Screening before sanctioning: Elections and the republican tradition

European Journal of Political Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 415-435

  Herreros, Francisco ^a  

^a CSIC Unidad de Politicas Comparadas UPC   (Spain)

Author keywords

Accountability; Agency problems; Elections; Electoral rules; Natural aristocracy; Republican tradition

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749438899     PISSN: 14748851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1474885106067281     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. John Ferejohn (1986) 'Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control', Public Choice 50: 5-25. Morris P. Fiorina (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Bernard Manin (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. P.E. Converse (1964) 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in D.E. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press. Robert C. Luskin (1987) 'Measuring Political Sophistication', American Journal of Political Science 31: 856-99.
3. James D. Fearon (1999) 'Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance', in A. Przeworski, B. Manin and S. Stokes (eds) Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. V.O. Key (1966) The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage Books. Ferejohn (n. 1). Manin (n. 1).
5. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes (1999) 'Elections and Representation', in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds) Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. John Ferejohn (1999) 'Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability', ibid.
6. Converse (n. 2).
7. G.C. Jacobson (1992) The Politics of Congressional Elections. New York: HarperCollins.
8. Luskin (n. 2).
9. John R. Zaller (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinions, p. 16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Samuel Popkin (1991) The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns, p. 10. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
11. Ferejohn (n. 5), p. 132.
12. Fearon (n. 3). Fearon's model of elections as a selection device has been related by Jane Mansbridge to what she calls 'gyroscopic representation', a model of representation in which voters select representatives who can be expected to perform in ways the voter approves, as, for example, a person of integrity with a commitment to the public good. Mansbridge (2003) 'Rethinking Representation', American Political Science Review 97(4): 515-28, p. 521. It seems that the standard interpretation of elections as a device for retrospective accountability is more accurately associated with what Mansbridge calls 'promissory representation'. This would be another difference between Fearon's model and the standard accountability model of elections. While this is interesting, in this article I will not deal explicitly with the model of representation associated with each interpretation of elections.
13. Fearon (n. 3), p. 57.
14. Ibid. p. 59.
15. Philip Pettit (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, pp. 5-6. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
16. Iseult Honohan (2002) Civic Republicanism, p. 40. New York: Routledge.
17. Manin (n. 1).
18. Aristotle (1997) Política, tr. Julián Marías and María Araújo, 1317b. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
19. Mogens Herman Hansen (1999) The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, pp. 152, 160, 233. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
20. Andrew Lintott (1999) The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 95. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
21. Daniel Waley (1988) The Italian City-Republics, p. 37. London and New York: Longman.
22. H.C. Butters (1985) Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence: 1502-1519, p. 34. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
23. Felix Gilbert (1965) Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence, p. 18. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
24. Quentin Skinner (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. Francesco Guicciardini (1970) Discorso di Logrogno in Opere di Francesco Guicciardini, vol. 1, p. 262. Turin: Editrice Torinese.
26. See David R. Weaver (1997) 'Leadership, Locke and the Federalist', American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 420-46, p. 438.
27. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (1987) The Federalist Papers, pp. 344-5. London: Penguin.
28. Ibid. pp. 323-4.
29. Carl J. Richards (1994) The Founders and the Classics. Greece, Rome and the American Enlightenment, pp. 124, 125. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
