Mounting challenges to governance in China: Surveying collective protestors, religious sects and criminal organizations

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 56, 2006, Pages 1-31

  Chung, Jae Ho ^a   Lai, Hongyi ^b   Xia, Ming ^c  

^a Seoul National University   (South Korea)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRIME; POPULAR PROTEST; RELIGION;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 33748485175     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20066184     Document Type: Article

References (209)

1. For Chinese publications on this theme, see Li Liangdong and Hou Shaowen, Wending: yadao yiqie de daju (Stability: The Foremost Goal that Overrides Everything Else) (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1999);
2. Guojia jihua weiyuanhui (State Planning Commission), Woguo shehui wending zhuangkuang genzong fenxi (Detailed Analysis of Social Stability in China) (Beijing: The Macroeconomic Research Institute, March 1999);
3. Han Mingmo, Shehui fazhan yu wending (Social Development and Stability) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2001);
4. Ma Jianzhong, Zhengzhi wendinglun (On Political Stability) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe, 2003);
5. Zhang Xianglin, Wendinglun (Theory of Stability) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxuan Chubanshe, 2004);
6. and Lai Hongyi, Hu Wen quan toushi (Hu-Wen under Full Scrutiny) (Hong Kong: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 2005).
7. Pertinent English materials include Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden (eds), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance (London: Routledge, 2000);
8. David Shambaugh (ed.), Is China Unstable? (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000);
9. Greg Austin, "China's Power: Searching for Stable Domestic Foundations", in Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin (eds), Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), ch. 4;
10. Murray Scot Tanner, "China Rethinks Unrest", The Washington Quarterly, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 137-56;
11. Jude Howell (ed.), Governance in China (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004):
12. Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds), State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004);
13. and Jae Ho Chung (ed.), Charting China's Future: Political, Social and International Dimensions (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
14. See, for instance, Kang Xiaoguang, "Weilai 3-5 nian Zhongguo dalu zhengzhi wending fenxi" (Analysis of Political Stability in Mainland China for the Coming Three to Five Years), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 3 (2002), pp. 1-15.
15. See Qin Baoqi and Tan Songlin, Zhongguo mimi shehui (Secret Societies in China) (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2002), Vol. 1, pp. 123-35.
16. For an overview of rebellions involving religious sects in imperial China, refer to relevant chapters in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (eds), Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Vols. 1-13;
17. Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976);
18. and David Ownby, Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
19. For resilient local religious practices under Mao, see Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz and Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
20. For a historical survey of China's religion at large, refer to Julia Ching, Chinese Religions (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1993).
21. See Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995);
22. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russian Organized Crime: Global Organized Crime Project (Washington: CSIS, 1997);
23. Russian Organized Crime and Corruption: Putin's Challenge (Washington: CSIS, 2000);
24. Phil Williams, Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat? (London: Frank Cass, 1997);
25. and Ko-lin Chin, Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
26. Ted Robert Gurr, Peter N. Grabosky, and Richard C. Hula, The Politics of Crime and Conflict (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 10-11, 666-67.
27. Elizabeth Perry puts all under the category of "contentious politics". See "Crime, Corruption, and Contention" in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds), The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 308-29.
28. Listed in The Criminal Law of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa, 1979, revised in 1997) are offenses of disturbing public and social order; assembling a crowd to disturb public order; illegal demonstration and parade; offenses against public security; organizing and joining in terrorist groups; organizing, leading and joining organized criminal groups; organizing and using evil cults and superstitious sects to undermine law enforcement and public order, and so on.
29. See Li Changping, Wo xiang zongli shuo shihua (Honest Words to Our Premier) (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Chubanshe, 2002);
30. and Yu Jianrong, Yuecun zhengzhi - zhuanxingqi Zhongguo xiangcun zhengzhi jiegou de bianqian (Politics in Yue Village: The Transformation of Village Political Structures in the Era of Transition) (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2001).
