Insurrectionary warfare: The German debate about a levée en masse in October 1918

Journal of Modern History

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 459-527

  Geyer, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33749850807     PISSN: 00222801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/339124     Document Type: Article

References (342)

1. Die nationale Verteidigung, die Erhebung des Volkes muß eingeleitet . . . werden. . . . [Es] darf kein Tag verloren gehen. Walther Rathenau, "Ein dunkler Tag," Vossische Zeitung, October 7, 1918,
2. repr. in Walther Rathenau, Gesammelte Schriften in sechs Bänden (Berlin, 1929), 6:258-61.
3. On the explicit use of the French terminology, see Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds., Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden (Düsseldorf, 1962), pp. 92, 103.
4. Wilhelm Breucker, Die Tragik Ludendorffs: Eine kritische Studie auf Grund persönlicher Erinnerungen an den General und seine Zeit (Stollhamm, 1953), p. 62.
5. Martin Sabrow, Die verdrängte Verschwörung: Der Rathenau-Mord und die deutsche Gegenrevolution (Frankfurt, 1999).
6. On the conspiracy, see Erich Ludendorff, Die überstaatlichen Mächte im letzten Jahr des Weltkrieges (Leipzig, n.d. [1927]).
7. On Rathenau, see Gerhard Hecker, Walther Rathenau und sein Verhältnis zu Militär und Krieg (Boppard am Rhein, 1983), pp. 428-44;
8. Ernst Schulin, Walther Rathenau: Repräsentant, Kritiker und Opfer seiner Zeit (Göttingen, 1979).
9. Among military historians, see Peter Graf von Kielmannsegg, Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 671.
10. The English literature seems to be unaware of the issue; see John Keegan, The First World War (New York, 1999).
11. Ute Frevert, Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1997).
12. Roland G. Foerster, ed., Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung (Munich, 1994).
13. Eckardt Opitz and Frank S. Rödiger, eds., Allgemeine Wehrpflicht: Geschichte, Probleme, Perspektiven (Bremen, 1994).
14. Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland, vol. 4: Die Herrschaft des deutschen Militarismus und die Katastrophe von 1918 (Munich, 1968), pp. 417-18.
15. See, e.g., Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (New York, 1997).
16. Wilhelm Deist, "Der militärische Zusammenbruch des Kaiserreichs. Zur Realität der Dolchstoßlegende," in Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft: Studien zur preußischdeutschen Militärgeschichte, ed. Wilhelm Deist (Munich, 1991), pp. 211-33,
17. "Verdeckter Militärstreik im Kriegsjahr 1918," in Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes: Eine Militärgeschichte von unten, ed. Wolfram Wette (Munich, 1995), pp. 146-67;
18. Nick Howard, "The German Revolution Defeated and Fascism Deferred: The Servicemen's Revolt and Social Democracy at the End of the First World War, 1918-1920," in Opposing Fascism: Community, Authority, and Resistance in Europe, ed. Tim Kirk and Anthony McElligott (Cambridge and New York, 1999), pp. 12-32.
19. Christoph Jahr, Gewöhnliche Soldaten: Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen Heer, 1914-1918 (Göttingen, 1998).
20. Ritter 4:418.
21. Ibid., 4:425.
22. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Der erste totale Krieg: Woran das deutsche Kaiserreich zugrunde ging - und was darauf folgte," Die Zeit 35 (August 20, 1998), p. 66.
23. The otherwise excellent collection by Jörg Dupler and Gerhard P. Groß, eds., Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung (Munich, 1999) is a good indication of this trend.
24. J. P. Harris and Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign, 8 August-11 November 1918 (London and Washington, 1998).
25. Ulrich Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage: Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1983).
26. Siegfried A. Kaehler, "Vier quellenkritische Untersuchungen zum Kriegsende 1918," Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen I. Philologische Klasse, no. 8 (1960): 423-81.
27. Herfried Münkler and Wolfgang Storch, Siegfrieden: Politik mit einem deutschen Mythos (Berlin, 1988).
28. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York, 1999).
29. Fritz Klein, Willibald Gutsche, and Joachim Petzold, eds., Deutschland im ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1968).
30. Friedrich von Payer, in the Cabinet meeting of October 20, 1918; Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), p. 289.
31. Dieter Riesenberger, Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland von den Anfängen bis 1933 (Göttingen, 1985), pp. 118-23.
32. The exception is Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford, 1993).
33. The idea of a code is borrowed from Shulamit Volkov, Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1990).
34. The two most recent accounts are Joachim Petzold, "Die Entscheidung vom 29. September 1918," Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte 4 (1965): 517-34;
35. Eberhard Kessel, "Ludendorffs Waffenstillstandsforderung am 29. September 1918," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 2 (1968): 65-86.
36. Bernhard Schwertfeger, Das Weltkriegsende: Gedanken über die deutsche Kriegführung (Potsdam, 1937).
37. Wolfgang Foerster, Der Feldherr Ludendorff im Unglück: Eine Studie über seine seelische Haltung in der Endphase des ersten Weltkrieges (Wiesbaden, 1952).
38. quote from the manuscript (fn. 27), because the published version is reduced and cleaned up. Franz Uhle-Wettler, Erich Ludendorff in seiner Zeit: Soldat - Stratege - Revolutionär. Eine Neubewertung (Berg, 1995).
39. Albrecht von Thaer, Generalstabsdienst an der Front und in der O. H. L. aus Briefen und Tagebitchaufzeichnungen, 1915-1919, ed. Siegfried A. Kaehler (Göttingen, 1958), p. 234.
40. Wolfgang Foerster, "Ludendorffs seelische Haltung im Unglück (15.VII.-26.X.1918)," typescript of a draft with extensive handwritten revisions, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (hereafter BA-MA) [Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres] W-10/50 723, here p. 90.
41. He would subsequently deny having spoken of an impending catastrophe and made it look like an invention of Berlin civilians (who were out of their minds according to Ludendorff). He also rejected Paul von Hintze's account of the War Council of September 29. However, Hintze's account is for the most part truthful and, as far as Berlin is concerned, Ludendorff plain lied.
42. Ludendorff famously characterized August 8 as the "black day of the German army." Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1919), p. 547.
43. Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 1914-1918 Ibid., pp. 550-52.
44. Erich Ludendorff and Hans von Haeften, "Copy of a First Note of General Ludendorff on the Events of August 18 to His Dismissal," BA-MA W-10/52 066, p. 8.
45. This was also the assessment of the section heads in the Supreme Command; see Foerster, "Ludendorff im Unglück," p. 90;
46. and Bogdan Krizman, "Der militärische Zusammenbruch auf dem Balkan im Herbst 1918," Österreichische Osthefte 10 (1968): 268-93.
47. The Bavarian military representative at the Supreme Command noted the unusual nature of this admission which stood in contrast to the habit of "making every set-back into a major German victory" and added that "this unusual veracity makes one think." He concluded that "if they do not find the courage to tell the full truth today, a catastrophe will be inevitable." Königlich bayerischer Militärbevollmächtigter beim Großen Hauptquartier, September 29, 1918; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv [BayHStA], IV [Militärarchiv], Akten Kriegsministerium [Mkr]/1828.
