Quality cycles and the strategic manipulation of value

Operations Research

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 666-677

  Caulkins, Jonathan P ^a   Feichtinger, Gustav ^b   Haunschmied, Josef ^b   Tragler, Gernot ^a,b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

Author keywords

Dynamic programming optimal control: Multiple equilibria, Dechert Nishimura Skiba thresholds; Judicial legal: Drug markets, prices; Marketing: Pricing, competition strategy

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION STRATEGY; DECHERT NISHIMURA SKIBA THRESHOLDS; DRUG MARKETS; MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA; PRICES;

DECISION MAKING; DRUG PRODUCTS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; MARKETING; OPTIMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 33749501038     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1060.0294     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Agar, M., P. Bourgois, J. French, O. Murdoch. 1998. Heroin addict habit size in three cities: Context and variation. J. Drug Issues 28(4) 921-940.
2. Basar, T., R. Srikant. 2002. Revenue-maximizing pricing and capacity expansion in a many-users regime. Pmc. IEEE Conf. on Comput. Comm. and Networking. New York, 1-10.
3. Caulkins, J. P. 1994. Developing Price Series for Cocaine. MR-317-DPRC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
4. Caulkins, J. P., S. Chandler. 2006. Long-run trends in incarceration of drug offenders in the US. Crime Delinquency 52(4).
5. Caulkins, J. P., R. MacCoun. 2003. Limited rationality and the limits of supply reduction. J. Drug Issues 33(2) 433-464.
6. Caulkins, J. P., R. Padman. 1993. Quantity discounts and quality premia for illicit drugs. J. Amer. Statist. Association 88(423) 748-757.
7. Caulkins, J. P., P. Reuter. 1998. What price data tells us about drug markets. J. Drug Issues 28(3) 593-612.
8. Caulkins, J. P., E. Sevigny. 2005. How many people does the US incarcerate for drug use, and who are they? Contemporary Drug Problems 32(3) 405-428.
9. Caulkins, J. P., R. F. Haitl, G. Tragler, G. Feichtinger. 2001. Why politics makes strange bedfellows: A dynamic model with DNS curves. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 111(2) 237-254.
10. Caulkins, J. P., B. Johnson, A. Taylor, L. Taylor. 1999. What drug dealers tell us about their costs of doing business. J. Drug Issues 29(2) 323-340.
11. Caulkins, J. P., S. Paddock, R. Pacula, J. Chiesa. 2002. School-Based Drug Prevention: What Kind of Drug Use Does It Prevent? MR-1459-RWJ, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
12. Caulkins, J. P., C. P. Rydell, W. L. Schwabe, J. Chiesa. 1997. Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayers' Money? MR-827-DPRC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
13. Dechert, W. D. 2000. Personal communication, May 27.
14. Dechert, W. D., K. Nishimura. 1983. A complete characterization of optimal growth paths in an aggregated model with a non-concave production function. J. Econom. Theory 31 332-354.
15. Everingham, S. S., C. P. Rydell. 1994. Modeling the Demand for Cocaine. MR-332-ONDCP/A/DPRC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
16. Feichtinger, G., R. Hartl. 1986. Optimale Kontrolle Ökonomischer Prozesse - Anwendungen des Maximumprinzips in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. deGruyter, Berlin, Germany.
17. Feichtinger, G., F. Wirl. 2000. Instabilities in concave, dynamic, economic optimization. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 107 275-286.
18. Fuentes, J. R. 1998. The life of a cell: Managerial practice and strategy in Colombian cocaine distribution in the United States. Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, New York.
19. Goldstein, P. J. 1981. Getting over: Economic alternatives to predatory crime among street drug users. James A. Inciardi, ed. The Drugs-Crime. Connection. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA, 67-84.
20. Goldstein, P. J., D. S. Lipton, E. Preble, I. Sobel, T. Miller, W. Abbott, W. Paige, F. Soto. 1984. The marketing of street heroin in New York City. J. Drug Issues 14(3) 553-566.
21. Guckenheimer, J., P. Holmes. 1983. Nonlinear Oscillations, Dynamical Systems, and Bifurcation of Vector Fields. Springer, New York.
22. Haunschmied, J. L., P. M. Kort, R. F. Hartl, G. Feichtinger. 2003. A DNS-curve in a two state capital accumulation model: A numerical analysis. J. Econom. Dynam. Control 27(4) 701-716.
23. Hotteling, H. 1929. Stability in competition. Econom. J. 39 41-57.
24. Hser, Y. I., M. D. Anglin, C. Grella, D. Longshore, M. L. Prendergast. 1997. Drug treatment careers: A conceptual framework and existing research findings. J. Substance Abuse Treatment 14(6) 543-558.
25. Jacobs, B. A. 1996. Crack dealers and restrictive deterrence: Identifying narcs. Criminology 34(3) 409-431.
26. Kleiman, M. A. R. 1992. Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results. Basic Books, New York.
27. Léonard, D., N. V. Long. 1992. Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
28. Levitt, S., S. A. Venkatesh. 2000. An economic analysis of a drug-selling gang's finances. Quart. J. Econom. 115(3) 755-789.
29. Michel, P. 1982. On the transversality condition in infinite horizon optimal problems. Econometrica 50 975-985.
30. Milgrom, P., J. Roberts. 1982. Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis. Econometrica 50 443-460.
31. Reuter, P. 1983. Disorganized Crime. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
32. Reuter, P., J. P. Caulkins. 2004. Illegal lemons: Price dispersion in cocaine and heroin markets. Bull. Narcotics LVI(1-2) 141-165.
33. Riley, K. J. 1997. Crack, powder cocaine, and heroin: Drug purchase and use patterns in six U.S. cities. National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC.
34. Rocheleau, A. M., D. Boyum. 1994. Measuring heroin availability in three cities. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, DC.
35. Sevigny, E., J. P. Caulkins. 2004. Kingpins or mules? An analysis of drug offenders incarcerated in federal and state prisons. Criminology Public Policy 3(3) 401-434.
36. Simon, D., E. Burns. 1997. The Corner. Broadway Books, New York.
37. Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational. Wiley, New York.
38. Skiba, A. K. 1978. Optimal growth with a convex-concave production function. Econometrica 46 527-540.
39. Slobodyan, S. 2001. On impossibility of limit cycles in certain two-dimensional continuous-time growth models. Stud. Nonlinear Dynam. Econometrics 5(1) 33-40.
40. Spunt, B. 2003. The current New York City heroin scene. Substance. Use Misuse 38(10) 1539-1549.
41. Varian, H. R. 1996. Intermediate Economics: A Modern Approach, 4th ed. W. W. Norton & Company, New York.
42. Wendel, T., R. Curtis. 2000. The heraldry of heroin: "Dope stamps" and the dynamics of drug markets in New York City. J. Drug Issues 30 225.
43. Wilkins, C. 2001. A "new institutional economics" approach to the reliability of street-level drug transactions. Contemporary Drug Problems 28 679-693.