Cloning, parenthood, and genetic relatedness

Bioethics

Volumn 20, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 308-318

  Sparrow, Robert ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Children; Cloning; Ethics; Genes; Genetic relatedness; Parenthood

Indexed keywords

DNA;

ADOPTION; ATTITUDE; CELL NUCLEUS TRANSPLANTATION; DNA DONOR; DONOR; ETHICS; FERTILIZATION IN VITRO; HOSTILITY; HUMAN; HUMAN CLONING; HUMAN DIGNITY; HUMAN GENETICS; INFERTILITY; MOTHER; PARENTHOOD; REPRODUCTION; REVIEW;

EID: 33749521111     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2006.00509.x     Document Type: Review

References (46)

1. An early survey of potential issues is J.A. Robertson. The Question of Human Cloning. Hastings Cent Rep 1994; 24(2): 6-15. This paper is notable for denying the likelihood of cloning mammals by SCNT in 'even the mid-range future' (p. 6);
2. a vivid reminder of just how rapid technological development in the area is. Useful collections of post-'Dolly' discussions of cloning include, B. MacKinnon, ed. 2000. Human Cloning: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press;
3. G. McGee, ed. 2000. The Human Cloning Debate. Berkeley, California: Berkeley Hills Books;
4. M.C. Nussbaum & C. Sunstein, eds. 1998. Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
5. Robertson, Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning. op. cit. note 1, p. 6.
6. Robertson, Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning. p. 6.Ibid.
7. I am presuming of course that cloning technology will improve to such an extent that prohibitively large numbers of embryos need not be created to produce one clone. Note also here that we currently tolerate the creation and eventual destruction of a certain number of human embryos in the course of existing IVF procedures. For that matter, even a 'natural' pregnancy may have involved the creation and destruction of any number of embryos before a pregnancy comes to term.
8. B. Rollin. Send in the Clones . . . Don't Bother, They're Here. J Agric Environ Ethics 1997; 10: 25-40;
9. J. Harris. 1999. 'Goodbye Dolly?' The Ethics of Human Cloning. In Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford: Blackwell: 143-152.
10. It is easy to imagine medical or therapeutic reasons to desire the birth of a child with a certain genotype, for instance, to serve as a source of tissue for transplant or other therapy, but these are arguments for therapeutic cloning, which I am not discussing here.
11. See C. Strong. 2000. Cloning and Infertility. In The Human Cloning Debate. G. McGee, ed. Berkeley, California: Berkeley Hills Books: 184-211;
12. Harris, In The Human Cloning Debate. op. cit. note 5, pp. 148-149;
13. D.W. Brock. 1998. Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con. In Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning. M.C. Nussbaum & C. Sunstein, eds. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company: 141-164. The strength of the desire for children who are 'genetically related' is likely to vary amongst individuals and across cultures. Some cultures, especially in Asia and the Middle East, may place a very high value on the continuation of the family line through the birth of children who are genetically related to their parents.
14. One important case where parents are unable to provide 'viable' gametes is where both members of a couple carry a recessive gene for a lethal or severely debilitating genetic condition, such that they are unwilling to risk conceiving a child by 'normal' means. In this case, however, conception using existing IVF technology and pre-implantation diagnosis would allow them to conceive a child with each other and avoid the risk of a child inheriting the lethal genes. For cloning to serve a useful role, this option must be ruled out for some reason.
15. Strong, Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning. op. cit. note 7, p. 185.
16. Strong, Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning. Ibid: 190.
17. T.F. Murphy. 2000. Entitlement to Cloning: A Response to Strong. In The Human Cloning Debate. G. McGee, ed. Berkeley, California: Berkeley Hills Books: 212-220.
18. The possibility that lesbian couples might have good grounds to use cloning technology is mentioned in P. Kitcher. 2000. There Will Never Be Another You. In Human Cloning: Science, Ethics and Public Policy. Barbara McKinnon, ed. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press: 53-67. However, in his treatment of this scenario, Kitcher neglects the possibility that lesbian couples might prefer to use cloning rather than donor sperm because of a desire to avoid a male contribution to the pregnancy. Similarly, Timothy Murphy's defence of the rights of same sex couples to use cloning to produce children neglects the particular (political) benefits for lesbian couples. See Murphy, op. cit. note 11, pp. 212-220.
19. In fact, because there will be a small contribution from the mitachondrial DNA of the (other?) mother's ova both women might also be said to play a role in determining the genetic make-up of the child.
20. Cloning seems less likely to be of value to male homosexual couples. While cloning would allow a gay male couple the option of having a child that was genetically related to one of them, without a direct genetic contribution of a woman, creating the clone will still require a woman to provide an ovum and also, for the foreseeable future, to bring the child to term. The social/political motivation for the attempt to create a child without involving a member of the opposite sex is therefore missing.
21. My thanks to Patricia Peterson for drawing this possibility to my attention.
22. Cloning would allow a single man to reproduce himself without a genetic contribution from another person (with the exception of mitachondrial DNA) but would require use of a donated denucleated ova and the assistance of a surrogate mother. Given this, it is difficult to see that this process has many advantages over reproduction involving conception with a donor ova and the assistance of a surrogate mother, or indeed natural reproduction.
23. In this case, unlike those above, both parents are genetically related to the cloned child.
24. Jean Bethke Elshtain. 1998. To Clone or Not to Clone. In Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning. M.C. Nussbaum & C. Sunstein, eds. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company: 181-189.
25. Barbara Katz Rothman. 1998. Genetic maps and human imaginations: the limits of science in understanding who we are. New York: Norton & Co: 21-25.