31. For the severe difficulties associated with accessing data on rural instability, see Cheng Tongxun, Dangdai Zhongguo nongcun zhengzhi fazhan yanjiu (Study of Rural Political Development in Contemporary China) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 57-60.
32. A notable example is "The Persecution of Other Faiths" in Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Day (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), ch. 5. Other shorter reports are too numerous to list here.
33. Those sects that live peacefully with the state and, therefore, are not regarded as threats to the state fall outside the purview of this analysis.
34. Information from interviews in China; and Chen Jinsheng, Quntixing shijian yanjiu baogao (A Research Report on Collective Incidents) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 11, 32.
35. Some provinces declared CoPSI as the most important obstacle to social stability. See Jiangxi Political Legal Affairs Commission, "Luoshi zeren jiquan gongguan qianghua fangzhi quntixing shijian de cuoshi" (Measures on Grasping and Strengthening the Responsibility of Preventing CoPSI), in Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui (ed.), Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji (Collected Materials on Maintaining Social Stability) (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001), p. 188.
36. See Wu Zhongmin, "Zhongguo shehui gongzheng de xianzhuang yu qushi" (Current Conditions and Trends in Social Justice in China), in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin (eds), 2005 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (The Year of 2005: Analyses and Predictions of Social Conditions in China) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 227-36.
37. http://www.renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2004/6/21/3157.html (last accessed on 7 July 2004). Recent large-scale protests include a riot in Wanzhou (Chongqing) in October 2004, involving over 8,000 people who vandalized the government offices. In November 2004, as many as 100,000 disgruntled peasants clashed with the police in Hanyuan (Sichuan).
38. See "Zhongguo shiyuefen shiliuge chengshi baofa kangzheng shijian" (Events of Resistance Broke Out in Sixteen Cities in October), Zhengming (Contention), November 2004;
39. "Guanbi minfan, chuanmin da kangzheng" (Officials Force People to Rebel: Sichuan People's Great Struggle), Dongxiang (Trend), December 2004, pp. 55-56.
40. The remaining 16 per cent is made up of members of religious organizations and ethnic minorities. See "Woguo dangqian quntixing shijian de xianzhuang yu duice" (The Current Situation and Measures against CoPSI), in Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, pp. 46-48.
41. For the urban Chinese sympathy toward CoPSI, see the survey conducted in 2002 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 11,000 urban residents in Li Peilin, Zhang Yi, Zhao Yandong and Liang Dong, Shehui chongtu yu jieji yishi (Social Conflict and Class Consciousness) (Beijing: Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2005), pp. 94-99, 107-108.
42. For a report on a CoPSI in Shenzhen staged by 1,000 former PLA soldiers, see South China Morning Post, 7 November 2005.
43. Of 37,513 workers who participated in CoPSI in Fujian during 2000-02, laid-off workers (namely, workers who have lost their jobs but maintain their link with their work units for welfare claims) marked 49 per cent, while fired and retired workers made up 33 and 4 per cent respectively. See Chen Youfang, "Quntixing shijian sudao xu bawo sange guanxi" (Resolving CoPSI Requires the Grasp of the Three Relationships), Lingdao canyue (Leadership References), No. 10 (14 March 2003), p. 25.
44. Hebei Provincial Party Committee, "Jizhong paicha diaochu yufang quntixing shijian" (Grasp the Work of Researching and Preventing CoPSI) in Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui (ed.), Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, p. 78;
45. and Chen Jinsheng, Quntixing shijian yanjiu baogao, pp. 42-44.
46. Wu Zhongmin, "Zhongguo shehui gongzheng de xianzhuang yu qushi", pp. 227-36.
47. Hubei Provincial Party Committee, "Guanyu yufang he chuzhuo quntixing shijian de diaoyan baogao" (Research Report on Preventing and Countering CoPSI) in Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui (ed.), Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, p. 221.
