Gains from trade under uncertainty: The case of electric power markets

Journal of Business

Volumn 79, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1755-1782

  Bessembinder, Hendrik ^a   Lemmon, Michael L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748546945     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/503647     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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