Tensions in South Korean political parties in transition: From entourage to ideology?

Asian Survey

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 517-537

  Steinberg, David I ^a   Shin, Myung ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ideology; Left wing; Political parties; Politics; South Korea

Indexed keywords

ELECTORAL SYSTEM; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY; POLITICAL REFORM;

ASIA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; KOREA; SOUTH KOREA;

EID: 33748485614     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2006.46.4.517     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Byong-Man Ahn, Elites and Political Power in South Korea (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2003).
2. Some authors attribute the growth of political parties partly to the simplistic reaction of the U.S. military occupation, which by October 24, 1945, almost immediately after the occupation started, listed some 54 registered political parties; by March 1946, this number had increased to 134 because the U.S. said it would only deal with such groups. C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), p. 9.
3. Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 274. Significantly, this book could not be published in Korea in translation for about two decades.
4. Geir Helgesen, Democracy in South Korea, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) Reports, no. 18, rev. ed., Copenhagen, 1995, p. 28.
5. Ibid., p. 16.
6. For a detailed discussion of the machinations of the various leaders at that time, see Manwoo Lee, "South Korea's Politics of Succession and the December 1992 Presidential Election," in Politics and Policy in the New Korean State, ed. James Cotton (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
7. John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 117-18.
8. The two most important measures were the forced destruction of the Hanahoe, the underground military cabal that effectively controlled the army, ensuring the perpetuation of military influence throughout the society, and institution of the "real name" bank account system, which forced accounting of hidden funds that avoided taxation and could be used for political purposes. The military's removal from political power without demonstrations or ferment was a singularly successful effort that should be further studied to see its potential application in other states, and the real name accounts enabled the prosecution and conviction of former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo on charges of corruption.
9. "The FKTU had no grassroots base and no genuine interest in promoting worker welfare. Rather, its sole objective was to compete with, and eventually destroy, the leftist labor unions." Hagen Koo, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 26.
10. There were only 276 labor disputes in 1986, but after liberalization, 3,749, in 1987. Ibid., p. 159.
11. Ibid., p. 1.
12. Union membership, as a percentage of employed workers, reached a high of 24.3% in 1977. It was 23.3% in 1989, but dropped to 13.8% by 1998. Ibid., p. 159.
13. Personal interview, Seoul. See Oh, Korean Politics, pp. 8-18
14. Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) makes the case for the influence of culture on politics in Korea.
15. See David I. Steinberg, "Korea: Continuing Democratic Reform in the Republic of Korea: The Unfinished Symphony," in Deepening Democracy in Korea, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
16. Chulsu Kim, "Parties and Factions in Korean Politics," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1973.
17. Helgesen, Democracy in South Korea, p. 22, notes that when Kim Dae Jung was in opposition, he personally chose all his party's candidates, and when asked why, he replied why not?
18. Kwan-Yong Park, "More Difficult Change Than Revolution, and the Presidential Secretary," in The Kim Young Sam Presidency: Success and Failure, ed. Sung Deuk Hahm (Seoul: Nanam Publishing House, 2001), p. 83. The author was secretary to president Kim Young Sam. Those close to a number of presidents have commented that, although the cabinet may debate policies, when the president reaches a decision there is no further debate.
19. One of the remarkable examples of the sacrifice of principle for expediency was the alliance of Kim Dae Jung, the most liberal of all previous presidents, with Kim Jong Pil, his archenemy for many years, along with the political merger of the extreme right with the moderate left, with the objective of getting Kim Dae Jung elected president. The regional following of Kim Jong Pil in the Chungchong Provinces was important to supplement Kim Dae Jung's overwhelming position in the Cholla area.
20. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 180.
21. Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), p. 18.