48. Yan Junjie, Gongan jiceng jichu gongzuo lunwenji (Collected Essays on the Public Security Work at Grassroots) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Gong'an Daxue Chubanshe, 2003), p. 259.
49. See Research Office of the Ministry of Public Security, "Woguo dangqian quntixing shijian de xianzhuang yu duice", in Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui (ed.), Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, pp. 47-48;
50. and Gang Lin, Jean C. Oi, Xiaobo Lu and Yawei Liu, Crisis in the Hinterland: Rural Discontent in China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2003), p. 4.
51. Kevin O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance", World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1 (October 1996), pp. 31-55;
52. Yang Hede, Qunti shijian yanjiu (A Study of Collective Incidents) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Gong'an Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), p. 7;
53. Yang Zewan, Sannong wenti yu nongcun jingwu (The Issues of Peasants, Countryside and Agriculture and Rural Policing) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 72-73;
54. and Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
55. See Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui (ed.), Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, pp. 3, 11.
56. See Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Villages and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China", Modern China, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996), pp. 28-61;
57. and Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 139-40.
58. See, for instance, Cai Yongshun, "Managed Participation in China", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 3 (2004), pp. 425-52.
59. Refer to Donald MacInnis, Religions in China Today (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989);
60. Hongyi Lai, "Religious Revival in China", Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, No. 18 (2003), pp. 56-59.
61. On the revival of individual religions, see Alan Hunter and Kim-kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
62. Kenneth Dean, Lord of the Three in One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998);
63. and chapters by Lai Chi-Tim, Raoul Birnbaum, Dru Gladney, Richard Madsen, Daniel Bays and Nancy Chen in The China Quarterly, No. 174 (June 2003).
64. For China's governmental policies toward religion, see Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin (eds), God and Caesar in China (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
65. For the political logic of the state's differentiated treatments of official, independent and unorganized religions, refer to Hongyi H. Lai, "Religious Policies in Post-Totalitarian China: Maintaining Political Monopoly over a Reviving Society", Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), pp. 55-57.
66. Some religious groups no longer exist after they were banned by the state, their top leaders arrested or placed on the state's wanted list, and their organizations dismantled.
67. Data on Catholics at official and underground churches and Christians at house churches are based on Chinese government estimates cited by the US State Department in its "International Religious Freedom Report on China in 2004", posted at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ris/irf/2004/ 35396.htm, accessed on 1 August 2005;
68. "Hebeisheng Zhengding qu zhujiao Jia Zhiguo mengxi zaodao dabu" (Bishop Jia Zhiguo in the Zhengding Diocese, Hebei Province, China Were Arrested) in http://www.asianews.it, 7 April 2005.
69. For estimates of size of these churches, see "Henan liuming 'jiating jiaohui' lingxiu beipan laojiao" (Six 'Family House' Leaders in Henan Sentenced to Reform through Labor), in http://bjzc.org/bjs/bc/81 /102 on 1 September 2003;
70. "100 duoming jiating jiaohui lingxiu bei zhuabu; zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju zhaokai zongjiao gongzuo huiyi"(Over 100 Leaders of Family Churches Are Arrested; the Politburo of the Central Committee Holds a Religious Work Meeting), at http://www.boxun.com, 14 June 2004.
71. For the indigenization and globalization of and political conflict over Christianity in China, see Richard Madsen, "Chinese Christianity: Indigenization and Conflict", in Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden (eds), Chinese Society Change, Conflict and Resistance (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 2nd ed., pp. 271-88.
72. See information from the Vatican cited in "A Report Claims that China Detains an Underground Catholic Priest", posted at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/ on 12 February 2003.
73. See He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui (Terrorism, Heretical Cults and Secret Societies) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 244-45.
74. "Dangdai Zhongguo xiejiao yanbian de guiji" (A Track Record of the Evolution of Evil Cults in Contemporary China), at http:// www.anticult.sh.cn, accessed on 10 March 2005.
