On the strategic use of focal points in bargaining situations

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 622-634

  Janssen, Maarten C W ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Focal points; Game perceptions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748515669     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2006.04.006     Document Type: Article

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