003);
33. Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195 (2003);
34. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002);
35. William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 BUS. LAW. 961 (2003).
36. See also ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (collection of essays).
37. The recent literature on lawyer regulation highlights the importance of the culture and structure of large law firms. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998);
38. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593 (2002);
39. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985);
40. Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G. Hansen, Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2001).
41. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 37-42.
42. See id. at 4 (remarking that "case studies can be an especially valuable way to deepen our understanding of the complex interaction between context and individual character"). For useful recent studies of private practice, see JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005);
43. MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE (1994);
44. CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS (1996).
45. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 71-94.
46. Id at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 16-23; see also WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890-1930 (1986);
50. BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? (1961);
51. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964).
52. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 17. For the relevant background history, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise: 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983)
53. and Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
54. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 20; see generally ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1948 (1946) (providing the history and development of the firm).
55. REGAN, supra note 1, at 21 (questioning "whether the tournament is conducted on a level playing field, how many associates actually aspire to be a partner, and the extent to which the tournament is responsible for the rapid growth of large law firms"). See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991).
56. But see generally George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth, 84 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1998) (rejecting a tournament theory as an explanation for firm growth).
57. REGAN, supra note 1, at 24.
58. Id. at 26-27.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id. at 31-34.
61. Id. at 34.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 35 (quoting Susan Hansen, The Young and the Restless, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 69).
64. Id. at 37.
65. See id. at 37-38.
66. Id. at 40 (noting that lawyers regard specialty norms as legitimate because they mirror the "realities of practice in a particular field" manufactured by '"repeat players' who deal with one another on an ongoing basis").
67. Id. at 45.
68. Id. at 45-49.
69. See id. at 16 (describing Lederman's cultural background and personality at the firm). Historically, old-line Wall Street law firms openly discriminated in hiring on the basis of ethnicity, gender, race, and religion. Noting the "hegemony of Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture" in law firms during the early twentieth century, Jerold Auerbach explains that "[p]ofessionalism and xenophobia were mutually reinforc[ed]" and reiterated in rhetorical "themes of anti-urbanism, anti-Semitism, and nativism." See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 99-100 (1976).
70. REGAN, supra note 1, at 15-16.
71. Regan describes Gellene, an honors graduate from Georgetown University and Harvard Law School, as intellectually gifted and intensely driven and hence highly accustomed to competing in, and winning, tournaments of achievement. In fact, Regan asserts, intellectual competition and accomplishment validated Gellene's sense of self-worth. Id. at 51-52.
72. Regan highlights Gellene's intensive work habits (such as billable hours approaching and sometimes exceeding 3000 annually) and his delinquency in submitting timely billing records ("daynotes"). He reports that the Milbank compensation committee twice penalized Gellene for such delinquency. Id. 51-53. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 372-73 (1985) ("The effect of penalizing attorneys for not billing enough is to pit lawyers against one another in a contest to avoid having low hours compared to their peers.").
73. REGAN, supra note 1, at 63.
74. Id. at 74.
75. Id. at 74-75.
76. Id. at 76-77.
77. Id. at 80.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id. at 83.
80. Id. at 71-87.
81. Id at 87-94. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 2005).
82. Regan describes Bucyrus as an "old economy" manufacturing company with hard assets (production facilities) of sufficient value to warrant reorganization rather than auction in a liquidation sale. Reorganization pulled the bankruptcy into rancorous debtor-creditor negotiations over the relative priority of different claimants in the reorganized company. REGAN, supra note 1, at 355-56.
83. On lawyer liability in structured finance deals, see Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 403, 413-24 (1997);
84. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (2005).
85. REGAN, supra note 1, at 97-135.
86. Id. at 134-72.
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000).
88. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(14) (West 2005).
89. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014.
90. REGAN, supra note 1, at 149-50.
91. Id. at 147.
92. Id. at 150-56. Milbank discontinued its representation of Salovaara in the Greycliff Partners litigation in April 1994, and in the Busse Broadcasting Corporation transaction in October 1994, resuming the latter representation in 1995 and continuing until 1997. Id. at 156-57.
93. See id. at 134-72.
94. See id. at 173-202.
95. See id. at 209-13.
96. Id. at 214 (quoting Gellene). Milbank settled both the disgorgement lawsuit, returning the $1.86 million fee, and the malpractice suit, paying an undisclosed amount estimated at $27 to $50 million. Id. at 231-32. In addition, the Milbank executive committee removed Gellene as a partner. Id. at 229.
