Representative democracy as tautology: Ankersmit and Lefort on representation

European Journal of Political Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 321-342

  Näsström, Sofia ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Action; Aesthetics; Ankersmit; Conflict; Delegation; Democracy; Election; Lefort; Representation; Totalitarianism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749498854     PISSN: 14748851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1474885106064664     Document Type: Article

References (97)

1. James Madison, 'Federalist 10', in A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay (1961) The Federalist Papers, ed. C. Rossiter, p. 82. New York: Penguin.
2. For the classical defence of direct democracy, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', in D.A. Cress (ed.) (1987) The Basic Political Writings, book 3, ch. 15. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co. For a contemporary argument against representation, see Benjamin Barber (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hanna Pitkin (2004) 'Representation and Democracy: An Uneasy Alliance', Scandinavian Political Studies 27(3): 335-42.
3. Theorists who pursue this line of reasoning are, among others, Bernard Manin (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frank Ankersmit (1996) Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (2002) Political Representation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Claude Lefort (1988) Democracy and Political Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (1986) The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. J.B. Thompson. Cambridge: Polity Press. Nadia Urbinati (2004) 'Condorcet's Democratic Theory of Representative Government', European Journal of Political Theory (3)1: 53-75. John Dunn, 'Situating Democratic Political Accountability', in A. Przeworski, S.C. Stokes and B. Manin (eds) (1999) Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, pp. 329-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. David Plotke (1997) 'Representation is Democracy', Constellations 4(1): 19-34. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (1999) Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jane Mansbridge (2003) 'Rethinking Representation', American Political Science Review 97: 515-28.
4. From an empirical point of view, it may seem odd that political theorists today seek a democratic recuperation of representation. In political science, representation already has the status of a democratic institution. The problem lies elsewhere: How to improve accountability in the face of party decline and voter apathy. But the relationship between democracy and representation is not in any way resolved, or outdated. Putting representation on a par with democracy does not tell us how they relate, or, indeed, if they relate. As we shall see in this article, the significance of representation and its connection to democracy is subject to debate.
5. Ankersmit (1996, 2002, in n. 3) and Lefort (1988, 1986, in n. 3). For a discussion of aesthetic representation, see Kari Palonen (2004) 'Parliamentarism: A Politics of Temporal and Rhetorical Distances', Österreischische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften (ÖZG) 15(4): 111-25. For a discussion of savage democracy, see Miguel Abensour (2002) '"Savage Democracy" and "Principle of Anarchy"', Philosophy and Social Criticism 28(6): 703-26. Oliver Marchart (2004) 'Representing Power. Public Space, the Artist, and the Body of the Leader', ÖZG 15(3): 95-110. Bernard Flynn (2005) The Philosophy of Claude Lefort: Interpreting the Political. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 'Aesthetic politics' is Ankersmit's own term. The term 'savage', while occasionally used by Lefort, I borrow from Abensour. Abensour examines different meanings of the term, such as its relationship to human rights and democracy. In this article, I discuss the latter.
6. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 347.
7. Lefort (1986, in n. 3), chs 8, 9; (1988, in n. 3), chs 1, 11.
8. The distinction between ancient and modern self-government, between participating in government and consenting to those who do, is of course not always that clear. John Stuart Mill, while concerned with representative government, recommends public service for the citizens: 'Let a person have nothing to do for his country, and he will not care for it.' John Stuart Mill, 'Representative Government', in H.B. Acton (ed.) (1972) Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, p. 204. London: J.M. Dent & Sons. For a reading of Mill as a thinker who displaces the distinction between the ancients and the moderns, see Nadia Urbinati (2002) Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
9. Hanna Pitkin (1967) The Concept of Representation, pp. 8-9. Berkeley: University of California Press. For a similar definition, see Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 109. Ernesto Laclau (1996) Emancipation(s), p. 97. London and New York: Verso.
10. Rousseau (n. 2), p. 198. Rousseau is not alone in making this argument. In his Study on Sovereignty, Joseph de Maistre calls attention to the same problem. He draws a different conclusion, however. Unlike Rousseau, who takes the division to confirm the preeminence of direct participation in the rule of society, de Maistre uses it as an intellectual weapon against popular rule:
11. It is said that the people are sovereign, but over whom? - over themselves, apparently. The people are thus subject. There is surely something equivocal if not erroneous here, for the people which command are not the people which obey. It is enough, then, to put the general proposition, 'The people are sovereign' to feel that it needs an exegesis. This exegesis will not be long in coming, at least not in the French system. The people, it will be said, exercise their sovereignty by means of representatives. This begins to make sense. The people are a sovereign which cannot exercise sovereignty... ([1965] 'The Sovereignty of the People', in The Works of Joseph de Maistre, ed. J. Lively. New York: Schocken Books.)