75. He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, p. 245. Different tactics for evading the state's attention help explain the resilience of some factions and the perishing of others.
76. "Zhonggong xia yi mubiao zhixiang xiang gong" (The Next Target of the Chinese Communists Moved to Xiang Gong), at http:/ /www.mybuddhist.com, 1 September 2003;
77. "Zhongguo zongjiao xiaoxi" (News on Religion in China in 1999), at http://www.cmi.org.tw, 1 September 2003.
78. Data on Xiang Gong come from "Zhonggong xia yi mubiao zhixiang xiang gong"
79. and data on Falun Gong in He Bingsong, Xongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, p. 260.
80. For a discussion on the birth of prominent folk religious sects and their use of the internet, refer to Patricia M. Thornton, "The New Cybersects: Resistance and Repression in the Reform", in Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden (eds), Chinese Society, pp. 247-70.
81. For an official estimate, see He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, p. 260.
82. For Li Hongzhi's claim about the number of his followers, refer to Zhang Weiqing and Qiao Gong, Falun Gong chuangshiren Li Hongzhi pingzhuan (Li Hongzhi: The Founder of Falun Gong) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1999), pp. 12-14. Some experts estimated that the pre-suppression followers of the sect in China were in the tens of millions.
83. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US State Department, International Religious Freedom - China (2002), posted at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13870.htm on 7 October 2002.
84. For an inside look at the Chinese leaders' crackdown on Falun Gong, see Zong Hairen, Zhu Rongji zai 1999 (Zhu Rongji in 1999) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2001), pp. 47-70.
85. See Ronald Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, "The 'Falun Gong Problem': Politics and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in China", The China Quarterly, No. 175 (September 2003), pp. 623-42;
86. and Benjamin Penny, "The Life and Times of Li Hongzhi: Falun Gong and Religious Biography", The China Quarterly, No. 175 (September 2003), pp. 643-62.
87. People's Daily commentary, "The Political Motive Behind the More Than Three Hundred Sieges", translated in Ming Xia and Shiping Hua (eds), The Battle between the Chinese Government and the Falun Gong (special issue of Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 32, No. 5 [September /October 1999]), pp. 87-90.
88. He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, pp. 273-75.
89. Conversation with a Chinese scholar in China, October 2004, and with a Chinese analyst at a government think tank in April 2001.
90. To qualify as a criminal group, at least three people need to band together for collaborative criminal activities. See Ye Gaofeng and Liu Defa, Jituan fanzui duice yanjiu (A Study on Group Crime and Counter Policies) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancha Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 34-51.
91. Zeng Huafeng, Anfang heibang (Investigating Gangs in Secret) (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Chubanshe, 2002), pp. 51-63, 144-50, 336-40;
92. Xiao Chong (ed.), Zhonggong yu heishehui (The Chinese Communist Party and Underworld Society) (Hong Kong: Xiafeier, 2002);
93. and Ming Xia, "The Criminal-Political Nexus in China", in Active Society in Formation: Environmentalism, Labor, and the Underworld in China, Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report, No. 124 (September 2004).
94. He Bingsong, You zuzhi fanzui yanjiu: Zhongguo dalu heishehui (xingzhi) fanzui yanjiu (A Study of Organized Crime and Group Crime with Mafia-style Characteristics in the Mainland) (Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi Chubanshe, 2002), pp. 187-88. The Ministry of Justice in Taiwan warned that "the collusion of criminal gangs in three places (the mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) is inevitable".
95. See The Investigation Bureau, the Ministry of Justice, Dalu tai gang heibang diaocha yanjiu (Investigations and Research on the Organized Crime Gangs in the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) (Taipei: Ministry of Justice, 1998), p. 386.
96. Guangdong Jingcha Xuehui, Guangdong heishehui fanzui wenti yanjiu (Studies on Organized Crimes in Guangdong) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Gong'an Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), pp. 39-40;
97. Chong Gang and Pu Yu, Dangdai zhongguo shaohei jishi (Reports on Campaigns against the Criminal Underworld in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 1997), p. 10;
98. and Liu Fuhai, Zhujiao heishehui (Exterminating the Criminal Underworld) (Guangzhou: Nangfang Ribao Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 247, 336, 357.