26. Barbara Katz Rothman. 1998. Genetic maps and human imaginations: the limits of science in understanding who we are. 21-25.Ibid.
27. In fact the description of the genetic relation between parents and children given here and below is not strictly speaking accurate. Given that all human beings share the vast majority of their DNA with each other (as well as with rabbits, fish and bacterium), 'half their genes' here can only refer to the genetic variation within the human population. Furthermore, this Mendelian assumption about the genetic relation between parents and their children presumes that choice of mates is random. If people tend to choose partners who share genetic similarities with them, then each partner will tend to share more than 50% of their genes, within the range of human variation, with their offspring. There is some evidence that this is the case. See L. Dicks. Like Father, Like Husband. New Sci 2002; 2 February: 26-29. (My thanks to Ashley Sparrow, of the University of Canterbury, for drawing my attention to this paper). Nevertheless, the basic point - that the relation between parents and children is not one of genetic identity - stands.
28. Barbara Katz Rothman. 1989. Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company: 37-39.
29. Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society. op. cit. note 22, pp. 66-71.
30. K.D. Alpern. 1992. Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories. In The Ethics of Reproductive Technology. K.D. Alpern, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 147-169. Although it does not mention cloning, and was written before human cloning was thought to be a serious possibility, Alpern's discussion of the significance of an engineered relation of genetic identity is eerily prescient and extremely relevant today.
31. K.D. Alpern. In The Ethics of Reproductive Technology. Ibid: 160-164.
32. See also Avery Kolers. Cloning and Genetic Parenthood. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2003; 12: 401-410. Unfortunately, I only became aware of Kolers' excellent paper, which also deals with the complexities of our concept of genetic relatedness, after submitting this paper for publication. Revising this paper to take account of Kolers' arguments would have required extending it beyond the length appropriate for this journal and I have therefore chosen to publish it in its original form except for the inclusion of references to Kolers where they illuminate the argument.
33. This development itself has stripped away some of the context of reproduction that explains why it is important to couples to have 'their own' children. For instance, children conceived using artificial insemination are no longer a direct expression and result of sexual intimacy between their parents. Nor, if conception involves the use of donor gametes, need it affirm the love and mutual regard of the (genetic) parents. See Strong, op. cit. note 7, pp. 87-88.
34. For a discussion of the plausibility of various basis' for parenthood, see, A. Kolers & T. Bayne. 'Are you my mommy?' On the Genetic basis of Parenthood. J Appl Philos 2001; 18(3): 273-285.
35. Alpern, J Appl Philos op. cit. note 24, pp. 160-164.
36. See also Kolers, J Appl Philos op. cit. note 25.
37. Kolers, J Appl Philos Ibid: 163.
38. Harris, J Appl Philos op. cit. note 5, p. 148.
39. See also Kolers, J Appl Philos op. cit. note 25.
40. In the case of adoption this uncertainty may be reduced if prospective parents can select the child they wish to adopt. Even in this case the genetic inheritance of the child will to a certain extent represent an unknown. In many cases of adoption, parents will also confront the uncertainty of not knowing which child may become available for adoption.
41. But note the reservations expressed above about whether donors and their clones have any genetic relation at all - which explain why this matter remains arguable.
42. Note that if the argument for couples' rights to have access to a technology to allow them to become parents is grounded in the importance we place on participation in child rearing, or - more plausibly - in participation in conception, their rights to access in this case will be weak, because they have already conceived, and perhaps raised, a child. It is implausible to think that the 'right' to have children extends to the right to bring them up successfully.
43. Alpern, J Appl Philos op. cit. note 24, pp. 160-164. An important difference between a child produced through cloning and the original child that is being cloned for instance, is that the cloned child does not represent a mixing of the genetic character of its parents, so much as the reproduction of the result of a previous such mixing. This itself might be thought to constitute a significant difference in the process whereby the child is brought into being.
44. Strong, J Appl Philos op. cit. note 7, pp. 202-204.
45. In passing, we are now in a position to note that the case that I identified earlier as perhaps the most promising justification for reproductive cloning, that of a lesbian couple who wanted to have a child without requiring a genetic contribution from a man, is much weaker than first appeared. Because the genetic make-up of the clone will be identical to the donor, who presumably did have a male parent, clones will always have 'male' genes. Indeed the whole idea of distinguishing between 'male' and 'female' DNA is misguided. Except for those genes that can be linked to one of the sex chromosomes there is no way to distinguish 'male' from female human inheritance.
46. In particular it may be unethical to devote public funding to researching cloning. The ethical standards for the use of public funds seem to be higher than those for the use of private resources because we feel that decisions about the use of public monies should be appropriately responsive to public opinion, and that they express a society's aspirations and priorities in a way that private funding perhaps does not. Moreover, given the tightly inter-woven nature of privately - and publicly - funded research science, and the extent to which private research often 'piggybacks' on public research, through making use of techniques and results developed in publicly funded institutions and by employing researchers educated and trained in publicly funded institutions, a decision about the ethics of public funding may also have substantial implications for the future of any research into human cloning.