Getting out the vote with patronage and threat: The French and Italian Christian Democratic parties, 1944-1958

Journal of Interdisciplinary History

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 553-582

  Warner, Carolyn M ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 33749462730     PISSN: 00221953     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (154)

1. Francis de Tarr, The French Radical Party (London, 1961), 9.
2. See, for example, Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor, 1991);
3. Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge, 1985);
4. Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe: Theories of Political Party Formation Applied to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland," Politics and Society, XX (1992), 7-51.
5. Simon Hug, "The Emergence of New Political Parties from a Game Theoretic Perspective," European Journal of Political Research, XXIX (1994), 169-190;
6. Thomas A. Koelble, "Recasting Social Democracy in Europe: A Nested Games Explanation of Strategic Adjustment in Political Parties," Politics and Society, XX (1992), 51-70;
7. Kaare Strøm, "The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway," American Political Science Review, LXXXVIII (1994), 112-127.
8. Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard, "Rediscovering Reasonable Rationality in Institutional Analysis," European Journal of Political Research, XXIX (1996), 31-57. Success is defined, in the standard manner, as securing a substantial portion of the electoral vote in successive elections, thereby ensuring the long-term survival of the party. Failure can be defined as the decline of votes over time, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the party. The conclusion suggests an alternative definition for certain parties.
9. On conflicts and cleavages, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in idem (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, 1967), 1-64;
10. Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: The History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago, 1986);
11. Kitschelt, "Formation."
12. On positions and offices, see Giovanni Sartori, Parties an a Party Systems (New York, 1967);
13. Schlesinger, Political Parties.
14. Richard Rose and Thomas T. Mackie, "Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations," in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds.), When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton, 1988), 533-558;
15. Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven, 1970);
16. Przeworski, Capitalism. Quantitative studies leave considerable variance to be explained.
17. Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher T. Husbands, British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980's (London, 1985).
18. Koelble, "Recasting";
19. Kitschelt, "Formation";
20. Doug Perkins, "Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party Formation," Party Politics, II (1995), 355-375.
21. Because these three strategies enable parties to create subcultures that reinforce their hold over a bloc of voters, this study does not treat the building of subcultures as a separate strategy. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, 1986).
22. On coherence, see Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice (Ann Arbor, 1994).
23. For the seminal exposition of the programmatic approach, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957).
24. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley, 1988).
25. Martin Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," Politics and Society, VII (1977), 403-451;
26. Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston, 1978);
27. Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, 1981). Patronage is particularly effective where voters' life chances are limited.
28. Parties that fail to obtain access to national ministries still find constituency service useful and possible. See Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy (Cambridge, 1982);
29. Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven, 1967).
30. Jan Leighly, "Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation," Journal of Politics, LVIII (1996), 447-463.
31. The "threat" concept has been elaborated in Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), The Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor, 1989);
32. V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, XIX (1994/95), 130-166;
33. Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Brian L. Job, "The President and the Political Use of Force," American Political Science Review, LXXX (1986), 541-566.
34. The main difference between the French and Italian electoral systems was in the use of preference votes. This institutional feature had a role in DC success largely to the extent that it was willing to have activists illegally track individuals' vote choices when it gained control of the Interior Ministry. Preference votes became a bargaining chip of politicians within all of the Italian political parties, and in relation to societal actors. At first, both the French and Italian systems slightly favored large parties, although they allowed a plethora of parties to co-exist. Philip M. Willianis, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the French Fourth Republic (Hamden, 1964), Appendix VI, 504-508;
35. Paolo Farneti, The Italian Party System (Cambridge, 1980). The French Communist party (PCF) averaged c. 25% in national elections; the Italian Communist party (PCI) from 32%, when linked with the socialists in 1948, to 23% in 1953, and 20% in 1958; the French Socialists (SFIO) c. 13% (save 1946, 18%); the Italian Marxist Socialists (PSI) c. 13%.