97. See id. at 216.
98. Id. at 225-30.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000).
101. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 230-31.
102. See id. at 231.
103. See id. at 272.
104. See id. at 284-87. On the punishment of corporate crime under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Diane E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697 (2002);
105. Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L. REV. 375 (1993).
106. See United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999).
107. REGAN, supra note 1, at 173-74.
108. See id. at 314-319. See generally SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE 96-109 (2002) (describing conflicts of interest in corporate organizational settings);
109. Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823 (1992) (exploring risk avoidance in concurrent conflicts of interest);
110. Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1990);
111. W. Bradley Wendel, Conflicts of Interest Under the Revised Model Rules, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1363 (2003) (comparing rules for multiple client conflicts under Nebraska law with the 2002 Model Rules);
112. W. Bradley Wendel, The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (2003)
113. (assessing the roles of discretion and judgment in conflicts of interest in reviewing ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (2000)
114. and CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001)).
115. REGAN, supra note 1, at 314-21.
116. Id.
117. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908) (governing both adverse and conflicting interests).
118. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1983) (governing personal conflicts); id. at DR 5-105(A)-(C) (governing conflicts with other clients).
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004).
120. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-122, 125, 128, 130-131, & 135 (2000).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2004).
122. Id.
123. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2004).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2004).
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 2 (2004).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Comment links the consentability of a conflict to the circumstances of representation, permitting simultaneous representation "where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them" and where lawyers are able to "resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 28 (2004). In specific, "a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate." Id. (commenting also that "a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other").
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 12 (2004).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2004) ("For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others.").
132. Id. ("The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.").
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 26 (2004) ("The question is often one of proximity and degree.").
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. c (2000).
135. Id. § 121 cmt. c(iii).
136. Id. § 121 cmt. c(iv).
137. Id.; see also id. § 121 cmt. c(iii).
138. Id. § 128 cmt. d(iii).
139. Id. § 128 cmt. b (discussing the prohibition against conflicts of interest and its effect on effective legal representation).
140. REGAN, supra note 1, at 314.
141. Id. at 316.
142. Id. at 317-18.
143. Id. at 314-19.
144. Id. at 319.
145. Id. at 58, 326. For a general discussion of the changes in U.S. bankruptcy law, see DAVID SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001);
146. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Experience from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994).
147. REGAN, supra note 1, at 326-27.
148. Id. at 291, 326-33.
149. See id. at 345-48.
150. Id. at 368 (quoting David Goelzer, general counsel for Bucyrus).
151. Id. at 350.
152. Id. at 350-51.
153. For exposition of the classical norms manifested in the ABA Canons, see Susan D. Carle, Lawyers'Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1999) (focusing on the "justice" of a client's case but touching on the purposes of an ethical code).
154. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 11-52 (4th prtg. 1995).
155. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
157. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995) (challenging assumption of "one true professional faith" and tendency toward overbroad condemnation of conduct);
158. Robert W. Gordon, Professionalisms Old and New, Good and Bad, 8 LEGAL ETHICS 23 (2005) (pointing to the limits of professionalism as an ethical guide);
159. W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 557 (2001) (citing the ambiguities of professionalism);
160. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005) (linking professionalism to the interpretation of legal norms).
161. See KRONMAN, supra note 114; see also SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996) (condemning the lowered standards of the legal profession).
162. For criticism, see Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996) (examining Kronman's claim of declining virtue within the legal profession);
163. David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1994)
164. (reviewing ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993)).
165. See KRONMAN, supra note 114, at 15. The instant account offers a more generous reading of Kronman's jurisprudence than my earlier depiction. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Denaturalizing the Lawyer-Statesman, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1229-30 (1995)
166. (reviewing ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) and arguing that Kronman's emphasis on instrumental values in the ethics of lawyering causes him to place "faith in an artifact that privileges the mind and character of elite white, male, large-firm private lawyers").
167. See KRONMAN, supra note 114, at 15.
168. See id. at 14-17, 295.
169. See id. at 12.
170. See id. at 14-15.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 35.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 139.
175. See id. at 86.
176. See id. at 33-34.
177. See id. at 35.
178. See id. at 54.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 93.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 92-93.