48. Thaer, p. 235.
49. On the internal politics in Spa, see John D. Buckelew, "Erich Ludendorff and the German War Effort, 1916-1918: A Study in the Military Exercise of Power" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1974), pp. 418-22;
50. and Robert B. Asprey, The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I (New York, 1991).
51. Thaer, p. 235.
52. Quote by Colonel Heye (chief of operations section, Supreme Command) is represented by Foreign Secretary Paul von Hintze in Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918, vol. 2: Gutachten des Sachverständigen Oberst a.D. Bernhard Schwertfeger [= Vierte Reihe im Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassungsgebenenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages, 1919-1926] (Berlin, 1925), p. 407 (the volume is hereafter referred to as UA [Untersuchungsausschuß] 4/2, page).
53. Ludendorff paraphrased by Hintze, UA 4/2, 408.
54. On British tactics and operational doctrine, see Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics on the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-1918 (New Haven and London, 1994).
55. Ludendorff quoted by Hintze, UA 4/2, 405, 412.
56. Colonel Haeften quoted in Max von Baden, Erinnerungen und Dokumente (Berlin and Leipzig, 1928), p. 340: "Ich will meine Armee retten."
57. Telegram of Supreme Command in Kuhl collection, October 3, 1918, BA-MA W-10/50 652, p. 194.
58. Erich Ludendorff, Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung: Über ihre Tätigkeit, 1916-18 (Berlin, 1920), p. 530, with an explicit denial. Ludendorff forgot his own assessment that "a continuation of the war is useless" and that "the definite defeat of the German army is unavoidable," according to Thaer, pp. 234-35. Instead he preferred to remember the loss of confidence in the German troops which in Ludendorff's view had become unreliable.
59. Ludendorff, Urkunden, p. 530.
60. Ludendorff, Urkunden, Ibid., pp. 535-38.
61. Erich Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik (Berlin, 1922).
62. Note of Finance Minister Roedern on the events leading to the peace and armistice offer of October 4, 1918, UA 4/2, 418.
63. Roedern was a key official in the imperial government. His goal at this point was to ease in a new, more parliamentary government and especially a reform of the Prussian three-class system. Ludendorff accused him of exacerbating the crisis for his own ends.
64. For the presentations of the Generals Gallwitz and Mudra, see Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), pp. 397-411.
65. Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führertätigkeit im Weltkriege, 1914/1916: Belgien, Osten, Balkan (Berlin, 1929), p. 441;
66. Kuhl, diary excerpts, September 30, 1918, BA-MA W-10/50 652, p. 194 ("In other words, we declare the campaign lost, and start negotiations. Isn't this too early? First we need to stay put in the Hermannstellung."); Letter of Wilhelm Groener to Paul von Hintze, October 28, 1918, in Foerster, "Ludendorff im Unglück" (n. 27 above), pp. 102-3.
67. See the vituperation of Wild von Hohenborn, which is directed at the government rather than his superiors. Wilhelm Deist, ed., Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1970), 2:1315-17.
68. Note of Friedrich Graf von Schulenburg, n.d., BA-MA Nachlass Schulenburg, N58/1, p. 221.
69. Foerster, "Ludendorff im Unglück,"p. 104.
70. Within the framework of the stab-in-the-back debate there was always another and altogether equally vicious but entirely internal debate about the military leadership having lost its nerve and raised "the white flag." It is a debate that resurfaced in earnest in 1942-43 both in the Nazi and the military leadership - but then transformed by the mythical memory of 1918.
71. Tieschowitz, research for the final volume [of Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918], summer 1940, ms. p. 184, BA-MA W-10/50 726, p. 15.
72. Tieschowitz, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Ibid., p. 17.
73. Instructions to the Armistice Commission, October 23, 1918 (signed Hindenburg and Ludendorff); Amtliche Urkunden zur Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes 1918, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1924), pp. 191-92.
74. Hermann Cron, "Konnte das deutsche Heer im November 1918 weiterkämpfen? Untersuchungen auf Grund der Kriegsakten der Kommandobehörden," n.d., BA-MA W-10/52095.
75. There is a good case to be made for revisiting the entire issue of morale in 1918. Meeting of the Cabinet with General Groener, November 5, 1918; Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), pp. 529-32.
76. J. P. Harris, "Das britische Expeditionsheer in der Hundert Tage Schlacht vom 8. August bis 11. November 1918," in Düpier and Groß, eds. (n. 13 above), pp. 116-34, here p. 133.
77. Ritter (n. 7 above), 4:415, speaks of a "palace revolution" of the section chiefs.
78. Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen (n. 29 above), p. 582.
79. Generalfeldmarschall [Paul] von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (Leipzig, 1934), p. 306.
80. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967);
81. Winfried Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918 (Vienna and Munich, 1966);
82. Immanuel Geiss, "Armistice in Eastern Europe and the Fatal Sequels: Successor States and Wars, 1918-1923," in At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes, and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918, ed. Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 1998), pp. 237-54. It seems to me that a renewal of the debate on war aims is imperative, but the topic far exceeds the limits of this essay.
83. Bullitt Lowry, Armistice 1918 (Kent, Ohio, 1996);
84. Pierre Renouvin, L'armistice de Rethondes, 11 November 1918: Trent journées qui on fait la France (Paris, 1968).
85. Tieschowitz, BA-MA W-10/50 726, p. 18.
86. Ludendorff, Urkunden (n. 42 above), p. 534.
87. Ernst von Eisenhart-Rothe, Im Banne der Persönlichkeit: Aus den Lebenserinnerungen des Generals der Infantrie a. D. (Berlin, 1931), pp. 122-23.
88. Tieschowitz, BA-MA W-10/50 726, p. 17.
89. Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden für Europa: Die Politik der deutschen Reichstagsmehrheit, 1917-18 (Essen, 1988).
90. The idea of the ius gentium as the basis for a new European order will require separate study. It is surely as important (although not as politically prominent) as the notion of a levée en masse. 69 Paul von Hintze came into office on July 9 and was replaced by Wilhelm Soif on October 4. On Hintze's plan, see "Aufzeichnung des Auswärtigen Amtes, 28. September 1918," in Amtliche Urkunden (n. 56 above), p. 47, and UA 4/2, 405-6.
91. Johannes Hürter, ed., Paul von Hintze, Marineoffizier, Diplomat, Staatssekretär: Dokumente einer Karriere zwischen Militär und Politik, 1903-1918 (Munich, 1998), pp. 103-7; Ritter (n. 7 above), p. 415, considers the event an unprecedented palace revolution of staff officers.
92. UA 4/2, 401.
93. Much of the candor of Hintze's assessment comes from his postwar testimony (which is to be taken with a grain of salt, because at this point he was embroiled in nasty catcalls with Ludendorff). See ibid., 386-415.
94. Ibid., 401, 406.
95. Memorandum, signed by Rosenberg, Bergen, Stumm, September 28, 1918, in Amtliche Urkunden, p. 47. See Hürter, pp. 103-5, 639-40 (doc. 239).
