Materialism: Matters of definition, defense, and deconstruction

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 157-183

  Horgan, Terry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749370683     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-5987-x     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Armstrong, D.M. (1968): A Materialist Theory of Mind, Macmillan.
2. Armstrong, D.M. (1970): The Nature of Mind', in C.V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, Macmillan.
3. Barnard, R. and Horgan, T. (in press): Truth as Mediated Correspondence, The Monist.
4. Block, N. (1980): 'What is Functionalism?' in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press.
5. Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press.
6. Dennett, D. (1988): 'Quining Qualia', in A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness and Contemporary Science, Oxford University Press.
7. Dennett, D. (1991): Consciousness Explained, Little Brown.
8. Dowell, J.L. (manuscript). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. http://www.bgsu.edu/departments/phil/faculty/dowell/dowell.html.
9. Graham, G. and Horgan, T. (1994): 'Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy', Philosophical Issues 5, 219-247.
10. Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
11. Henderson, D. and Horgan, T. (2000): 'What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For?' Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, Spindel Conference Supplement on the Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Philosophy, 51-86.
12. Henderson, D. and Horgan, T. (2002): 'The A Priori Isn't All That It's Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something', Philosophical Topics 29, 219-250.
13. Hill, C. (1997): 'Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem', Philosophical Studies 87, 61-85.
14. Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. (1999): 'There are Fewer Things Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmerss Philosophy', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 445-454.
15. Horgan, T. (1978): 'Supervenient Bridge Laws', Philosophy of Science 45, 227-249.
16. Horgan, T. (1981): 'Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics', Synthese 49, 395-413.
17. Horgan, T. (1982): 'Supervenience and Microphysics', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63, 29-43.
18. Horgan T. (1984): 'Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics', Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, Spindel Conference Supplement on Supervenience, 19-38.
19. Horgan, T. (1986a): 'Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology', Nous 20, 21-31.
20. Horgan, T. (1986b): 'Truth and Ontology', Philosophical Papers 15, 1-21.
21. Horgan, T. (1987): 'Supervenient Qualia', Philosophical Review 96, 491-520.
22. Horgan, T. (1991): 'Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics', Erkenntnis 34, 297-322.
23. Horgan, T. (1993a): 'The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology', Mind and Language 8, 282-297.
24. Horgan, T. (1993b): 'Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology', in S. Wagner and R. Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, Notre Dame University Press.
25. Horgan, T. (1993c): 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World', Mind 102, 555-586.
26. Morgan, T. (2001): 'Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence', in M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, MIT Press.
27. Morgan, T. and Potrc, M. (in press): 'Abundant Truth in an Austere World', in P. Greenough and M. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism: New Debates, Oxford University Press.
28. Morgan, T. and Potrc, M (forthcoming): Austere Realism.
29. Morgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2001): 'Deconstructing New Wave Materialism', in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents, Cambridge University Press.
30. Morgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002): 'The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality', in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford.
31. Morgan, T., Tienson, J., and Graham, G. (2004): 'Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat', in R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, Walter de Gruyter.
32. Jackson, F. (1998): From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford University Press.
33. Kim, J. (1998): Mind in a Physical. World, MIT Press.
34. Kim, J. (2005): Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press.
35. Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press.
36. Lewis, D. (1966): 'An Argument for the Identity Theory', Journal of Philosophy 63, 17-25.
37. Lewis, D. (1970): 'How to Define Theoretical Terms', Journal of Philosophy 70, 427-446.
38. Lewis, D. (1972): 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 249-258.
39. Lewis, D. (1979): 'Counterfactual Dependence and Times Arrow', Nous 13, 455-476.
40. Lewis, D. (1980): 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press.
41. Loar, B. (1997): 'Phenomenal States', in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, MIT Press.
42. McLaughlin, B. (2001): 'In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Morgan and Tienson', in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents, Cambridge University Press.
43. Melnyk, A. (2003): A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism, Cambridge University Press.
44. Moore, G.E. (1903): Prindpia Ethica, Cambridge University Press.
45. Moore, G.E. (1922): 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value', in Philosophical Studies, Harcourt, Brace, and Co.
46. Oppenheim P. and Putnam, H. (1958): 'Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis' in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, University of Minnesota Press.
47. White, S. (1986): 'Curse of the Qualia', Synthese 68, 333-368.