183. See id. at 99-100.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 134 (observing the cooperative role between lawyers and judges).
186. See id. (discussing how lawyers' work includes that of judges' - "namely, the maintenance of the rule of law").
187. Id. at 143-46 (defining the good lawyer's public-spirited devotion to law as an essential component of craft).
188. See id. at 21, 238, 247-48.
189. See id. at 300-01, 316, 349-50, 359-63.
190. See id. at 316.
191. Id. at 316-17, 359-62, 366-68.
192. See id. at 370-72.
193. See id. at 371-72.
194. See id. at 370.
195. Id. at 272-314.
196. Id. at 273-83; REGAN, supra note 1, at 31-42.
197. See KRONMAN, supra note 114, at 278-79. Regan remarks, "All large firms . . . now inhabit a universe whose governing laws are those of the market." REGAN, supra note 1, at 42.
198. See generally id. at 291-300.
199. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 384 (2001) (discussing how "common good" lay at the center of republican thought);
200. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241 (1992);
201. see also Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003).
202. See Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1610-14 (2002);
203. see also Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Conduct in the "Tobacco Wars", 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436-39 (2001) (noting that adversarial tactics of tobacco lawyers have been "morally objectionable");
204. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's The Path of Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1571, 1581 (1997) (examining Holmes's paradigmatic view of the lawyer as representative of the "bad man");
205. W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2003).
206. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Equality and Affiliation as Bases of Ethical Responsibility, 61 LA. L. REV. 173, 173-74 (2000);
207. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 379 (2004);
208. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Responsibility, Professional and Otherwise, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (1999).
209. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1999);
210. W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 116-18 (2000).
211. Brandeis stands as the best exemplar of this enlarged scope of lawyer responsibility. See William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1985);
212. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1471 (1996);
213. see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 237-38 (1988) (applauding the "Brandeisian vision of moral activism").
214. See W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1960 (2001).
215. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 11 IND. L.J. 1 (2002) (assailing normative weakness in rational-choice theories of social norms).
216. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1992);
217. Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrongs with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 (1995).
218. See generally Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1996) (discerning community norms within ethics rules, narratives, and commitments).
219. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation - Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1182 (2003);
220. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., State Supreme Court Regulatory Authority over the Legal Profession, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1997);
221. David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?-Managing Conflict and Context in Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 480 (1996);
222. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 834 (1992).
223. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983);
224. cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (1994) (examining the role of lawyers in Cover's writings).
225. Cover, supra note 160, at 9.
226. Id.
227. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287, 1301-02 (1982).
228. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (tracing the moral dilemmas and dissonance spawned by the enactment and enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law).
229. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 658-80, 682 (1981).
230. Theologically, Shaffer's prophetic vision comes from a biblical sense of justice and spiritual renewal. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice of Justice?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1999)
231. (reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998));
232. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Irony of Lawyers' Justice in America, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 (2002).
233. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981);
234. Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and Jurisprudence from Within Religious Congregations, 16 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961 (2001).
235. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1998);
236. see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 628 (2003).
237. On spiritual engagement as love and reconstructive community, see Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990);
238. Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resurrecting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431 (1994).
239. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 469, 469-71, 477-78 (2003).
240. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers and the Biblical Prophets, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 521, 521 (2003) ("Much of what admirable lawyer-heroes have done . . . has been prophetic in the biblical sense . . . . ");
241. Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REV. 229 (1999) (discussing communitarian legal ethics).
242. REGAN, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting Bob O'Hara, Milbank partner).
243. On the relationship between law and social norms, and their impact on behavior and change, see ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000);
244. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999);
245. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997);
246. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
247. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 1-4; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (sketching a theory of ethical discretion in lawyer decisionmaking).
248. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 211-19 (1996) (discussing how professional liability insurance augments existing ethical rules or creates new classes of restricted conduct);
249. Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 234-41 (1996).
250. SIMON, supra note 9, at 8-9.
251. Simon, supra note 172, at 1085.
252. See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 14-16 (1997) (discussing how people handle the everyday dimensions of risk);
253. James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1410-11 (1987) (showing how business managers avoid risk rather than accept it).
254. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, in RISK AND MORALITY 258, 262-63 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).