99. Zhou Xintong, Yiwang dajin: chanchu heibang anli jishi (Take All with One Haut of Dragnet: Cases of Eradicating Criminal Gangs) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2001), p. 265;
100. and Yang Yujuan, Youzuzhi fanzui zhencha (Investigations of Organized Crime) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Gong'an Daxue, 2003), p. 178.
101. Li Wenyan and Tian Hongjie, "Dahei chue" xingshi falu shiyong jieshuo (Interpretations and Applications of Criminal Law Clauses for "Striking Organized Crimes and Eradicating Evil Forces") (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2001), p. 61.
102. Yangcheng wanbao (Yangcheng Evening News), 5 December 1999 at http:// www.sina.com.cn (last accessed 6 December 1999);
103. Li Bing, "Dahei yao dachu heihoutai" (To Combat Organized Crime Should Strike out Black Backstage Supporters), 22 December 2000, at: http:// www.sina.com.cn (last accessed on 23 December 2000);
104. and http://bj.netsh.com/bbs/86359/messages/40.html.
105. Economic activities controlled by the criminal underworld constitute a big chunk of the "hidden economy" (yinxing jingji). Every year in the late 1990s, incomes from drug sales allegedly reached 100 billion yuan. See Cui Min (ed.), Dupin fanzui: fazhan qushi yu ezhi duice (The Crime of Drugs: Trends and Containment Policies) (Beijing: Jingguan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1999), p. 239.
106. It is also estimated that the sex industry controlled largely by criminal groups generated revenues of 500 billion yuan a year. See Liu Ning and Tian Huiming (eds), Heise youhuan (The Black Malaise) (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 2001), p. 20.
107. Furthermore, smuggling syndicates cause a loss of 30 billion yuan per year to the nation. See He Qinglian, Zhongguo xiandaihua de xianjing (Hong Kong: Broad Press, 2004), p. 314;
108. and Duowei news report, "Zhongguo siqian guanyuan juan 500 yi waitao" (Four Thousand Officials Fled out of the Country with More than 50 Billion), www.chinesenewsnet.com, accessed on 11 March 2005.
109. Ming Xia, "The Criminal-Political Nexus in China";
110. Lin Zhe, Fubai fanzuixue yanjiu (Criminology of Corruption) (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), p. 97;
111. and Kong Simeng and Chang Qing, Zhongguo tiaozhan heishehui (China: Challenges of Crime Underworld) (Nanning: Guangxi Remnin Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 23-52.
112. Cao Feng, Diwuci Gaochao (The Fifth Wave: Crimes in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1997), pp. 3-14;
113. and Michael Dutton, "The Basic Character of Crime in Contemporary China", The China Quarterly, No. 149 (March 1997), pp. 160-77.
114. Susan Trevaskes, "Courts on the Campaign Path in China", Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2002), pp. 673-93;
115. and Murray Scot Tanner, "Campaign-style Policing in China and Its Critics", in Borge Bakken (ed.), Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 171-88.
116. Qin Liqiang, Shehui wending de anquanfa: Zhongguo fanzui yujing yu shehui zhian pingjia (Safety Valves for Social Stability: An Evaluation of Early Warnings of Crime and Social Order in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Gong'an Daxue Chubanshe, 2004), p. 101. According to He Bingsong, 197,000 criminal groups were uncovered and destroyed, including 876,000 group members. See He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, p. 302.
117. See He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, p. 302.
118. Although China still compares favorably with the world average crime rate in the UN survey, its trend is moving in a dangerous direction. See Børge Bakken, "Comparative Perspectives on Crime in China", in Børge Bakken (ed.), Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China, pp. 64-99;
119. and US Department of Justice (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/ 4meastab.htm), accessed on 8 May 2006.