12. Urbinati (n. 3), p. 53.
13. Barber (n. 2), pp. 135, 145-6.
14. Joseph Schumpeter (1976) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 263. New York: Harper Perennial.
15. As Urbinati argues, Joseph Schumpeter, together with Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels, 'endorsed Rousseau's general will as the norm of democracy only to conclude, predictably, that democracy was an illusory ideal used by the ruling class to conceal the invariably elitist character of parliamentary regimes'. Urbinati (n. 3), p. 55.
16. Manin (n. 3), p. 192.
17. Dunn (n. 3), p. 343.
18. Przeworski et al. (n. 3), pp. 4-5.
19. See, among others, Otto von Gierke (1990) Community in Historical Perspective: A Translation of Selections from Das deutsche Genossenshaftsrecht, ed. A. Black, tr. M. Fischer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ernst Kantorowicz (1997) The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
20. Ankersmit (1996, 2002, in n. 3).
21. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 190. Others who according to Ankersmit hold this view are Edmund Burke and Emmanuel Sieyès.
22. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), pp. 26, 30.
23. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), ch. 6.
24. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 30.
25. Bonnie Honig (1993) Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.
26. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 189. Quoted from Niccolo Machiavelli (1996), in Discourses on Livy, tr. H.C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
27. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 190. Quoted from Niccolo Machiavelli (1984) The Prince, tr. G. Bull. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
28. Identification, in Ankersmit's use of the term, pertains both to a politics of 'ideas' and 'identities', as long as representation takes place against the backdrop of a common ground. On ideas and identities in representative democracy, see Iris Marion Young (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Anne Philips (1995) The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jane Mansbridge (1999) 'Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes"', Journal of Politics 61(3): 628-57.
29. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 38.
30. Emmanuel Sieyès (2003) Political Writings, ed. M. Sonenscher. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co. For Ankersmit's discussion of Sieyès, see (1996, in n. 3), pp. 29, 46, 50-1.
31. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 115.
32. Pitkin (n. 10), p. 108.
33. Ibid. p. 140.
34. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), pp. 113-14, 190. In this respect, he follows in the footsteps of Emmanuel Sieyès. Sieyès is famous for rejecting the republican view of politics as anchored in a pre-existent people. In his view, it contradicts the idea of government as a voluntary association of free and equal individuals. 'The social contract', he writes in words reminiscent of those of Hobbes and Locke, 'binds the associates to one another'. Sieyès, 'What is the Third Estate?' (n. 30), p. 12. To claim that there is first a political association, and then a contract with representatives, is therefore to mistake freedom for its opposite. The political association only comes into being by way of representation. See Michael Sonenscher's introduction to Sieyès's idea of representation in Political Writings.
35. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 47.
36. Ibid. pp. 103-4.
37. Ibid. p. 104; (2002, in n. 3), ch. 6.
38. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), pp. 28-9.
39. Ibid. p. 347.
40. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 273. See also Claude Lefort (2000) Writing: The Political Test, ed. and tr. D.A. Curtis, pp. 109-41. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press.
41. The term democratic revolution he borrows from Tocqueville. For a discussion of the 'democratic revolution', see also Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London and New York: Verso.
42. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 17.
43. Ibid. p. 16. See also Kantorowicz (n. 19).
44. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 19.
45. As Sir Robert Filmer argues, the people cannot rule themselves. For those who 'are the people this minute, are not the people the next minute'. Sir Robert Filmer quoted from Simone Chambers (2004) 'Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy', Constellations 11(2): 153-73, at p. 154. On the changing nature of the people, see also Edmund Morgan (1988) Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co. Hannah Arendt (1964) On Revolution, Chs 4-5. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Bernard Yack (2001) 'Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism', Political Theory 29(4): 517-36. Jefferson and Paine both recognized the problem of change in the set-up of the American constitution. However, they reduced it to a generational question. The people who live today are not identical with those who will live in 20 years, which is why Jefferson demands a new revolution every twenty years: 'for the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure'. Jefferson in a letter to Colonel Smith 1787, in (1944) The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. A. Koch and W. Peden, p. 436. New York: Random House.
46. Morgan (n. 45). On the importance of narratives and stories in the construction of peoples, see Rogers M. Smith (2003) Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
47. Kantorowicz (n. 19), p. 280. 'The angels', Kantorowicz writes, 'were like man, created: But man's transitory tempus could not be theirs, since angels were eternal beings, bodiless, immortal.' On time and continuity, ibid. ch. 6. For a discussion on Kantorowicz, see Lefort (1988, in n. 3), ch. 11.