255. See Jonathan Simon, Risking Rescue: High Altitude Rescue as Moral Risk and Moral Opportunity, in RISK AND MORALITY, supra note 177, at 375, 399-401.
256. For analyses on moral hazard in different contexts, see CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 28-48 (1985);
257. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996);
258. Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91 (1996);
259. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11 (1999).
260. See EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
261. For skeptical accounts of corporate governance trends, see William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999);
262. Robert Eli Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003);
263. David A. Skeel Jr., Creditors' Ball: The 'New' New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003).
264. See 2 BETTY VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTITIES ch. 23, 1-18 (1990).
265. See generally THOMAS L. BARTON ET AL., MAKING ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT PAY OFF (2002) (studying enterprise-wide risk management in businesses).
266. See generally George S. Oldfield & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 39 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 33 (1997).
267. See Jeffrey S. Grange, Risk Management and the "Rogue" Trader: Trading-Related Losses, Director & Officer Liability, Prudent Risk Management, Insurance Risk Transfer, the Role of Education, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 332-33 (2000);
268. Neil D. Levin, Insurance Supervision Meets the Marketplace: The Regulatory Response to Derivatives as a Risk Management Tool in the Insurance Industry, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 17 (2000).
269. See Bryan A. Liang, The Effectiveness of Physician Risk Management: Potential Problems for Patient Safety, 5 RISK DECISION & POLICY 183, 194-99 (2000).
270. See generally DAVID E. MARCINKO, INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR PHYSICIANS AND ADVISORS (2005);
271. Frank V. Lefevre et al., A Survey of Physician Training Programs in Risk Management and Communication Skills for Malpractice Prevention, 28 J.L. Med. & Ethics 258 (2000).
272. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 275, 285 (2001);
273. A.G. Celli, Jr., Note, Toward a Risk Contribution Approach to Tortfeasor Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1990);
274. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 314-15 (1990).
275. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 396-98 (2005);
276. Sarah Guyton, An Institutional Perspective on the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 571, 573-75 (2004).
277. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 102-04 (1995);
278. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: No Lawyer or Client Is Safe, 47 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1995);
279. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2586-88 (1996);
280. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1663-65 (1994).
281. On the intersection of business and legal ethics, see Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics and Legal Ethics for the Common Good: Come, Let Us Reason Together, 29 J. CORP. L. 469, 510-24 (2004);
282. Rob Atkinson, Growing Greener Grass: Looking From Legal Ethics to Business Ethics, and Back, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 951, 960-81 (2004).
283. On moral decay in law firm culture, see Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 720-46 (1998);
284. William J. Wernz, The Ethics of Large Law Firms - Responses and Reflections, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 186-97 (2005).
285. See Colleen L. Rest, Electronic Mail and Confidential Client-Attorney Communications: Risk Management, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 309, 310-12 (1998).
286. See Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 275-76 (1994).
287. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 565 (2002);
288. Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor, Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1012 (1994);
289. Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 103, 104-06 (2000);
290. Peter J. Winders, Law Firm General Counsel Extravagance or Necessity?, 15 PROF. LAW. 1 (2005).
291. See Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336 (2005);
292. see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 335-36 (2003).
293. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Underlying Causes of Withdrawal and Expulsion of Partners from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073, 1073-75 (1998).
294. See Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 41, 43-45 (2004);
295. Frederic L. Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1285, 1285-86 (1988);
296. Andrew S. Hanen & Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exclusions, Selected Coverage and Consumer Issues, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 75, 77-78 (1992);
297. Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities: An Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 641, 641-44 (1998).
298. For a look at loss prevention and malpractice generally, see Mark Bassingthwaighte, Insurance Show and Tell: Make Sure Your Malpractice Carrier Knows About Your Firm's Loss Prevention Efforts, 89 A.B.A. J. 36 (2003);
299. George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305 (1997).
300. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 697 (2002);
301. see also Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998).
302. ANTHONY E. DAVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS 16 (1995). Davis defines "risk" in terms of "any danger that, if not controlled, may lead to any consequence unintended by and actually or potentially harmful to a law firm or practitioner." Id. at 15;
303. see also John A. Edginton, Managing Lawyers' Risks at the Millennium, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1987, 1989-90 (1999) (outlining risk management principles for law firms);
304. William H. Fortune & Dulaney O'Roark, Risk Management for Lawyers, 45 S.C. L. REV. 617, 618-19 (1994) (suggesting that lawyers "manage . . . risk by practicing defensive law");
305. Bao Q. Tran & Jonathan P. Tomes, Risk Analysis: Your Key to Compliance, ACC DOCKET, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 38-54 (discussing how to assess risk and review such assessments).