30. J.G.A. Pocock (1975) The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 128, 288. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
31. Bernard Manin (1994) 'Checks, Balances and Boundaries: The Separation of Powers in the Constitutional Debate of 1787', in Biancamaria Fontana (ed.) The Invention of the Modern Republic, pp. 30-1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32. John P. McCormick (2001) 'Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism', American Political Science Review 95(2): 297-313, pp. 300-1.
33. Manin (n. 1), pp. 55-6.
34. James Harrington (1992) The Commonwealth of Oceana, pp. 278-81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35. Pocock (n. 30), pp. 381-2.
36. Madison (n. 27), p. 343.
37. Hamilton (n. 27), pp. 437-40.
38. Jon Elster (1999) 'Accountability in Athenian Politics', in Przeworski et al. (n. 5), pp. 266-70. Hansen (n. 19), pp. 213-18, 222.
39. Maurizio Viroli (1999) Repubblicanesimo, p. 37. Rome: Editori Laterza.
40. Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta (2001) 'Trust in Signs', in Karen Cook (ed.) Trust in Society. New York: Russell Sage. Niccolò Machiavelli (1992) El príncipe, pp. 85, 91-2. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Niccolò Machiavelli (1996) Discursos sobre la primera década de Tito Livio, pp. 70-1, 217. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
41. Machiavelli (n. 40), pp. 85, 91-2.
42. W.B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd (2002) The Essential Antifederalist, p. 181. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield.
43. Fearon (n. 3). This is an important difference between Fearon's conception of what constitute 'good types' of politicians and the republican conception. For Fearon, good types are those that share the voters' interests. However, for most of the republicans, voting was not a means of combining divergent interests or, as Arrow claimed, a means of preference aggregation. For them it was a process that searched the common good of the community. This can coincide (or not) with majority vote. Therefore, in order to be a 'good type' of politician in republican terms sharing the interest of the constituents is not enough. It would be necessary for those interests to coincide with the common good of the republic.
44. Guicciardini (n. 25), p. 274.
45. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-Agent Model, p. 364. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
46. Philip Pettit (1998) 'Republican Theory and Political Trust', in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds) Trust and Governance, p. 301. New York: Russell Sage.
47. Harrington (n. 34), pp. 33, 38.
48. Cicero (2001) Sobre los deberes [De Officiis], tr. José Guillén Cabañero, 1. 15. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
49. Ibid. 2. 32-5.
50. Bacharach and Gambetta (n. 40).
51. Cicero (n. 48), 1. 41.
52. Lintott (n. 20), p. 173.
53. Neal Wood (1991) Cicero's Social and Political Thought, p. 92. Berkeley: University of California Press.
54. Quentin Skinner (1978) The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1, The Renaissance, pp. 45-7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
55. Ibid. p. 161.
56. Pocock (n. 30), pp. 230-1.
57. Guicciardini (n. 25), p. 274; Pocock (n. 30), p. 219.
58. Richards (n. 29), pp. 129-30.
59. Harrington (n. 34), p. 23.
60. Skinner (n. 24), p. 32.
61. Richards (n. 29), p. 131.
62. Garrett Ward Sheldon (1993) The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, pp. 74, 144. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Joseph J. Ellis (1998) American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson, p. 79. New York: Vintage Books.
63. Thomas Jefferson (1984) Writings, p. 1306. New York: Library of America.
64. David McCullough (2002) John Adams, p. 67. New York: Touchstone.
65. See Emery Lee III (1997) 'Representation, Virtue, and Political Jealousy in the Brutus-Publius Dialogue', Journal of Politics 59(4): 1073-95, p. 1074.
66. Madison (n. 27), pp. 126-7.
67. Hamilton (n. 27), p. 431.
68. Gordon S. Wood (1987) The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787, p. 18. Virginia, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
69. Ibid. p. 62.
70. Allen and Lloyd (n. 42), p. 22.
71. Lee (n. 65), p. 1078.
72. Allen and Lloyd (n. 42), p. 149.
73. Niccolò Machiavelli (1995) Del arte de la guerra, p. 76. Madrid: Tecnos.
74. Wood (n. 68), p. 209.
75. Allen and Lloyd (n. 42), p. 53.
76. Cicero (2000) Sobre la república [De re publica], tr. Álvaro D'Ors, 1. 28-9. Madrid: Gredos.
77. Gilbert (n. 23), p. 27; Skinner (n. 54), p. 161.