96. Hürter, pp. 640-42 (doc. 240) and 643 (doc. 241). It is interesting to contemplate that Hintze was the only one to bring suggestions as to what to do to the war council.
97. UA 4/2, 406.
98. Hintze speaks explicitly of a "democratic facade" - and he meant it. Hence associating him with parliamentarization is a rather dubious proposition. Hürter, p. 666 (doc. 254).
99. Ibid., p. 406 (my italics).
100. Ibid, (my italics).
101. The English literature on Max von Baden is exceedingly scarce. See Klaus Epstein, "Wrong Man in the Maelstrom: The Government of Max von Baden," Review of Politics 26, no. 2 (1962): 215-43.
102. His connections to the "ethical imperialism" movement (which also informed his stand on peace) have recently resurfaced in Eberhard Demm, "Kurt Hahn's Memorandum on the Subject of Ethical Imperialism 1918," War in History 5, no. 1 (1998): 84-120.
103. The basic source is still Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above).
104. There is no significant historiography on this both politically and militarily astute Bavarian prince. See Kurt Sendtner, Rupprecht von Wittelsbach, Kronprinz von Bayern (Munich, 1954) for key documents;
105. and see his war diary (Rupprecht, Kronprinz von Bayern, Mein Kriegstagebuch, ed. Eugen von Frauenholz, 3 vols. [Munich, 1929]). On the necessity of immediate peace negotiations, see Rupprecht's letter to Max von Baden, August 15, 1918, in Max von Baden (n. 40 above), pp. 288-89.
106. On October 18, Rupprecht wrote to Max again: "Perhaps you are interested to hear something about the military situation. Our soldiers are overtired and have suffered horrendous losses. I do not expect very much for a 'levée en masse' following Carnot's example at the beginning of the French revolutionary wars. The levée was so successful, because it occurred at the beginning of the war, but we are in our fifth year of war and our reserves are exhausted to the limit. . . . Ludendorff does not recognize the entire seriousness of the situation. We must come to a peace under all circumstances, before the enemy forces its way into Germany; or woe is us." Max von Baden, pp. 466-67.
107. Historiography (such as Manfred Rauh, Die Parlamentarisierung des Deutschen Reiches [Düsseldorf, 1977]) debates the issue of parliamentarization, but tends to overlook the link between parliamentarization and "the erection of a German defensive wall." Especially in view of the worsening military situation, the Interfraktionelle Ausschuß insisted that defense is no longer a military but a "political-moral issue."
108. Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds., Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuß 1917/1918, 2 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1959), 2:653.
109. Conrad Haußmann, Schlaglichter: Reichstagsbriefe und Aufzeichnungen (Frankfurt am Main, 1924), pp. 227-28.
110. Max von Baden, pp. 319-20.
111. Matthias and Morsey, Der Interfraktioneller Ausschuß, p. 653.
112. Friedrich Ebert is quoted in "Die sozialdemokratischen Forderungen," Vossische Zeitung 489 (September 24, 1918).
113. "We will now have to organize the national defense, as long as peace cannot be had"; quoted in Wilhelm Stahl, ed., Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender 34 (1918) (Munich, 1922), p. 292 (SPD directory meeting, September 23, 1918).
114. Philipp Scheidemann, Vorwärts (September 24, 1918). Needless to say, Scheidemann preferred to forget this and similar articles, and a sympathetic historiography has not picked up on them either - which has suited the stab-in-the back historiography well.
115. Their problem was a Prussian-Imperial German regime that would not yield or budge. But opposing the regime did not entail abandoning a very strong sense of national integrity. The conflation of opposition to Prussia and monarchism with defeatism constitutes part of the stab-in-the-back legend. See Otto Ebenau, In der Strafsache gegen Prinz Max von Baden und fünf Genossen wegen Hochverrats (Munich, 1921).
116. August Keim, Prinz Max von Baden und das Kriegskabinett, Reichsverderber, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1922).
117. A typical Statement: "Prince Max von Baden has emphasized in his speech to the Reichstag that Germany was ready for peace, but that it would not shy away from national defense, the mobilization of all forces of the people, if the conditions of the victors [sic] for our people were intolerable. One would expect that Prince Max was not of the opinion that we only continue war, because Wilhelm II wants to continue to be kaiser. The highest enthusiasm, the sacrifice of the last drop of blood and possession cannot be demanded from every single man or woman, in order to preserve Wilhelm II as emperor. . . . The German working class cannot sacrifice the future of the fatherland in order to salvage any one of the Hohenzollern. Wilhelm II has not done enough for the German people so that they might be ready to sacrifice themselves for him." Fränkische Tagespost (October 25, 1918); quoted in Adolf Sturzenberger, Die Abdankung Kaiser Wilhelms II: Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Kaiserfrage und die Haltung der Presse (Berlin, 1937), p. 86.
118. Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (New York, 1976).
119. See below, p. 507.
120. This particular draft was written on October 19 and, together with the ones emanating from the War Ministry (Captain Colin Ross), deserves a more detailed analysis for its mixture of radical republicanism, racism, and totalitarianism. The point here is that this draft reflected an attitude dating back into summer 1918 that was central to the formation of the new government: that domestic liberty was worth fighting for and that the latter was now threatened by the chauvinism of the enemy. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (henceforth HStaS), Nachlass Conrad Haußmann Q1/2/17.
121. Max von Baden (n. 40 above), p. 366.
122. Typically, this issue has not been the subject of historical analysis. See ibid., pp. 356-59. Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), pp. 65-82, esp. pp. 77-82.
123. Max von Baden, p. 367.
124. A useful discussion of the situation is Ernst Schulin, Walther Rathenau: Repräsentant, Kritiker und Opfer seiner Zeit (Göttingen, 1979), pp. 85-95.
125. Walther Rathenau, "Die Stunde drängt," in Politische Schriften, ed. Walther Rathenau (Berlin, 1928), pp. 68-69, here p. 69.
126. Gerhard Hecker, Walther Rathenau und sein Verhältnis zu Militär und Krieg (Boppard am Rhein, 1983), pp. 428-44.
127. Walther Rathenau, "Ein dunkler Tag" (n. 1 above), 6:258-61 (henceforth cited as "Tag"). The proclamation had previously been rejected by the liberal Berliner Zeitung. Ernst Troeltsch refused to cosign it.
128. Walther Rathenau, "Die dunkelste Stunde," Die Zukunft 27/14 (1919): 50-54 (henceforth cited as "Stunde").
129. See Thomas Rohkrämer, Eine andere Moderne? Zivilisationskritik, Natur und Technik in Deutschland, 1880-1933 (Paderborn, 1999).
130. Rathenau, "Die Stunde drängt," p. 68.
131. Rathenau, "Die Stunde drängt," Ibid., p. 68.
132. "Insurrection in national defense is the duty. The country is unexhausted. Not all forces, not all hearts are at the front. Cities, railway stations, offices, rears are full of people, field-grey and city-grey." See also Walther Rathenau, "Festigkeit" (September 30, 1918) in Politische Aufsätze, ed. Walther Rathenau (Berlin, 1928), pp. 63-67:
133. "Wir halten den Krieg beliebig lange aus . . ." (p. 64).