36. On religious practice, see François-André Isambert and Jean-Paul Terrenoire, Atlas de la pratique cultuelle des catholiques en France (Paris, 1980), 59-79;
37. Silvio Burgalassi, Il Comportamento Religioso degli Italiani (Florence, 1968);
38. Mattei Dogan, "Le donne italiane tra Cattolicesimo e Marxismo," in Alberto Spreafico and Joseph LaPalombara (eds.), Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia (Milan, 1963), 475-494. France and Italy shared a Napoleonic, centralized administrative system, and a weak presidency; executive power rested in the cabinet, dependent upon the bicameral parliament.
39. The French Senate overrepresented rural regions, but, as an institution, it was less powerful than its Italian counterpart. In both parties, the national councils and executives became the de facto holders of party power; departmental and provincial federations vied for influence at those levels. Ronald E. M. Irving, Christian Democracy in France (London, 1973), 95-105;
40. Pierre Letamendia, "Le M.R.P.," unpub. thèse du doctorat (Univ. de Bordeaux, 1975), I, 249-266;
41. Jean-Paul Chassériaud, Le Parti Démocrate Chrétien en Italie (Paris, 1965), 37-100.
42. Michael P. Fogarty, Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953 (London, 1957), 3-11;
43. Irving, The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe (London, 1979), xvii-xxii;
44. Kees van Kersbergen, "The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy," in David Hanley (ed.), Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective (London, 1994), 31-47;
45. Mario Einaudi and François Goguel, Christian Democracy in Italy and France (South Bend, 1952);
46. Jean-Marie Mayeur, Catholicisme social et démocratie chrétienne: Principes romains, experiences françaises (Paris, 1986);
47. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Ithaca, 1996), 1-2.
48. PDP votes were calculated from Georges LaChapelle, Élections Législatives 22-29 avril, 1928. Résultats Officiels (Paris, n.d. [1929?]);
49. Georges LaChapelle, idem, Élections Législatives 1er & 8 Mai 1932. Résultats Officiels (Paris, 1932);
50. Georges LaChapelle, idem, Élections Législatives 26 Avril & 3 Mai 1936. Résultats Officiels (Paris, 1936).
51. Jean-Claude Delbreil, Centrisme et Démocratie-Chrétienne en France: Le Parti Démocrate Populaire des origines au. M.R.P. 1919-1944 (Paris, 1990), 183.
52. Jean-Claude Delbreil, Centrisme et Démocratie-Chrétienne en France: Le Parti Démocrate Populaire des origines au. M.R.P. 1919-1944 Ibid., 427;
53. Anne Sa'adah, "Le Mouvement Republicain Populaire et la Reconstitution du Système Partisan Français, 1944-1951," Revue Franç,aise de Science Politique, XXXVII (1987), 33-58;
54. François Bazin, "Les députés MRP élus les 21 octobre 1945, 2 juin et 10 novembre 1946: Itinéraire politique d'une génération catholique," unpub. thèse du doctorat (Institut d'Études Politiques, 1981), 163;
55. Gabriele De Rosa, Il Partito Popolare (Bari, 1988), 291.
56. Measures of other organizational variables yield similar results. Occupational variables yield statistically insignificant results. Warner, "Priests, Patronage and Politicians: The Role of Political Party Strategies and of Institutions in the Construction of the French and Italian Christian Democratic Parties, 1944-1958," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Harvard Univ., 1994), 154b.
57. Archives Nationales [hereinafter AN], A-MRP, 350AP/1, 1MRP2 Dr. 2, statement in Commission Exécutive file, March 22, 1949, 5; Letamendia, "Le M.R.P.," 50-73;
58. Fogarty, Christian Democracy, 338;
59. Jean Cayeux, Le MRP sans de Gaulle (Paris, 1946), 21;
60. Albert Gortais, speech to the Third National Congress of the MRP, March 14, 1947, printed as Démocratie et Libération (Mayenne, 1947), 8, 15, 17-23;
61. Pierre Corval, "Indépendence," L'Aube, 2571 (March 27, 1945), 1.
62. Cayeaux, Le MRP, 21, 24, 28-29, 31;
63. Peter Novick, The Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (New York, 1968), 130-132;
64. André Latreille, De Gaulle, La Libération et l'Église catholique (Paris, 1978). The MRP leadership was made up of diverse Catholics, including former PDP activists.