306. See Suzanne Rose, Risk Management: Is the Culture of Your Firm Inviting Malpractice or Ethics Violations?, 41 TENN. B.J. 22, 23-24 (2005) (counseling law firms on risk avoidance through culture modification).
307. See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 180, at 1-25.
308. Baker, supra note 179, at 289.
309. See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 180, at 18.
310. See William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge, 94 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2006). Incentive effects may also implicate moral hazard. For Baker, '"moral hazard' refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss." Baker, supra note 184, at 239. Without more, it is unclear whether risk management systems create moral hazard by encouraging or tempting "good people to do wrong" Id. at 241.
311. Simon, supra note 204, at 1987 ("Risk management forces attention to practical consequences of professional responsibility decisions, at least insofar as consequences are measured by liability.").
312. Id. at 1988 ("The risk management view is resolutely collaborative.").
313. Id. at 1990 ("[L]ike ethics teaching, risk management encourages clear articulation of ethical decisions.").
314. See Baker & Simon, supra note 180, at 11.
315. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 215-16.
316. See id. at 314-24.
317. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 & DR 1-103(A) (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. g (2000) ("For the purpose of identifying conflicts of interest, a lawyer should have reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to detect conflicts of interest, including procedures to determine in both litigation and nonlitigation matters the parties and interests involved in each representation."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-401 (1996) (citing lawyer supervisory obligations under Rule 5.1).
318. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2004).
319. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 3 (2004).
320. See id.
321. See generally REGAN, supra note 1.
322. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1966 (2006) ("[C]onceptualizing ethics as a matter of avoiding liability can influence [personal] dispositions, attitudes, and motives, and therefore how someone exercises her discretion."); SIMON, supra note 9, at 109-37.
323. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 138-69.
324. See id. at 205. For earlier, less amenable accounts of Simon's jurisprudence, see Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Raceing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999);
325. Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2619-29 (1993).
326. REGAN, supra note 1, at 368 (quoting David Goelzer).
327. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 172, at 1083-84.
328. See id. at 1083.
329. See id. at 1083, 1091.
330. See id. at 1144.
331. See id. at 1090-91.
332. See id. at 1093-94.
333. See COVER, supra note 163, at 201-56.
334. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 172, at 1096-98.
335. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 139-40.
336. See Simon, supra note 172, at 1103.
337. See id. at 1108-09.
338. Long-run claims of justice fail to revive this republican appeal. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 53-76.
339. REGAN, supra note 1, at 71-172.
340. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 & 5-24 (1983) (discussing the responsibilities of a lawyer retained or employed by a corporation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 49, 96 & 131 (2000) (discussing a lawyer's duties to a client in general, breach of fiduciary duty, representation of organizations, and conflicts of interest in representing organizations, respectively). See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-365 (1992) (discussing conflicts of interest in representing trade
341. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2004).
342. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2004).
343. See id.
344. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 5 (2004).
345. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2004).
346. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2004).
347. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2004).
348. Id.
349. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2004).
350. Under Model Rule 1.7, a conflict of interest may exist prior to representation. In that event, the rule directs declination of the representation, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client. The rule recommends the adoption of reasonable firm-wide procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm practice, to determine the persons and issues embroiled in both litigation and nonlitigation conflicts. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (2004).
351. Alternatively, under Model Rule 1.7, a conflict may arise subsequent to representation. In such event, the rule ordinarily directs withdrawal from the representation, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2004).
352. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (2004).
353. Id.
354. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 1 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109(A), DR 2-110(A)-(C) (1983) (discussing acceptance of and withdrawal from employment); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 31-32 (2000). See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) (discussing withdrawal when a lawyer's services will otherwise be used to perpetrate a fraud).
355. REGAN, supra note 1, at 37-41, 298.
356. Id. at 53-54, 60-62. In 1989, Milbank discovered that Gellene had neglected to acquire membership in the New York state bar and the federal bar, delaying his licensing for almost nine years, despite his assertions to the contrary. As a consequence, Milbank removed Gellene as a partner, reinstating him only after the state bar conducted a hearing and reached a decision to accept his application. By way of penalty, the 1991 reinstatement redesignated Gellene's partnership class, depriving him of two years of seniority. Id. at 60-62.