134. Rathenau, "Die Stunde drängt," p. 68.
135. Hecker, Rathenau, pp. 435-36.
136. Colmar von der Goltz, Leon Gambetta und seine Armeen (Berlin, 1877),
137. Das Volk in Waffen: Ein Buch über Heerwesen und Kriegführung unserer Zeit, 5th ed. (Berlin, 1899).
138. Rathenau, "Tag."
139. See also Walther Rathenau, "Staat und Vaterland," in Nach der Flut, ed. Walther Rathenau (Berlin, 1919), pp. 34-48.
140. Rathenau, "Tag."
141. On Rathenau's ideas about a future war as Gesinnungskrieg (war of ideology), see Walther Rathenau, Zeitliches (Berlin, 1919), pp. 71-82.
142. Paul Letourneau, Walther Rathenau ou le rêve prométhéen: Pensée politique et economique (1867-1922) (Quebec, 1987).
143. Walther Rathenau, Von kommenden Dingen, ed. Hans Dieter Hellige and Ernst Schulin, vol. 2: Hauptwerke und Gespräche, pp. 297-497,
144. Walther Rathenau-Gesamtausgabe (Munich and Heidelberg, 1977), p. 465.
145. Jacob Leib Talmon, The History of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952).
146. Ludendorff, Urkunden (n. 42 above), pp. 547-48. The minutes of the meeting with Ludendorff mention a second point but do not explain it.
147. Lothar Burchardt, "Walther Rathenau und die Ursprünge deutsche Rohstoffbewirtschaftung im Ersten Weltkrieg," Tradition 15, no. 4 (1970): 169-96.
148. With the revolution, Rathenau was accused of being a Kriegsverlängerer. Harry Graf Kessler, Walther Rathenau: Sein Leben und sein Werk (Berlin, 1928), p. 267.
149. This remarkable turnabout rankles Wolfgang Kruse, "Kriegswirtschaft und Gesellschaftsvision: Walther Rathenau und die Organisierung des Kapitalismus," in Walther Rathenau, 1867/1922: Die Extreme berühren sich, ed. Hans Wilderotter (Berlin, [1993]), pp. 151-68.
150. But it is perfectly consistent with the Volksstaat ideal (which very clearly was conceived as a revolution to overcome the revolution). Letter to Heinrich Scheuch, October 15, 1918 and letter to Erzberger, October 26, 1918; Walther Rathenau, Politische Briefe (Dresden, 1929), pp. 195-200 and 205-13.
151. Rathenau maintained his levée posture and veered, at least rhetorically, to the radical Right when writing on October 17 that "we would rather fight in order to go down in defense of the honor of our people." Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ed., Walther Rathenau: Tagebuch, 1907-1922 (Düsseldorf, 1967), pp. 227-29.
152. Rathenau suggested that all three would happen as a result of the "dissolution of the front" - a rather shrewd analysis. Letter to Maximilian Harden, October 8, 1918; Hans Dieter Hellige, ed., Walther Rathenau-Maximilian Harden: Briefwechsel, 1897-1920 (Munich and Heidelberg, 1983), p. 750.
153. Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), p. 127 (meeting of the Cabinet). Solf and Roedern were the staunchest supporters of the levée in the Cabinet.
154. Sturzenberger (n. 90 above), pp. 48-78. Karin Herrmann, "Der Zusammenbruch 1918 in der deutschen Tagespresse. Politische Ziele, Reaktionen und Ereignisse und die Versuchung der Meinungsführung, 23. September bis 11. November 1918" (Ph.D. diss., University of Münster, 1958).
155. Heinz Hagenlücke, Deutsche Vaterlandspartei: Die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaiserreiches (Düsseldorf, 1997);
156. James Retallack, Notables of the Right: The Conservative Party and Political Mobilization in Germany, 1876-1918 (Boston, 1988).
157. See the October 5 statement of the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei: It is the "sacred duty" to do everything in order "to bring the German people to the recognition of the dangers that are threatening them and, if necessary, to entice them to the strongest possible resistance against the enemy." Karl Wortmann, Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei (Halle, 1926), p. 59.
158. Anneliese Thimme, Flucht in den Mythos: Die deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918 (Göttingen, 1969).
159. A good sample of these calls for national insurrection and Endkampf can be found in Bundesarchiv Berlin, Stellvertreter des Reichskanzlers Friedrich von Payer, R703/ 74: Stellungnahmen und Eingaben zur "Vaterlandsverteidigung."
160. See above, p. 474.
161. Max von Baden (n. 40 above), p. 331, speaks of the "determination to fight to death."
162. Alfred von Tirpitz, Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkriege, 2 vols. (Hamburg and Berlin, 1926), 2:616-23.
163. In the following I have abstained from references to World War II; the connections and linkages are almost too overwhelming. The sole purpose here is to establish incipient practice at the end of World War I.
164. A first discussion of this subject is Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge, Mass., and New York, 2000).
165. Stig Förster, Der doppelte Militarismus: Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik zwischen Status-quo-Sicherung und Aggression, 1890-1913 (Stuttgart, 1985).
166. Holger Afflerbach, "Bis zum letzten Mann und letzten Groschen: Die Wehrpflicht im deutschen Reich und ihre Auswirkungen auf das militärische Führungsdenken im Ersten Weltkrieg," in Die Wehrpflicht, ed. Foerster (n. 6 above), pp. 71-90.
167. Dirk Stegmann, "Die deutsche Inlandspropaganda 1917/1918. Zum innenpolitischen Machtkampf zwischen OHL und ziviler Reichsleitung in der Endphase des Kaiserreiches," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 12 (1972): 329-78;
168. Wilhelm Deist, "Zensur und Propaganda in Deutschland während des Ersten Weltkrieges," in Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft, ed. Deist (n. 8 above), pp. 153-64.
169. Diekmann, "Die Ersatzlage im Jahr 1918," BA-MA W-10/51 834,
170. Teil I: "Die Entwicklung bis Ende Juli 1918," pp. 22-35;
171. Teil III: "Kampf um die Volksbewaffnung," pp. 17-18.
172. Meeting with the chancellor in the presence of Ludendorff, October 9, 1918, Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), p. 122;
173. Diekmann, "Kampf um die Volksbewaffnung," pp. 36-38;
174. Letter to Heinrich Scheuch, October 9, 1918, Walther Rathenau, Politische Briefe (Dresden, 1929), pp. 188-91.
175. Cabinet meeting of October 17; Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 226;
176. Diekmann, "Kampf um die Volksbewaffnung," pp. 41-42.
177. Kgl. Württ. Militärbevollmächtigter, Nr. 1717/18 geh. to Württemberg War Ministry, October 18, 1918, HStaS, Nachlass Gen. Ltn. Theodor von Ströbel, M6601/226. Thanks to Oliver Stein who pointed me to this file in Stuttgart.
178. Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 227.
179. Meeting of Cabinet with Groener, November 5, 1918, Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, ibid., pp. 529-30.
