Noisy leadership: An experimental approach

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 37-62

  Güth, Werner ^a   Müller, Wieland ^b   Spiegel, Yossi ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^b Department of Economics ^*  (Netherlands)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Commitment; Errors in communication; Experiments; Imperfect observability; Oligopoly; Sequential games

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748900247     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.004     Document Type: Article

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