120. Sichuan nianjian 1991 (The Provincial Yearbook of Sichuan 1991) (Chengdu: Sichuan Nianjian Chubanshe, 1991), p. 167;
121. and Zhang Xiaoqin and Zhao Guoling (eds), Dangdai Zhongguo de fanzui yu zhili (Crime and Its Management in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2001), p. 18.
122. See Børge Bakken, The Exemplary Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 378;
123. Xiao Yang, Zhongguo xingshi zhengce he celue wenti (Policies and Tactics of Criminal Justice in China) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1996), p. 124;
124. and Michael Dutton, "Toward a Government of the Contract: Policing in the Era of Reform", in Børge Bakken (ed.), Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China, p. 207.
125. Mark S. Gaylord, "China", in Gregg Barak (ed.), Crime and Crime Control: A Global View (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000), p. 22.
126. Cai Shaoqing, "Dangdai Zhongguo de heishehui" (Criminal Gangs in Contemporary China), paper delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, China Colloquium, 18 April 1996, p. 1;
127. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Crime, Corruption, and Contention", p. 323;
128. and "Shaohei bixian fanfu" (To sweep over gangs we must first combat corruption), in Liu Ning and Tian Huiming (eds), Zhongguo zhi tong (Pains of China) (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 2001), p. 105.
129. This assessment is based on an internal investigation by the Ministry of Public Security. See Shuliang Feng, "Crime and Crime Control in a Changing China", in Liu Jianhong, Lening Zhang and Steven F. Messner (eds), Crime and Social Control (Westport: Greenwood, 2001), pp. 123-24.
130. The Central Commission on the Comprehensive Management of Social Stability was established in March 1991 as a permanent organization to assist the Party Center and the State Council to lead the national work on maintaining social stability. The commission, currently headed by Luo Gan, consists of twenty-plus members who are leading officials from the National People's Congress, the State Council, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Protectorate, and Ministries of Justice, Public Security, State Security, Finance and so on, with its secretariat housed in the Central Political and Legal Commission.
131. http://www.renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2004/6/21/3157.html (last accessed on 7 July 2004). A publication released by the Central Commission of Political and Legal Affairs - Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji (2001) - also has relevant chapters on all provinces in China.
132. See Guojia jihua weiyuanhui hongguan jingji yanjiuyuan, Woguo shehui xingshi genzong fenxi yu duice yanjiu (In-depth Analysis of China's Social Conditions and Measures) (Beijing: Macro-economic Research Institute, December 2000), pp. 97-99.
133. Woguo shehui xingshi genzong fenxi yu duice yanjiu, p. 97.
134. Viewed in this light, the policy focus of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration on the "Revival of the Northeast" (zhenxing dongbei) is easily comprehensible.
135. See Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, p. 10;
136. and "Nongmin lingxiu", pp. 8-31.
137. Shaanxi does not figure very highly in the overall ranking of CoPSI, probably because it does not have such a prominent yet severely stagnant agricultural sector as central China. Nor does it enjoy as easy transportation in the countryside as in central China, which could facilitate collective action by peasants. Further, it also does not face as severe a "rusting" of industrial bases as does the Northeast.
138. Numerous protests in Shaanxi are attributed to the Disciples Association with strong bases in Ankang and Yunyang. Religious protests in Zhejiang were instigated largely by the Shouters Faction. Beijing's religious protests were mostly staged by Falun Gong. The data came from the same sources as in Figure 1.
139. Both Henan and Hunan have a large rural population that has suffered from agricultural stagnation for years. This large discontented rural population is fertile soil for the revival of Christianity in Henan where it was propagated by Western Christian missionaries several centuries ago. It has also catalyzed the birth of numerous unofficial religious groups in Hunan where local sects have a long history.
