On ensuring that physicalism is not a dual attribute theory in sheep's clothing

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 227-249

  Jackson, Frank ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749334909     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-006-5989-3     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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13. Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
14. Lewis, D.K. (1971): "An Argument for the Identity Theory", reprinted in Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, David M. Rosenthal (ed.), (pp. 162-171) New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
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