180. War Ministry, Order to the Territorial Commands, October 20, Diekmann, "Kampf um die Volksbewaffnung," BA-MA W-10/51 834, pp. 50-51.
181. Report of Count Lerchenfeld, October 10: According to State Secretary Soif a "battle of desperation" was only possible if industry was shut down; Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 132.
182. Kgl. Württ. Militärbevollmächtigter, Nr. 1717/18 geh. to Württemberg War Ministry, October 18, 1918 (n. 135 above).
183. See n. 93 above.
184. Diekmann, "Ersatzlage," Teil I, pp. 17-33.
185. On the plans of the Supreme Command, see minutes on a meeting concerning reserves, June 18, 1918, Ludendorff, Urkunden (n. 42 above), pp. 110-16.
186. See Heinrich Scheuch's position in the meeting of June 18; Ludendorff, Urkunden, pp. 110-16;
187. Richard Bessel, "Mobilization and Demobilization in Germany, 1916-1919," in State, Society, and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War, ed. John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 212-22.
188. Diekmann, "Ersatzlage," Teil III, pp. 51-53.
189. The entire issue of policing during 1918 needs further attention for the shift from criminalization of target groups, which is entirely in concordance with an authoritarian state, to terror as a key element of civil war type policing. See Peter Holquist, "'Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work': Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context," Journal of Modern History 69, no. 3 (1997): 415.
190. Memorandum of the Bureau of Reserves, War Ministry, October 8, 1918, Diekmann, "Ersatzlage," Teil III, p. 37. However, the memorandum also points to the great difficulties with introducing a passport with a photo.
191. Quartermaster General, July 18, 1918, Diekmann, "Ersatzlage," Teil II: Documents, no. 5, no page.
192. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J., 1976), bk. 6, chap. 26, pp. 479-83.
193. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Ibid., p. 483.
194. Foerster, "Ludendorffs seelische Haltung" (n. 27 above), pp. 90-92. Ludendorff supposedly said: "Like a drowning man grasps a straw, I grasped this news."
195. Ludendorff, Urkunden, pp. 551-53.
196. Ludendorff, Urkunden, Ibid., p. 552.
197. Telephone call of Hindenburg to Max von Baden on October 20, transmitted by the liaison, Colonel Haeften. Amtliche Urkunden (n. 56 above), doc. 63, p. 166. See also the telegram that triggered (but was not the cause of) Ludendorff's dismissal (telegram of October 24 from the chief of the General Staff [and signed by Hindenburg] to the armies) in which the Supreme Command stated that "Wilson . . . demands military capitulation. This is unacceptable for the soldier. . . . For soldiers, Wilson's response therefore can only be a summons to continue resistance with utmost force." Ibid., doc. 76b, p. 194. At this point, the synchronization with the Right worked. The Deutsche Vaterlandspartei issued a similar memorandum to Max von Baden on the same day. Hagenlücke (n. 121 above), p. 381.
198. See, e.g., the file on "Organisation der Abwehrschlacht" with a determination of defensive lines and zones in Alsace-Lorraine; HStaS, Heeresgruppe Herzog Albrecht, M 30/1/154.
199. On border defense, see Hermann von Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1918: Dem deutschen Volke dargestellt (Berlin, 1929), 11:432 (only in planning stage). The key for these initial considerations of a defensive battle was Metz as the German equivalent to Verdun.
200. Chief of General Staff, situation report, October 23, 1918; Rupprecht von Bayern, Kriegstagebuch (n. 81 above), 3:363.
201. The case gains some poignancy due to the fact that Schwertfeger became one of the main researchers for the Reichstag Enquete concerning the sources of the German collapse. Bernhard Schwertfeger, "Die politischen und militärischen Verantwortlichkeiten im Verlauf der Offensive von 1918, 2 Teile," in Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918, ed. Albrecht Philipp (Berlin, 1925).
202. Schwertfeger, Das Weltkriegsende (n. 24 above), p. 197.
203. For the precedent, see Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York, 1991).
204. This controversial issue is summarized in Hans Meier-Welcker, "Die deutsche Führung an der Westfront im Frühsommer 1918: Zum Problem der militärischen Lagebeurteilung," Welt als Geschichte 21 (1961): 164-84.
205. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 642-55.
206. After the war Wilhelm Groener made this point most vociferously. Copy of letter from Groener to Hintze, October 28, 1919, BA-MA W-10/52066. For the argument in favor of a more limited withdrawal, see the cautious critique of Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg, 11:400.
207. Hermann von Kuhl, "Entstehung, Durchführung und Zusammenbruch der Offensive von 1918," in Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zitsammenbnichs im Jahre 1918, ed. Albrecht Philipp (Berlin, 1924), pp. 1-238.
208. [Wolfgang] Foerster, "Ludendorffs Strategie vom April bis Oktober 1918," pp. 75-76, BA-MA RH6/v.38.
209. General Wetzell, "Die Oberste Heeresleitung in der Abwehr; Stellungnahme zu der Vorarbeit zu Band XIV," p. 7, speaks of Ludendorff's intention "to force the French into bleeding themselves to death," BA-MA W-10/51 828.
210. This may well have been the case. Ludendorff also seems to have thought that control over French and Belgian territory could be used as a bargaining chip. Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg, 11:433:
211. "We stay put where we are." These tactics drove up casualties dramatically and may well be partly responsible for the growing unrest among frontline troops in the summer of 1918. Such tactics were surely one of the causes (the others being desertion and surrender) for the continuing dramatic depletion of manpower after the end of the spring offensive. The extraordinarily high casualty rates of August, September, and October 1918 are commonly overlooked. Diekmann, "Ersatzlage" (n. 132 above), Teil III, p. 1.
212. Fritz von Loßberg, Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege, 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1939), pp. 347-49;
213. Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg, 11:400, 428.
214. Rupprecht von Bayern, Kriegstagebuch (n. 81 above), 3:358-59. Rupprecht noted on September 29: "At last! One recognizes the influence of Hindenburg."
215. General Wetzell, "Stellungnahme zu dem Entwurf einer Resolution des 4. Untersuchungsausschusses über die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918," BA-MA RH61/v.139, p. 54.
216. Rupprecht von Bayern, Kriegstagebuch, 3:358-59. The Supreme Command's order emphasized the necessity of complete destruction of railways and telephone communications.
217. See, e.g., Supreme Command, "Retrospective assessment of the military situation," September 15, 1918;
218. Amtliche Urkunden (n. 56 above), doc. 10c, pp. 39-40. See also the planned destruction in the area of the Heeresgruppe Herzog Albrecht (Alsace Lorraine); HStaS, M 30/1/259.
219. See file "Diebstähle und Räubereien deutscher Militärpersonen zum Schaden der feindlichen Bevölkerung im besetzten Gebiet"; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, MA [Ministerium des kgl. Hauses und des Äußeren bzw. der Staatskanzlei] 104153.
220. Ibid., 39.
221. Meeting of October 17, Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), pp. 240-41.
222. The issue developed into a tug-of-war over words in the preparation of the third German armistice note.
223. Lebenserinnerungen des Generaloberst Wilhelm von Heye, BA-MA Nl Heye N 18/5, Teil II: Wie ich den Weltkrieg erlebte, p. 79.
