On the foundations of pragmatic arguments

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 100, Issue 8, 2003, Pages 383-402

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EID: 33748851145     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2003100826     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. In particular, it excludes the possibility of the agent preferring to be resolute: having the preference that he always will execute any plan that has been previously-adopted. Such a preference involves other values than preferences for outcomes as prime conveyors of value-see E. F. McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice (New-York: Cambridge, 1990).
2. The distinction I wish to emphasize is similar to the distinction between now-for-then/then-for-then preferences championed by R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (New York: Oxford, 1988).
3. This distinction is due to Wlodek Rabinowicz, "Money Pump with Foresight" in Michael Almeida, ed., Imperceptible Harms and Benefits (Boston: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 123-52.
4. This is a lexicographic decision method. See, for instance, Isaac Levi, Hard Choices (New York: Cambridge, 1986).
5. "Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps," this JOURNAL, LXXXIII, 2 (February 1986): 112-19.
6. A detailed exposition of feasibility can be found in P.J. Hammond, "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, XLIII (1976): 159-73.
7. "Belief and the Will," this JOURNAL, VXXXI, 5 (May 1984): 235-56.
8. This is essentially the line of argument presented by Brian Skyrms, "A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?" Philosophy of Science, LX, 2 (June 1993): 320-28.
9. See, for instance, David Christensen, "Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs," The Philosophical Review, C, 2 (April 1991): 229-47.
10. "The Demons of Decision," The Monist, LXX, 2 (1987): 193-211.
11. A similar point is made in Rabinowicz, "On Seidenfeld's Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom," Theory and Decision, XLIII (1997): 279-92.