Equilibria and restoring forces in models of vote dynamics

Political Analysis

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 369-392

  McDonald, Michael D ^a   Best, Robin ^a  

^a BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748793070     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpj008     Document Type: Article

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