224. Lebenserinnerungen des Generaloberst Wilhelm von Heye, Teil II: Wie ich den Weltkrieg erlebte, p. 79. Ibid.
225. Lebenserinnerungen des Generaloberst Wilhelm von Heye, Teil II: Wie ich den Weltkrieg erlebte, p. 79. Ibid.
226. Meeting of October 17, Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 241.
227. Joachim von Stülpnagel to Otto Hasse, June 26, 1925, BA-MA Nl Stülpnagel N5/20.
228. The original is in BA-MA Nl Stülpnagel 5/10; an official copy, that is, a copy that circulated among the staff, can be found under [Zentrale] 153/24 z, February 26, 1924, BA-MA RHS/v.911. Stülpnagel also distributed copies widely to former officers, including Hindenburg.
229. Draft of summary conclusions for the 1924 war game [279/24 T1 IB geh. to TA] "People's War and Border Defense [Volkskrieg und Grenzschutz]." BA-MA Nl Stülpnagel N5/20.
230. Draft of summary conclusions for the 1924 war game [279/24 T1 IB geh. to TA] "People's War and Border Defense [Volkskrieg und Grenzschutz]." BA-MA Nl Stülpnagel N5/20.
231. Draft of concluding evaluation of the 1925 war game "Battle against Poland," June 1925, BA-MA Nl Stülpnagel N5/20.
232. Draft of summary conclusions for the 1924 war game; see n. 169 above. The operations section presumed casualty rates of up to 75 percent among the border defense units.
233. Michael Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit: Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik, 1924-1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980).
234. Johannes Hürter, Wilhelm Groener: Reichswehrminister am Ende der Weimarer Republik (1928-1932) (Munich, 1992), pp. 128-48.
235. Stig Förster, "Optionen der Kriegführung im Zeitalter des 'Volkskrieges': Zu Helmuth von Moltkes militärisch-politischen Überlegungen nach den Erfahrungen der Einigungskriege," in Militärische Verantwortung in Staat und Gesellschaft: 175 Jahre Generalstabsausbildung in Deutschland, ed. Detlef Bald (Koblenz, 1986), pp. 83-107.
236. This is in contrast to the situation in 1914: Egmont Zechlin, "Deutschland zwischen Kabinettskrieg und Wirtschaftskrieg. Politik und Kriegführung in den ersten Monaten des Weltkrieges 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 199 (1964): 347-458.
237. The reverberations of this debate extend all the way to the so-called Historikerstreit. See esp. Andreas Hillgruber's essay on "two kinds of catastrophe" - an ill-fated reflection on the military defeat of the Third Reich, which, among other things, was unaware of the historicity of this thinking about military catastrophe. Andreas Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums (Berlin, 1986).
238. Max von Baden (n. 40 above), pp. 405-57.
239. Kaehler, "Vier quellenkritische Untersuchungen (fn. 16); Wilhelm Michaelis, "Zum Problem des Königstodes am Ende der Hohenzollernmonarchie," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 13 (1962): 695-704;
240. Martin Kohlrausch, "The Deserting Warlord: Fashioning Wilhelm II's Flight in Germany after the First World War" (M.A. thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 1997). This debate is one entry point into ideas of collective death in 1918. A study along these lines would entail a discussion of the attempted refashioning of the emperor either as a "tribal king" (hence: the king's ride into death) through his sacrifice for a future Germanic people's state, or, alternatively (among Suebians like Groener), as a Barbarossa.
241. Aide-mémoire of Max von Baden, October 16, 1918; Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung (n. 2 above), pp. 216-17, here p. 216.
242. Cabinet meeting, with Generals Ludendorff and Hoffmann attending the morning session; and Cabinet meeting (afternoon), October 17, 1918, Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, pp. 220-53.
243. Robert Friedberg, national liberal vice president of the Prussian State Ministry, quoted in Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 243.
244. Roedern, quoted in Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, ibid., pp. 233, 238, 243.
245. Payer, in the Cabinet meeting of October 20, 1918; Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 289. The full quote is: "One is allowed [in this situation] to think of one's good name. We are the ones to make the lost war lost. We carry the responsibility before history."
246. Ludendorff had extended the extremes very far, indeed. If the German army was pushed back to the German borders, it would have to make a last stand there that would "decide, if we can prevail or if we succumb" (Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 243). This was what Colonel Haeften thought when he mentioned that "the war would not stretch to the outer limits," but he then instantly added that he would have to ask Ludendorff for clarification first.
247. Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen (n. 29 above), p. 570.
248. Cabinet meeting, October 17, 1918 (afternoon); Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 246.
249. Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 246.
250. In his memoirs Haußmann makes clear how much depended on an open discussion of options with Ludendorff. The supporters of a continuation of the war like Haußmann were concerned above all with whether or not the Supreme Command could provide a minimum guarantee that the military situation allowed sufficient time for negotiation. Conrad Haußmann, Schlaglichter (n. 84 above), p. 256.
251. As with the king's sacrifice, I am omitting here the debate on the suicide mission of the navy. The reason is much the same. The rush to conclusions has garbled the event and its meaning(s). However, there is no doubt that the naval brass wanted a suicide mission. As useful recent summary, see Gerhard Paul Groß, Die Seekriegführung der kaiserlichen Marine im Jahre 1918 (Frankfurt am Main and Bern, 1989).
252. The purpose of this message is the subject of considerable controversy, because at least superficially the dismissal of Ludendorff was its outcome. Surprisingly, there is still no satisfactory monographic and empirical analysis simply of what happened. As it stands, Kaehler, "Vier quellenkritische Untersuchungen" (n. 16 above), remains the most careful and thoughtful treatment of the subject. The standard reference is Alfred Niemann, Kaiser und Revolution: Die entscheidenden Ereignisse im Großen Hauptquartier (Berlin, 1922).
253. Chief of the General Staff of the field army, Field Marshal von Hindenburg to the armies, October 24, 1918, Amtliche Urkunden (n. 56 above), doc. 76b, p. 104.
254. Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik (n. 50 above), 2:1338-40.
255. Ulrich Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage: Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1983).
256. Friedrich Payer, Von Bethmann Hollweg bis Ebert: Erinnerungen und Bilder (Frankfurt am Main, 1923), pp. 142-43.
257. Friedrich Payer, Von Bethmann Hollweg bis Ebert: Erinnerungen und Bilder 1923), pp. 142-43. Ibid.
258. Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 193rd-195th session, October 22-24, 1918, microfiche (Washington, D.C.: Microcard Eds., 1967).
259. Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Ibid., 193rd session, October 22, 1918, 6165.
260. Cabinet meeting of October 17 (morning); Matthias and Morsey, Die Regierung, p. 229. In this particular case, Bertolt Brecht's poetry imitated life. To Ludendorff's question, whether Scheidemann could not "lift the morale of the masses," Scheidemann responded: "It is a question of potatoes."