65. The common denominator was, with few exceptions, participation in the Catholic resistance. Bazin, "Les députés MRP," 36-101;
66. Letamendia, "Le M.R.P.," 63-66.
67. On the MRP'S goals, see André Colin and Maurice René Simmonet, Ligne d'Action pour la Libération (Paris, 1944);
68. Bazin "Les députés."
69. On not cloning the PDP, see letter of L. Terrenoire to A. Juge, 1943, "there are footprints in which we will no longer put our feet," quoted in "Les députés." ibid., 169-170,
70. and Juge, "Du PDP au MRP, août 1939-décembre 1944," "Les députés." quoted in ibid., 163; Archives Ernest Pezet, Box #4, letter to the editor of Ouest-France, July 30, 1945.
71. The French Catholic Church did not have the same role and influence in French society that the Italian Church had in Italy. Arguably, the MRP could afford to ignore the Church. However, the French Catholic Church was influential in many parts of France. Gérard Cholvy, "Cette Bretagne du Midi," in Henri Enjalbert and Cholvy (eds.), Histoire du Rouergue (Toulouse, 1987; 2d ed.), 393-424;
72. Bernard Leger, Les Opinions Politiques des Provinces Françaises: Les partis politiques-géographie électorale (Paris, 1936). Archives de la Préfet de Paris (hereinafter APP), MRP box 278.247-2, June 27, 1945.
73. As various government reports note, the Church wanted an ally in the government, and the issue was one that could divide departments. APP, MRP box 278.247-2, no. 622, August 20, 1951; AN, FI CII Dr. 150, Morbihan, rapport du préfet, October 22, 1945; Williams, Crisis, 116. An Executive Committee member argued, "We shouldn't put the election before the question of social justice"; it was more urgent to ally with the socialists to implement policies benefiting workers and the poor than to break with them in order to support the program of state subsidies to private schools. AN, A-MRP 350/AP/49 2MRP2 Dr.20, Commission Exécutive, May 18, 1951.
74. Cahiers du Clergé Rural de France, 67 (January/February 1945);
75. Pierre Pierrard, L'Eglise et les ouvriers en France (1940-1990) (Paris, 1991);
76. Mouvement Républicain Populaire, Pourquoi et Comment créer une Equipe ouvrière: Plan d'organisation et de Travail (Paris, 1946). APP, MRP box 278.247-1, police report, November 22, 1947.
77. A 1952 survey, and electoral returns from 1951, showed that most Catholics voted for the MRP, the Independents, Peasants, and Gaullists, not for the left parties. Williams, Crisis, 109, 155. The Church continued to issue voting instructions in later elections. Citizens' organizations that lobbied for educational subsidies proliferated, most notably the Comité d'action scolaire pour la liberté de l'enseignement and the Association de parents d'élèves de l'enseignement libre, each with memberships of several hundred thousand.
78. Maurice Feltin (Archbishop of Paris) Semaine Religieuse de Paris (SRP), 102/5302, 17 Dec. 1955.
79. The report added, "Our role is to undertake a political education of the masses." AN, A-MRP, 350/AP/65, 3MRP1 Dr. 17. Equipes Ouvrières Pres. Jean Sachet, December 2, 1951, 2, 11. As early as 1944, an MRP leader stated, "[W]e are Christian and revolutionary-inspired democrats, and, without abdicating our ideal, we await the French masses." Marc Sangnier, written message to MRP Congrès National, Paris, November 1944.
80. Williams, Crisis, 133;
81. Jean Charlot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition, 1946-1958 (Paris, 1983), 17-68;
82. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle. II. La Politique 1944-1959 (Paris, 1985), 225-249.
83. AN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457/AP/67. Bidault letter to Diplomatie Paris, April 25, 1947.
84. André Siegfried, Édouard Bonnefous, and J.-B. Duroselle, L'année politique 1948 (Paris, 1949), IV, 444;
85. Charlot, Le Gaullisme, 69-79.
86. Archives Fédération de la Seine, Neuilly section leader, September 30, 1949. On MRP'S concern about the "antidemocratic" aspect of de Gaulle's party, see AN, A-MRP, 350/AP/46 2MRP2 Dr. 6, Commission Exécutive, December 2, 1947; AN, A-MRP, 350/AP/65, 3MRP1 Dr. 17, Rencontre Nationale des Equipes Ouvières, Pres. [of Equipes] Jean Sachet, December 2, 1951.