78. Cicero (2002) La amistad [De amicitia], tr. José Guillén Cabañero, 25. 95. Madrid: Trotta.
79. Gilbert (n. 23), p. 85; Pocock (n. 30), p. 133; Manin (n. 1), p. 62.
80. Guicciardini (n. 25), p. 275.
81. Montesquieu (1987) Del espíritu de las leyes, pp. 12-13. Madrid: Tecnos. See also Manin (n. 1), pp. 73-4.
82. Madison (n. 27), p. 122.
83. Ibid. p. 330. See also Jay (n. 27), pp. 376-7.
84. Madison (n. 27), p. 337; see also Jay (n. 27), p. 94.
85. Madison (n. 27), pp. 122, 127. See also Roberto Gargarella (1996) La justicia frente al gobierno: Sobre el carácter contramayoritario del poder judicial, pp. 28-9. Barcelona: Ariel.
86. Colleen Sheehan (2004) 'Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle over Republicanism and the Role of Public Opinion', American Political Science Review 98(3): 405-24.
87. Hamilton (n. 27), p. 104. However, there are also some references in Madison about the pernicious effects of demagogues on the opinions of the people: See Madison (n. 27), pp. 351, 366, 371.
88. Wood (n. 68), p. 509.
89. Machiavelli (1996, in n. 40), p. 169.
90. Algernon Sidney (1996) Court Maxims, pp. 27-8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
91. Wood (n. 68), p. 62.
92. Garrett Ward Sheldon (1990) 'Mr Jefferson's Political Theory', in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.) The Political Theory of the Constitution, pp. 120-1. New York: University of Virginia Press.
93. Gordon S. Wood (2003) The American Revolution: A History, p. 100. New York: Modern Library.
94. Jefferson (n. 63), p. 1306.
95. Thomas Paine (1995) Common Sense, p. 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wood (n. 68), pp. 165-6.
96. Allen and Lloyd (n. 42), pp. 40, 44-5.
97. Manin (n. 1), p. 110.
98. Paine (n. 95), p. 7.
99. Wood (n. 68), p. 167.
100. Lee (n. 65), pp. 1080-1.
101. Madison (n. 27).
102. Manin (n. 1), p. 122.
103. Wood (n. 53), pp. 96, 112.
104. Skinner (n. 54), p. 59.
105. Wood (n. 68), p. 217.
106. Richards (n. 29), p. 131.
107. Manin (n. 1), p. 105.
108. Machiavelli (1996, in n. 40), p. 396.
109. Samuel L. Popkin and Michael A. Dimock (2000) 'Knowledge, Trust, and International Reasoning', in Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin (eds) Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A second version of this idea is that public opinion is rational in the aggregate, because individual errors cancel out in the process of aggregation: See B.I. Page and R.Y. Shapiro (1992) The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American's Political Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
110. Pocock (n. 30), p. 230.
111. Madison (n. 27), p. 330; see also Jay (n. 27), pp. 376-7.
112. Cicero (2000) Bruto [Brutus], tr. Manuel Mañas, 49. 184-6. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
113. Marcia L. Colish (1978) 'Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince', Sixteenth Century Journal 9(4): 80-93, p. 89.
114. Montesquieu (n. 81), pp. 13, 33.
115. Machiavelli (1996, in n. 40), p. 393.
116. Machiavelli (1992, in n. 40), pp. 85, 91-2; (1996, in n. 40), pp. 70-1, 217.
117. Quentin Skinner (1995) Maquiavelo, p. 59. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
118. In modern political science, the use of heuristics and cues in forming political opinions has also been questioned. Kuklinski and Quirk consider, using findings from experimental survey research, that people make systematic mistakes in their political judgments when using information shortcuts: They tend to employ systematically biased political stereotypes, have pronounced overconfidence in their political opinions, they are extremely resistant to incorporate new information, are readily influenced by 'easy arguments' that do not provide much information and, finally, they usually employ untrustworthy signals to judge political messages. Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) 'Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics and Mass Opinion', in Lupia, McCubbins and S.L. Popkin (eds) Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality, pp. 169-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bartels has also questioned the rationality of the use of heuristics in political choices. His conclusion is that political ignorance has systematic and significant consequences on political choices. He also claims that, in the aggregate, individual errors most probably do not cancel out, because they are not random, but are systematically biased in the same direction. Bartels (1996) 'Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections', American Journal of Political Science 40(1): 194-230.
119. Machiavelli (1996, in n. 40), p. 37.
120. Jefferson (n. 63), pp. 1305-6.