On forward-secure storage

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4117 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 251-270

  Dziembowski, Stefan ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW   (Poland)

^b SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER VIRUSES; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DATA COMPRESSION; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; STORAGE ALLOCATION (COMPUTER);

CIPHERTEXTS; FORWARD SECURE STORAGE (FSS); PLAINTEXTS;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 33749583877     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11818175_15     Document Type: Conference Paper

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