Fischer and ravizza on history and ownership

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 103-114

  Shabo, Seth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749405636     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790500091425     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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5. FRANKFURT, HARRY. 1988. Three concepts of free action. In The importance of what we care about. New York: Cambridge University Press.
6. HAJI, ISHTIYAQUE. 1996. Moral responsibility and the problem of induced pro-attitudes. Dialogue 35: 703-20.
7. HAJI, ISHTIYAQUE. 1998. Moral appraisability. New York: Oxford University Press.
8. LEHRER, KEITH. 1968. ‘Cans’ without ‘ifs'. Analysis 29: 29-32.
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11. STUMP, ELEONORE. 1996. Persons: identification and freedom. Philosophical Topics 24: 183-214.
12. STUMP, ELEONORE. 2002. Control and causal determinism. In Contours of agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by S. Buss and L. Overton. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
13. ZIMMERMAN, DAVID. 2002. Reasons-responsiveness and ownership-of-agency: Fischer and Ravizza's historicist theory of responsibility. Journal of Ethics 6: 199-234.
14. ZIMMERMAN, DAVID. 2003. That was then, this is now: Personal history vs. psychological structure in compatibilist theories of autonomous agency. Nous 37: 638-71.