22. Shin, Mass Politics, p. 191.
23. Doh Chull Shin, "The Dynamics of Democratization in Korea," in The Korea Democracy Barometer Survey, East-West Center POSCO Fellow Report, Honolulu, December 2000, p. 17.
24. Ibid., p. 18.
25. Sungjoo Han, "Consensus or Polarization? Ideology as an Explanation of South Korean Politics," paper presented at the annual Association for Asian Studies meeting, Washington, D.C., March 1971.
26. For a detailed study of this period, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990).
27. The U.S. observed Cho's trial but seemed to make no public protest. The essential dilemma for the U.S. in Korea in its attempts to further democracy and human rights (an essentially lower priority than security) was whether to go public in its criticisms of the South government, thus indirectly giving the North an additional stick with which to beat the South, and to cause a negative backlash of the South's autocratic rulers. See David I. Steinberg, "U.S. Policy and Human Rights in the Republic of Korea: The Influence of Policy or the Policy of Influence," in Implementing U.S. Human Rights Policy: Agendas, Policies, Practices, ed. Debra Liang-Fenton (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2004).
28. There were accusations in the 1960s that the government party actually sponsored and paid for opposition parties to split the opposition vote. These parties were known as sakura (in Japanese, cherry blossoms), perhaps because of their ephemeral flowering.
29. Larry Diamond, "Consolidating Democracy in South Korea," East-West Center POSCO Fellow Report, Honolulu, September 1999, pp. 12-13.
30. See David I. Steinberg, "Human Rights and Civil Society in Korea: The Influence of Orthodoxy and Ideology," Korea Journal (Fall 1997).
31. President Kim's first task was to salvage the economic ship of state that had been virtually sunk in the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and one with which at the close of his term President Kim Young Sam did not cope.
32. For example, Chung-in Moon and David Steinberg, eds. Kim Dae Jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Washington, D.C. and Seoul: Georgetown University and Yonsei University Press, 1999).
33. Choong Nam Kim, "The Sunshine Policy and Its Impact on South Korea's Relations with Major Powers," Korean Observer 35:4 (Winter 2004), p. 589.
34. Hakjoon Kim, "Recent Trends Surrounding the Two Koreas and Their Impacts on the Inter-Korean Relations (May to December 2004)," paper given at the SAIS-Ilmin Conference on the U.S.-Korea Alliance and the Future of Northeast Asia, Washington, D.C., December 6-7, 2004.
35. Kwang-Jin Ryu, "Hanguk Hyukshin Chongdangui Chonggang Chongchaek Bigyoyungu" [Comparative analysis of the platforms and policies of Korea's reformist parties], in Chongdang, Songo, Yoron [Political party, election, and public opnion], ed. Kwang-ung Kim et al. (Seoul: Hanwul, 1996).
36. Sung-Hun Jung, "Minjungodongdangui Yakjingwa Sahoedang Shilpae Yoinae Daehan Bunsok" [Analyzing the Democratic Labor Party's rise and the Socialist Party's failure], Chongchi Bipyong [Political Criticism] 2 (2002), pp. 61-84.
37. Hyun-Yon Cho, "6/13 Chibangsongo Pyonggawa 16 Dae Daeson Chonmang: Minjunodongdangeul Choongshimeuro" [6/13 local elections and the outlook of the 16th presidential election: The Democratic Labor Party perspective], ibid., pp. 29-60.
38. Sung-Hun Jung, "Minjungodongdangui Yakjin."
39. Kenneth M. Wells, ed., South Korea's Minjung Movement: The Culture and Politics of Dissidence (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).
40. Koo, Korean Workers, p. 137.
41. Choi Chungmoo, "The Minjung Culture Movement and the Construction of Popular Culture in Korea," in South Korea's Minjung Movement, p. 117.
42. Kim Yong-Ho, "Political Significance of the 2002 Presidential Election Outcome and Political Prospects for the Roh Administration," Korea Journal 43:2 (Summer 2003), p. 239.
43. For Kwon's views on anti-American sentiment, see an interview in the introduction to David I. Steinberg, ed., Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2005).
44. See David I. Steinberg, "The Second Social Revolution in South Korea?" International Herald Tribune, November 10, 2004
45. and David I. Steinberg, "The New Political Paradigm in South Korea: Social Change and the Elite Structure," in New Paradigms for Transpacific Collaboration, Korea Economic Institute, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, 16, 2006, Washington, D.C., at .
46. For example, National Assembly representatives of the DLP Roh Hoe-Chan and Shim Sang-Jung are said to be potential leaders who may have national appeal.
47. See Kim Sung-han, "Brothers Versus Friends: Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Emerging Anti-Americanism in South Korea," in Steinberg, ed., Korean Attitudes.