261. Michael Kumpfmüller, Die Schlacht von Stalingrad: Metamorphosen eines deutschen Mythos (Munich, 1995);
262. Jürgen Förster, ed., Stalingrad. Ereignis, Wirkung, Symbol (Munich, 1992).
263. Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik, 2:1339.
264. Bernd Wegner, "Hitler, der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Choreographie des Untergangs," Geschichte und Gesellschaft (forthcoming).
265. The formidable exception is Bessel, Germany after the First World War (n. 21 above).
266. Robert Weldon Whalen, Bitter Wounds: German Victims of the Great War, 1914-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984).
267. Bessel, Germany after the First World War.
268. Ruth Leys, "Death Masks: Kardiner and Ferenczi on Psychic Trauma," Representations 53 (Winter 1996): 44-73.
269. Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge and New York, 1995).
270. Theodor Lessing, Haarmann: Die Geschichte eines Werwolfs und andere Gerichtsreportagen (Munich, 1995).
271. Birgit Richard, Todesbilder: Kunst, Subkultur, Medien (Munich, 1995);
272. Laurence A. Rickels, The Vampire Lectures (Minneapolis and London, 1999).
273. Nosferatu - Eine Symphonie des Grauens, F. W. Murnau, director, 1921, produced by Prana Film, black and white; Metropolis, Fritz Lang, director, 1925-26, produced by UFA, black and white.
274. Max von Baden (n. 40 above), p. 413.
275. George Mosse, "Tod, Zeit und Geschichte: Die völkische Utopie der Überwindung," in Deutsches utopisches Denken im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermand (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 50-69;
276. George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, 1990);
277. Rainer Hering, "'Des deutschen Volkes Wiedergeburt'. Völkischer Nationalismus und politische Erneuerungspläne," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 42 (1994): 1079-84.
278. Ulrich Linse, Barfüssige Propheten: Erlöser der zwanziger Jahre (Berlin, 1983).
279. Walther Rathenau, "An Alle, die der Haß nicht blendet," Die Zukunft 21, no. 11/ 12 (1918): 318-23.
280. Rathenau, Nach der Flut (n. 108 above).
281. All quotes from Rathenau, "An Alle, die der Haß nicht blendet."
282. The text should be compared to the more temperate if, in substance, not more conciliatory call for the foundation of a "German Liberty Party." Walther Rathenau, "Aufruf zur Bildung einer 'Partei der deutschen Freiheit,'" in Politische Aufsätze, ed. Walther Rathenau (Berlin, 1928), pp. 72-80, here esp. p. 75.
283. Shulamit Volkov, "Ich bin ein Deutscher Jüdischen Stammes," in Walther Rathenau, 1867-1922: Die Extreme berühren sich (n. 117 above),pp. 129-50;
284. Ernst Schulin, "Rathenau et la France," Revue d'Allemagne 4, no. 3 (1972): 547-57.
285. Walther Rathenau, "Stille Bereitung (gegen Kriegsende)," in Politische Aufsätze, pp. 172-77, here p. 177. "Es bricht herein, eisig, zäh und dunkel, der Winter einer Völkerwanderung, und der Baum der weißen Menschheit wird nackt und kahl stehen. . . . Freies Bewußtsein der kommenden Weltnacht ziehmt uns. (The winter of great migration dawns, glacial, grim and dark, and the tree of white humankind stands naked and bare. . . . Awareness and acceptance of the coming world-night befits us.)"
286. Ebert, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 193rd session, October 22, 1918, 6166.
287. Ebert, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Ibid., 6161. He explained: "if the rulers of the enemy countries force an unconditional peace on us, if our economic life forces are raped [werden unsere wirtschaftlichen Lebenskräfte vergewaltigt] and our chances for economic development are cut, the working class is hit hard. (Very true, among Social Democrats.) If we are thrown back into a condition which forces hundreds of thousands of workers to emigrate every year, then the German worker is threatened by the fate of the coolie."
288. Max von Baden (n. 40 above), p. 411.
289. On the topos of the enslavement of Germans that runs from Kleist to Hitler, see Ruth Klüger, "Freiheit die ich meine: Fremdherrschaft in Kleists 'Hermannsschlacht' und 'Verlobung in St. Domingo,'" in Katastrophen: Über deutsche Literatur, ed. Ruth Klüger (Göttingen, 1994), pp. 133-62.
290. Maria Tatar, Lustmord: Sexual Murder in Weimar Germany (Princeton, N.J., 1995).
291. Thomas Anz and Joseph Vogel, eds., Die Dichter und der Krieg: Deutsche Lyrik, 1914-1918 (Munich, 1982);
292. Wolfgang Natter, Literature at War, 1914-1940: Representing the "Time of Greatness" in Germany (New Haven and London, 1999).
293. Bruno Thoß, Der Ludendorff-Kreis, 1919-1923: München als Zentrum der mitteleuropäischen Gegenrevolution zwischen Revolution und Hitler-Putsch (Munich, 1978); Thimme (n. 123 above).
294. The controversy between Rathenau and Maximilian Harden over the former's assessment of the armistice is a case in point. Harden's compelling argument in favor of the armistice has quite completely disappeared. See, e.g., Maximilian Harden, "Das Recht soll siegen," Die Zukunft 103, nos. 1-3 (1918): 1-64;
295. Peter Berglar, "Walther Rathenau und Maximilian Harden: Zur Problematik ihrer Freundschaft," Historische Zeitschrift 209, no. 1 (1969): 75-94.
296. Michael Epkenhans, "'Wir als deutsches Volk sind nicht klein zu kriegen . . .' Aus den Tagebüchern des Fregattenkapitäns Bogislav von Selchow 1918/19," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 55 (1996): 165-224.
297. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984).
298. Reichswehrministerium Zentrale 342/23 I, May 23, 1923, BA-MA RW6/v. 37.
299. See below, pp. 520-21.
300. Ulf Hedetoft, War and Death as Touchstone of National Identity (Aalborg, 1990).
301. Hans Peter Herrmann, Machtphantasie Deutschland: Nationalismus, Männlichkeit und Fremdenhass im Vaterlandsdiskurs deutscher Schriftsteller des 18. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt, 1996);
302. Hasko Zimmer, Auf dem Altar des Vaterlands: Religion und Patriotismus in der deutschen Kriegslyrik des 19. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt, 1971).
303. Albert Portmann-Tinguely, Romantik und Krieg: Eine Untersuchung zum Bild des Krieges bei deutschen Romantikem und Freiheitssängern (Freiburg [Schweiz], 1989);
304. Klaus Vondung, "Träume von Tod und Untergang: Präludien zur Apokalypse in der deutschen Literatur und Kunst vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," in Von kommenden Zeiten: Geschichts-prophetien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Joachim H. Knoll and Julius H. Schoeps (Stuttgart and Bonn, 1984), pp. 143-68.
305. Jan Philipp Reemtsma, "Blutiger Boden: Streifzug durch ein Textgelände," Mittelweg 36 8, no. 3 (1999): 3-48.
306. Heinrich von Kleist, "Katechismus der Deutschen, abgefaßt nach dem Spanischen zum Gebrauch für Kinder und Alte," in Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Heinrich von Kleist (Darmstadt, 1983), pp. 350-60, here p. 360.