357. Id. at 198-99, 301. Gellene's neglect resulted in a court ordered default judgment against South Street and a loss of $19.9 million. In submissions to the court, Gellene falsely attributed the delay to a conflict between Salovaara and Eckert. Id. at 301.
358. Id. at 37-42.
359. Id. at 57-59.
360. Id. at 63-70.
361. Id. at 344-47.
362. Id. at 4-6.
363. Id. at 41-42.
364. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 99, 116 (1998);
365. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes, Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1423 (1997).
366. REGAN, supra note 1, at 272 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Biskupic's closing federal prosecution argument).
367. See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 230-57 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992).
368. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 457, 490 (2000);
369. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement: Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989).
370. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1758 (2005).
371. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991);
372. see also Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2002) (re-examining Professor Schneyer's argument for a respondeat superior standard to assure law firm compliance with ethics standards).
373. REGAN, supra note 1, at 358-59.
374. See id.; see also Harvey S. James Jr., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making through Organizational Structure, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 43 (2000) (arguing that a formal organization structure, including compensation practices, performance and evaluation systems, and decision-making assignments, is necessary but not sufficient to promote ethical conduct).
375. REGAN, supra note 1, at 358-61.
376. Id. at 358.
377. Id. at 360.
378. See id. at 361-66.
379. Id. at 366.
380. Id. at 361.
381. Id. at 365-66. See generally DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF: How SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES (1998) (describing the methods securities firms use for self-regulation).
382. REGAN, supra note 1, at 366.
383. Id.
384. See Mitchell M. Simon, Navigating Troubled Waters: Dealing with Personal Values when Representing Others, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 415 (2005) (developing a framework for incorporating individual morality into daily legal choices).
385. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988) (identifying three aspects of independence and focusing on means of developing "autonomous social force");
386. Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the Organizational Client: Legal Diagnosis and Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 179 (2001) (discussing the significance of problem identification).
387. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 315-25 (1998) (suggesting creative ways to strengthen professionalism).
388. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 549 (1998) (discussing the importance of reputation for legal work).
389. See William H. Simon, Criminal Defenders and Community Justice: The Drug Court Example, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1595 (2003) (describing the role of community courts to strengthen legal practice);
390. William H. Simon & Charles F. Sabel, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (examining broader problem-solving role of lawyers in institutional reform litigation);
391. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 177-81 (2004) (discussing the reinvigoration of lawyers' problem-solving role in relation to public concerns).
392. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 880 (2002) (highlighting integrity as applied to lawyers);
393. David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (2003) (identifying ways self-deception hinders integrity);
394. Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 333 (2003) (exploring ways to inculcate integrity during professional training).
395. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996) (applying virtue ethics to specific legal questions).
396. See generally ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999) (developing a means to apply Aristotelian understanding of virtue to contemporary choices);
397. VIRTUE ETHICS (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, eds., 1997).
398. See William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1996);
399. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 424 (2004) (arguing that lawyers have an obligation to maintain a legitimate legal system);
400. David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 290 (1996) (noting lawyers' express commitment to obey the law).
401. See David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 979 (1999) (arguing that lawyers should generally avoid willful ignorance, especially in regard to corporate clients' efforts to enrich themselves);
402. William H. Simon, The Belated Decline of Literalism in Professional Responsibility Doctrine: Soft Deception and the Rule of Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1881, 1881 (2002) (supporting the decline of literalism in professional responsibility);
403. W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667 (2001)
404. (reviewing ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)) (connecting ordinary moral considerations and professional role prescriptions);
405. see also David Luban, The Art of Honesty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1774 (2001) (describing lawyers' failure to distinguish facts from truth).
406. For discussion on lying and lawyering, see Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 155, 175 (1996) (differentiating between morally acceptable and unacceptable lies by lawyers)
407. and William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 463 (1999) (arguing that lawyers' lies on behalf of their clients are only justified when there is an important competing moral value).
408. See W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1567, 1569 (2003) (arguing for the use of honor as a restraint on legal practices).