87. The MRP prided itself on having "avoided the politics of two blocs." Maurice Schumann, speech in Paris, April 6, 1946, quoted in William Ross Yates, "Power, Principle, and the Doctrine of the Mouvement Republicain Populaire," American Political Science Review, LII (1958), 429. Where the party emphasized anticommunism, it had good results, for example in the parliamentary elections in a Midi-Pyrénées department of Aveyron.
88. Le Pays, 7-8 Oct. 1945, 6 Nov. 1946, 7 Nov. 1946;
89. Rouergue Républicain, 12 Nov. 1946.
90. The PCF was a force with which to reckon; it had won 25% of the vote in 1946 and had a strong electoral presence (25% or more) in twenty-seven French departments. Henry Ehrmann, "The French Peasant and Communism," American Political Science Review, XL (1952), 19-43;
91. George H. Gallup, Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, France 1939, 1944-1967 (New York, 1976), I, 103. No sample size is given, just "350 geographical units."
92. AN, FI CII Dr. 207, Seine, Rapport du Préfet, n.d, 1952, 16, Dr. 405, Seine, March 15, 1953. For opinion polls, and de Gaulle, see Jean-Pierre Rioux (Godfrey Rogers, trans.), The Fourth Republic 1944-1958 (Cambridge, 1987), 493. In areas where the RPF had made almost no impact, the MRP still lost a substantial number of votes to conservatives who played the anticommunist theme and catered to influential clergy. Institut Charles de Gaulle, Archives RPF (hereinafter A-RPF), BP2-12d, February 9, 1948.
93. Whereas the MRP viewed political parties as essential intermediaries "between the people and the executive and legislative powers," de Gaulle viewed them as destructive and self-serving. The strategy deprived the MRP of a third support, the United States government. The quotation came from Pierre-Henri Teitgen, MRP leader, in Irving, Christian Democracy in France, 67.
94. Charles d'Aragon, "Le village et les pouvoirs," in Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras (eds.), Les Paysans et La Politique dans la France contemporaine (Paris, 1958), 512.
95. Some politicians succeeded in building veritable political machines, for example, Jacques Chaban Delmas, at the time a Radical and Gaullist mayor, and later to become a deputy (under Pompidou), and prime minister. Jean-François Médard, "Political Clientelism in France: The Center-Periphery Nexus Reexamined," in Samuel N. Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand (eds.), Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (Beverly Hills, 1981).
96. See Christian Prieur, "La campagne électorale dans l'Aveyron" in Maurice Duverger, François Goguel, and Jean Touchard (eds.), Les Élections du 2 Janvier 1956 (Paris, 1957), 322-352; he discusses "neutralizing" challengers on 331.
97. François de Menthon, Vers la Quatrième République (Paris, 1946), 7-8. The SFIO was involved in every major scandal of the Fourth Republic; the PCF had its problems as well.
98. Williams, Crisis, 99, 391;
99. on the Radicals, see de Tarr, French Radical Party;
100. Serge Berstein, Histoire du Parti Radical (Paris, 1980-1982), I-II.
101. Like the other parties, the MRP "colonized" some of the ministerial departments, notably Foreign Affairs, but, unlike several other parties, it did not use its "colonies" to extract votes from constituencies. Williams, Crisis, 418-419;
102. Gordon Wright, "Catholics and Peasantry in France," Political Science Quarterly, LXVIII (1953), 526-551.
103. AN, FI CIII, Dr. 1251, Aveyron, rapport du préfet sur les élections municipaux, 1947. On the MRP view of "change," see Wright, "Catholics."