307. Otfried Ehrismann, Das Nibelungenlied in Deutschland: Studien zur Rezeption des Nibelungenlieds von der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1975);
308. Roswitha Mattausch and Viktoria Schmitt-Linsenhoff, "Vom Nationalepos zur Weltanschauungsoper - Die Rezeption des Nibelungenliedes 1800 bis 1918," in Trophäe oder Leichenstein? Kulturgeschichtliche Aspekte des Geschichtsbewußtseins in Frankfurt im 19. Jahrhundert. 100 Jahre Historisches Museum Frankfurt am Main 1878-1978 (Frankfurt, 1978), pp. 302-25.
309. John Evert Härd, Das Nibelungenepos: Wertung und Wirkung von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart, trans. Christine Palm (Tübingen, 1996);
310. David J. Levin, Richard Wagner, Fritz Lang, and the Nibelungen: The Dramaturgy of Disavowal (Princeton, N.J., 1998).
311. See Klaus von See, "Das Nibelungenlied - Ein Nationalepos," in Die Nibelungen: Ein deutscher Wahn, eine deutscher Alptraum; Studien und Dokumente zur Rezeption des Nibelungenstoffes im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Joachim Heinzle and Anneliese Waldschmidt (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp. 43-110.
312. Münkler and Storch, Siegfrieden (n. 16 above).
313. Joachim Köhler, Wagners Hitler: Der Prophet und sein Vollstrecker, 2d ed. (Munich, 1997).
314. Die Nibelungen. Teil 1: Siegfried. Teil 2: Kriemhilds Rache, Fritz Lang, director, 1924, screenplay by Thea von Harbou, 3216m (Teil 1), 3576m (Teil 2), black and white; Thea Harbou, Das Nibelungenbuch (Munich, 1923).
315. Ernst Barlach, Das Nibelungenlied (Hanau, repr. 1983);
316. Peter Paret, "Field Marshal and Beggar: Ernst Barlach in the First World War," in Peter Paret, German Encounters with Modernism, 1840-1945 (Cambridge and New York, 2001).
317. Paret, German Encounters, p. 179.
318. Elmar Jansen, Ernst Barlach, Käthe Kollwitz: Berührungen, Grenzen, Gegenbilder (Berlin, 1989);
319. Regina Schulte, "Kaethe Kollwitz's Sacrifice," History Workshop Journal 41 (Spring 1996): 193-221;
320. Viktoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff, "Kohl und Kollwitz: Staats- und Weiblichkeitsdiskurse in der Neuen Wache 1993," in Das Volk: Abbild, Konstruktion, Phantasma, ed. Annette Graczyk (Berlin, 1996), pp. 185-205.
321. Breucker (n. 3 above), p. 165.
322. Hans Kopp, Geschichte der Ludendorff-Bewegung (N.p., 1975);
323. Gert Borst, "Die Ludendorff-Bewegung, 1919-1961: Eine Analyse monologer Kommunikationsformen in der sozialen Zeitkommunikation" (Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, 1969).
324. Eberhard Jäckel, ed., Hitler: Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 1905-1924 (Stuttgart, 1980),
325. esp. "Vaterland oder Kolonie," July 20, 1921, p. 440, but also see pp. 870, 879.
326. The ups and down of national liberation rhetoric can be traced following the abundant Clausewitz references through Hitler's career. Adolf Hitler, Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen: Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933, ed. Clemens Vollnhals (Munich and New York, 1992).
327. Adolf Hitler: Sein Leben und seine Reden, ed. Adolf-Viktor von Koerber (Munich, 1923), pp. 77-78.
328. "Das Ruhrgebiet hätte das deutsche Moskau werden müssen! Wir hätten erweisen müssen, daß das deutsche Volk von 1923 nicht mehr das Volk von 1918 ist! Es wäre notwendig gewesen, der Welt durch ein gewaltiges Flammenzeichen Kunde zu geben: das deutsche Volk ist nicht länger mehr gewillt, sich zu beugen! Und wenn noch ärgere Not über uns käme! Es soll Not kommen! Das Volk der Entehrung und Schande ist jetzt wieder zum Volk der Helden geworden! Hinter dem brennenden Ruhrgebiet hätte ein solches Volk seinen Widerstand auf Tod und Leben organisiert. . . . Jetzt bricht eine andere Stunde an. Ofen um Ofen, Brücke um Brücke gesprengt! Deutschland erwacht! Frankreichs Armee hätte sich nicht in das Grauen eines solchen Weltunterganges peitschen lassen! Bei Gott, wir ständen bereits heute anders da!" On variants, see Jäckel, Hitler, pp. 967, 982, 985.
329. Nr. 279/24 T1IB geh. to Truppenamt; BA-MA, Nl Stülpnagel N5/20.
330. On Joseph Goebbels treating the same theme of the Ruhr and insurrection, see Claus E. Bärsch, "Die Geschichtsprophetie des Joseph Goebbels," in Von kommenden Zeiten: Geschichtsprophetien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, pp. 169-78.b.
331. Felix Dahn, quoted in Härd (n. 245 above), p. 173.
332. On the uses of Hagen, see Werner Wunderlich, Der Schatz des Drachentödters: Materialien zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Nibelungenliedes (Stuttgart, 1977).
333. "Odenwaldbrunnen," in Ernst Bertram, Der Rhein: Ein Gedenkbuch (Munich, 1922), p. 47.
334. Fritz Lang, Worauf es im Nibelungenfilm ankam (N.p., n. d. [1924]), p. 2,
335. quoted in Heinz B. Heller, "'Man stellt Denkmäler nicht auf den flachen Asphalt': Fritz Längs Nibelungen-Film," in Die Nibelungen: Ein deutscher Wahn. pp. 351-68, here p. 351.
336. Lang, Worauf es im Nibelungenfilm ankam, p. 14.
337. Harbou, Das Nibelungenbuch, p. 117. In Harbou, the words are those of Hagen who is taunting the ghost of Siegfried.
338. Peter Krüger, "Etzels Halle und Stalingrad: Die Rede Görings vom 30.1.1943," in Die Nibelungen: Ein deutscher Wahn, pp. 151-90, here p. 180.
339. Christian Gerlach, "The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews," Journal of Modern History 70, no. 4 (1998): 759-812.
340. Robert Minder, Allemagne et les Allemandes: Essai d'histoire culturelle (Paris, 1948), 1:245: "Dans cette rage concentrée, dans ce sadomasochisme gigantesque, quelle figure plus hitlérienne que le Hagen du Nibelungenlied?"
341. Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary, To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism (Princeton, N.J., 1999).
342. Neither is 1918 the beginning nor is 1943 the end of this story of a catastrophic nationalism which has a "cult of the defensive" as its military equivalent. A brief sketch of the Volkskrieg tradition from Carl Clausewitz's On War (1832) to Carl Schmitt's Theory of the Partisan (1963) concludes a much shortened version of this essay to be published in Daniel Moran, ed., The People in Arms: Military Myth and Legitimacy since the French Revolution (Cambridge and New York, 2002).