409. See generally Rob Atkinson, Liberating Lawyers: Divergent Parallels in Intruder in the Dust and To Kill a Mockingbird, 49 DUKE L.J. 601, 604-05 (1999) (contrasting the paternalistic ethics of Atticus Finch and the more challenging ethics of Lucas Beauchamp);
410. Constance Frisby Fain, Characteristics of the Heroic Lawyer and Avoidance of Unprofessional Conduct, 13 WIDENER L.J. 61 (2003) (describing how "heroic" lawyers benefit the profession);
411. William H. Simon, Moral Icons: A Comment on Steven Lubet's Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1376, 1377 (1999) (endorsing an understanding of Finch's morally complicated heroism);
412. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 421 (2001) (tracing the theme of "moral pluck" through John Grisham's novels, L.A. Law, and The Practice);
413. W. Bradley Wendel, Our Love-Hate Relationship with Heroic Lawyers, 13 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2003) (noting that personal sacrifice is as important a quality of legal heroism as courtroom skill).
414. See generally David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons From the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855 (1998) (analyzing clients as independent moral agents, particularly related to law firm diversity).
415. On the scope of disclosure and whistleblowing rules, see Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1995).
416. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 805-17 (2001);
417. see also Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, March 31, 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf (describing lawyer-director cooperation in corporate governance).
418. For an analysis of norm integration in legal rules and regulations, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 (2001)
419. and Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (2003).
420. For statutory provisions regarding attorneys and implementing regulations, see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7202, 7245, 7262 (2005); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2005). See also Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004);
421. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
422. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post-Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) (discussing director and officer responsibility for compliance programs);
423. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and their Officers and Directors for an Ethical Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (discussing officer and director responsibility to disclose unethical corporate culture).
424. See generally JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY (Supp. 2005) (providing guidelines for corporate risk management and compliance programs).
425. See George H. Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637 (1994);
426. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977);
427. Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (2005).
428. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 1044 (1997) (discussing when a lawyer should interdict client fraud);
429. Donald Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 78 (1993) (discussing lawyer ethical responsibilities in relation to client fraud).
430. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 833 (1994) (analyzing corporate criminal liability and monitoring incentives);
431. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (reviewing duty-based corporate liability regimes);
432. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999) (discussing how corporate liability is increasingly pushed onto corporate agents);
433. Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937 (2003) (showing how criminal law failed to provide adequate deterrence);
434. Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 BUS. LAW. 617 (1994) (outlining various steps to avoid criminal liability).
435. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1015 (1997) (analyzing a corporate lawyer's responsibility to bring compliance issues to the attention of the board);
436. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389, 1418 (2004) (analyzing the ethical obligations of an independent lawyer-director).
437. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee's Ethical and Legal Responsibilities: The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 28 (2005) (reviewing the ethical obligations of the board of director's audit committee).
438. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004).
439. For historical background on racial partisanship in the legal profession, see generally David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915 (2005);
440. David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999)
441. (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999));
442. David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999);
443. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998);
444. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996).
445. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (examining numerous failures that lead to unequal access to justice and proposing alternatives);
446. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013 (2004) (same);
447. Deborah L. Rhode, Defining the Challenges of Professionalism: Access to Law and Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C L. REV. 889 (2003) (examining the challenges facing the enlargement of lawyer professionalism).
448. Compare Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415, 2418 (1999) (considering strategies to improve the "culture of commitment" to pro bono work),
449. with Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democratic Critique of Pro Bono Publico Representation of the Poor: The Good as the Enemy of the Best, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2001) (arguing that an expanded system of tax-funded lawyers would be the best means to provide legal services to the poor).
450. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the "Public" Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721 (2005);
451. Robert W. Gordon, Private Career-Building and Public Benefits: Reflections on "Doing Well By Doing Good," 41 HOUS. L. REV. 113 (2004);
452. David B. Wilkins, Doing Well By Doing Good? The Role of Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2004);
453. Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and the Public Interest, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1501 (2002) (book review).
454. See Michael P. Allen, Can Actions Teach Louder Than Words: The Role of Mentoring and Modeling in Teaching Professional Ethics: An Introduction (and a Confession), 14 WIDENER L.J. 323, 328 (2005);
455. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories About Clients, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1998);
456. W. Bradley Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 711, 713-14 (2002).
457. See Letter from Thomas L. Shaffer, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, Notre Dame Law School, to Anthony V. Alfieri (Jan. 30, 2006) (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.