The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism

Public Choice

Volumn 128, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 289-315

  Kurrild Klitgaard, Peter ^a   Justesen, Mogens K ^b   Klemmensen, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Bush doctrine; Democracy; Freedom; Rent seeking; Transnational terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748576626     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9055-7     Document Type: Article

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