104. On small farmers as entrepreneurs, see Bernard Broussard, Le Pays, 2 Sept. 1945.
105. The DC'S economic policies, mostly neoclassical liberal, with some moderate reforms, proceeded from its threefold orientation. It was not inevitable, however, that the DC would capitulate so much to capitalists (who themselves were sometimes divided). The MRP also faced hostile capitalist groups, yet persisted in pushing for social and economic reforms - at a great electoral price. For overviews of the DC'S economic policies, see Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988 (London, 1990), 121-297;
106. Mariuccia Salvati, Stato e industria nella ricostruzione (Milan, 1982).
107. Pietro Scoppola, La Proposta Politica di De Gasperi (Bologna, 1977), 128-129, 114-115, 153, 242.
108. Chassériaud, Le Parti Démocrate, 273, 275-291;
109. Paolo Pombeni, Il gruppo dossettiano e la fondazione della democrazia italiana (1938-1948) (Bologna, 1979);
110. Scoppola, La Proposta, 149-150;
111. Geoffrey Pridham, Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy (London, 1988);
112. Alan S. Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy (New Haven, 1979). The role of intraparty conflict and coalition building, and an explanation of how the centrists in Italy and the leftists in France won their respective internal battles for leadership are important subjects that call for a separate analysis. The point in this study is that who leads matters, and that party strategies are not reducible to internal party structures.
113. See W. Rand Smith, "Industrial Crisis and the Left: Adjustment Strategies in Socialist France and Spain," Comparative Politics, XXVIII (1995), 1-24.
114. Jean-Dominique Durand, L'Église Catholique dans la Crise de l'Italie (1943-1948) (Rome, 1991), 619-620.
115. Scoppola, La Proposta, 201-252;
116. Celso Ghini, Le Elezioni in Italia (1946-1968) (Milan, 1968), 66-67; Archivo Centrale dello Stato (hereinafter, ACS), MinIntGab, fondo Situazioni Politica ed economica della regione, Lombardia, f. 2493.42, Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri, no. 200/1, February 22, 1947, 4.
117. In early 1947, the Church was expressing "disillusionment" with the DC "because it did not see in that Party a sufficient barrier against the overflow of communism and anti-clericalism." For the DC'S rationale, see DC memorandum, dated 1944, quoted in Scoppola, La Proposta, 260-262.
118. Luigi Palma, DC leader, January 10, 1947, at meeting of Catholic Action's national directorate (the Presidenza generale), quoted in La Proposta, ibid., 245.
119. Francesco Malgeri (ed.), Storia della Democrazia Cristiana. Il. De Gasperi e l'età del centrismo, 1948-1954 (Rome, 1987), 485-487;
120. Mario Casella, 18 Aprile 1948: la mobilitazione delle organizzazioni cattoliche (Lecce, 1992);
121. Durand, L'Église; Ginsborg, History, 111-112. In France, on May 5, 1947, Paul Ramadier, the Socialist prime minister, dismissed the Communists from the government; the MRP remained in the government.
122. Rioux, Fourth Republic, 125-126.
123. Panebianco argues that the DC was an externally validated party, virtually the emanation of the Catholic Church, but this study finds that the DC leaders had to work to get the Church's support, while trying to establish some distance from the Church (Angelo Panebianco, Modelli di partito: organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici [Bologna, 1982]).
124. The PCI'S history in the early years of the Republic was complex. The party's activists were anticlerical, but Palmiro Togliatti, its leader, tried to ease tensions. De Gasperi, among others, feared that Togliatti's stance was only tactical. Scoppola, La Proposta, 295-299. The PCI stressed that communism and Catholicism were reconcilable. The Communist party earlier had agreed not to oppose the 1929 Lateran Pacts in the new constitution, giving the Church freedom in many religious matters, and much influence in education.
125. See Scoppola, La Proposta, 152-153. Numerous Azione Cattolica missionaries reported about the confusion among Catholic voters. The extent of the phenomenon varied within and across regions, even in northern Italy.
126. See Casella, 18 Aprile 1948, 265-288.
127. Percy Allum, Politics and Society in Post-War Naples (Cambridge, 1973);
128. Joseph LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton, 1964).
129. Francesco Compagna, Lauro e la Democrazia Cristiana (Rome, 1960);
130. Allum, Politics, 283-289. On bungled patronage, see ACS, PS Dir. Generale, Elezioni Politiche, Napoli, E1/A b. 16, no. 10499, April 15, 1953; ACS, MinIntPS, 1949, fondo Relazioni, Reggio Calabria, b. 8, no. 4817, November 27, 1949; 1953, fondo Relazioni, Reggio Calabria, b. 17, January 17, 30, 1952; 1953-1956, fondo Relazioni, Reggio Calabria, f. 6995/66 b. 363, no. 789, January 29, 1953.
