Capital indivisibility and tax competition: Are there too many business areas when some of them are empty?

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 399-417

  Jayet, Hubert ^a   Paty, Sonia ^a  

^a UNIV LILLE   (France)

Author keywords

Business areas; Central planner; Decentralized equilibrium; Informational asymmetry; Investment indivisibility; Market of sites; Tax competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749627772     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2006.04.001     Document Type: Article

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