48. Lefort (1986, in n. 3), p. 303.
49. Ibid.; (1988, in n. 3), p. 17.
50. As Quentin Skinner argues, it is Thomas Hobbes who first articulates the understanding of popular sovereignty as a non-place. Leviathan, which Hobbes characteristically refers to as a 'mortal god', is a power separated both from rulers and ruled. It exists independently of both the people who once instituted it and those currently acting in its name. Quentin Skinner (1999) 'The State', in R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds) Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
51. Lefort (1986, in n. 3), p. 303; (1988, in n. 3), p. 17.
52. For various meanings of the term 'savage' in the theory of Lefort, see Abensour (n. 5), pp. 704-10.
53. 'If we bear in mind the monarchical model of the Ancien Regime, the meaning of the transformation can be summarized as follows: Democratic society is instituted as a society without a body, as a society which undermines the representation of an organic totality.' Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 18.
54. Ibid. p. 12. See also Marchart (n. 5).
55. For the discussion on totalitarianism: Lefort (1986, in n. 3), chs 8-9; (1988, in n. 3), ch. 1. See also Hannah Arendt in (2004) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books.
56. Lefort (1986, in n. 3), p. 305.
57. Ibid. pp. 286-91, 305-6 and (1988, in n. 3), pp. 13-14.
58. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 13. On immanentism, see Jean-Luc Nancy (1991) The Inoperative Community, ed. P. Connor. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. Or as Arendt describes it: 'In contradistinction to both tyrannical and authoritarian regimes, the proper image of totalitarian rule and organization seems to me to be the structure of the onion, in whose center, in a kind of empty space, the leader is located; whatever he does - whether he integrates the body politic as in an authoritarian hierarchy, or oppresses his subjects like a tyrant - he does it from within, and not from without or above.' Hannah Arendt (1993) Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, p. 99. New York: Penguin Books. In a recent article, Lefort criticizes Arendt's conception of totalitarianism for being too limited. Arendt 'denounced the myth of the One without considering the scheme of a new symbolic order. That is the reason why she has not measured the abyss that separates two forms of society: Totalitarianism and modern democracy.' Claude Lefort (2002) 'Thinking with and against Hannah Arendt', Social Research 69(2): 447-59, at p. 459.
59. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 105.
60. Ibid. p. 47. Also ibid. p. 39, and (2002, in n. 3), p. 196: '[R]epresentation deals with the "organization of truth rather than truth itself"'.
61. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 47.
62. Ibid. pp. 58, 252; (2002, in n. 3), ch. 8.
63. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 50.
64. See e.g. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), pp. 12, 116, 198.
65. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), pp. 28-9, 43; (2002, in n. 3), p. 196.
66. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 109. Ankersmit (2001) Historical Representation, p. 11. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
67. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 345.
68. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 198.
69. Ibid. p. 117.
70. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 50.
71. In one passage, Ankersmit identifies the artist as the people. He argues that power 'originates in the decision of the people to allow the body of the people to be divided into representatives and persons represented' (1996, in n. 3), p. 50. If this were the case, we would expect to find the creative initiative in politics on the side of the people. The many references to the politician tell a different story, however.
72. Schumpeter (n. 14), p. 262. Ankersmit is not only concerned with the irrationality of citizens. In contemporary societies, we do not only have the problem with 'the inconsistent' but also with 'the unstable and floating voter' (1996, in n. 3), p. 362.
73. Schumpeter (n. 14), p. 256.
74. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 235.
75. Ibid. p. 190.
76. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), p. 105.
77. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 226.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid. p. 17.
80. Ibid. p. 18.
81. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), pp. 104-5.
82. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), pp. 18-19, 226; (1986, in n. 3), p. 303.
83. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 19.
84. Ibid. p. 17.
85. Ibid. pp. 226-7.
86. Ankersmit (n. 66), p. 11. For a discussion of Ankersmit's aesthetic reading of history, see Mark Bevir and Frank Ankersmit (2000) 'Exchanging Ideas', Rethinking History 4(3): 351-72. Heikki Saari (2005) 'On Frank Ankersmit's Postmodernist Theory of Historical Narrativity', Rethinking History 9(1): 5-21. John Zammito (2005) 'Ankersmit and Historical Representation', History and Theory 44: 155-81.
87. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), pp. 1-4; (n. 66), Introduction.
88. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), p. 37.
89. Ibid. p. 67.
90. Ibid. p. 4.
91. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 16.
92. Abensour (n. 5). For a discussion of the role of an-archy in politics, see also Sofia Näsström (2004) 'The An-Archical State: Logics of Legitimacy in the Social Contract Tradition', dissertation, Stockholm Series in Politics 99, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University.
93. Ankersmit (2002, in n. 3), pp. 115-18; (1996, in n. 3), p. 104; Lefort (1986, in n. 3).
94. Ankersmit (1996, in n. 3), pp. 354-72.
95. Ibid. p. 355.
96. Lefort (1988, in n. 3), p. 19.
97. Ibid.