131. ACS, MinIntGab, 1953-1956, f. Democrazia Cristiana, "Relazione sulla Situazione Politica, Sindacale, economica, dello spirito dell'ordine pubblico e della pubblica sicurezza durante il meso di Marzo 1956," no. 6998/2, April 26, 1956.
132. Irwin M. Wall, L'influence américaine sur la politique française 1945-1954 (Paris, 1989);
133. United States Government, Superintendent of Documents, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1946), V, 421-422, 413;
134. Foreign Relations of the United States ibid. (1947), VI, 889, 772;
135. Yves Cartuyvels, "La confirmation officielle de l'existence du réseau Gladio et de l'intervention clandestine américaine en Italie, in Jan Willems (ed.), Gladio (Brussels, 1991), 123-131.
136. Allum, Politics, 161-168;
137. LaPalombara, Interest Groups, 200, 308.
138. Ginsborg, History, 162, 171-173;
139. Manlio Rossi-Doria, Rapporto sulla Federconsorzi (Bari, 1963);
140. Tarrow, "Maintaining Hegemony in Italy: "The Softer They Rise, the Slower They Fall!'", in T. J. Pempel (ed.), Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, 1990), 319;
141. Franco Cazzola, "I pilastri del regime: Gli Enti pubblici di sicurezza sociale," Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, XVII (1976), 421-447.
142. Mario Caciagli, Democrazia Cristiana e Potere nel Mezzogiomo. Il sistema democristiano a Catania (Rimini/Firenze, 1977);
143. Ginsborg, History, 162;
144. LaPalombara, Interest Groups, 319;
145. Giovanni Cervigni, "Le defezioni dal [sic] Partito Comunista in Calabria," Nord e Sud, II (1955), 65-95;
146. ACS, MinInt Reggio Calabria and Napoli files; Ufficio Studi Edison, "Inchiesta Elettorale nel Mezzogiomo," in idem, Indagine ragionata sui risultati della elezioni politiche del 1948 e di quelle provincialei e regionali del 1951-1952 in relazione alla prossima consultazione elettorale (Milan, 1953), 6-8, 18-26; Archivio Azione Cattolica, Presidenza Generale VI.18 fondo Corrispondenza con le diocesi 1947-1951, Calabria.
147. Francesco Turvasi, M. S. C. "Situazione religiosa di Marri (Cosenza)," 1-5.
148. Allum, Politics, 161, 167.
149. Paul V. Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge, 1994).
150. AN, A-MRP, 350/AP/91, 6MRP3 Dr1 1952, Réunion des Secretaires et Presidents Fédéraux, September 27-28, 1952, 5; Jean Raymond-Laurent, Archives de Paris, Archives Raymond-Laurent, D.51 Z117, 1945.
151. Some have suggested that political pragmatism may be a typical characteristic of Italian Catholicism. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, 1993), 6. This necessarily short summary precludes discussion of the politically significant differences between the leaders mentioned in these paragraphs.
152. Richard M. Locke and Kathleen Thelen, "Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextualized Comparisons and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics," Politics and Society, XXIII (1995), 337-367.
153. Evidence from Eastern Europe suggests that patronage is a useful strategy for new parties trying to hold together diverse voting coalitions through successive elections. Mitchell Orenstein, "Parties and Organized Interests in East Central Europe," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996;
154. Kitschelt, "Post-Communist Democracies: Do Party Systems Help or Hinder Democratic Consolidation?" paper presented at the conference, "Democracy, Markets, and Civil Societies in Post-1989 East Central Europe," Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1996. Like the DC, Germany's Christian Democratic party (CDU-CSU) in the 1950s and Mexico's dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in the 1920s appear to have succeeded, in part, by going beyond programmatic appeal to position themselves vis-à-vis a plausible threat.