140. While Hunan and the three northeast provinces are ranked very high in terms of official-gangster collusion, Guangdong and Sichuan's ranking with regard to a political-criminal nexus is relatively low. In contrast, Henan is ranked high in terms of both the number of criminal groups and official-gangster collusion.
141. It is perhaps not coincidental that the first riot-police units were established in the provincial capital of Henan, Zhengzhou.
142. See Ching Kwan Lee, "Pathways of Labor Insurgency", in Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden (eds), Chinese Society, pp. 41-61. Labor dispute statistics also reflect a similar pattern, since not only did the total number of disputes rise sharply from 8,150 in 1992 to 184,000 in 2002 but the share of unresolved disputes also increased from 3.2 to 9 per cent for the same period.
143. See Laodong he shehui baozhang fazhan shiye tongji gongbao (Circular on the Statistics of the Development of Labor and Social Security) at http:/ /www.molss.gov.cn/index_tongji.htm, last accessed on 24 June 2004.
144. See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Fall of Imperial China (New York: Free Press, 1975).
145. For an interesting study that contends that the People's Republic of China will fare better than most of the short-lived dynasties in Chinese history, see Hongyi Harry Lai, "The Life Span of Unified Regimes in China", The China Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 93-124.
146. For urban cases in this regard, see Ching Kwan Lee, "Pathways of Labor Insurgency", pp. 51-57.
147. For rural cases, see "Nongmin lingxiu" (Peasant Ring-Leaders), Banyuetan, No. 2 (2000), pp. 8-21;
148. and Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation without Representation, pp. 147-48.
149. "Quntixing shijian de tedian chengyin ji chuzhi duice", in Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui (ed.), Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, p. 211;
150. and Cheng Tongxun, Zhongguo nongmin zuzhihua yanjiu chutan (Preliminary Discussions of Peasant Organizations in China) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 37-39.
151. Chen Jinsheng, Quntixing shijian yanjiu baogao, pp. 74-75.
152. See Gang Lin, Jean C. Oi, Xiaobo Lu and Yawei Liu, Crisis in the Hinterland, pp. 5, 10.
153. "Woguo fasheng quntixing shijian de diaocha yu sikao" (Survey and Thoughts on Collective Public Security Incidents in China), Lingdao canyue, No. 31 (August 10, 2001), p. 18;
154. and Yu Jianrong, "Dangqian bufen diqu nongcun quntixing shijian de zhuyao tedian" (Major Characteristics of CoPSI in the Rural Areas), Lingdao canyue, No. 21 (25 July 2002), pp. 14-15.
155. Mainland Affairs Commission of the Executive Yuan, Dalu zongjiao xianzhuang jianjie (A Concise Introduction to the Current Situation of Religion in Mainland) (Taipei: Dalu Weiyuanhui, 1996), p. 87.
156. Jiang Jiasen, Duliu;
157. and Wu Dongsheng, Xiejiao de mimi: dangdai Zhongguo xiejiao juhe jizhi yanjiu (The Secrecy of Evil Cult: A Study on the Regime of Evil Cult Assembly in Today's China) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 102-12.
158. "China's Four Large Family Churches Issue Statements, Demanding Release of Followers and Freedom in Beliefs", posted at http:// www.democracy.org.hk on 1 December 1998.
159. In July 2004, a family church in Anhui organized a meeting which 100 church leaders from Xinjiang, Anhui and Zhejiang attended. In August, a Henan family church organized a retreat in Kaifeng, which was attended by over 100 leaders from Henan, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. See "100 duoming jiating jiaohui lingxiu bei zhuabu";
160. "100 duoming jiating jiaohui lingxiu Xinjiang bei zhuabu" (Over 100 Leaders of the Family Church Arrested in Xinjiang), at http:// www.boxun.com, 21 June 2004;
161. "100 duoming jiating jiaohui lingxiu Henan Kaifeng bei zhuabu" (Over 100 Leaders of the Family Church Were Arrested in Kaifeng, Henan), at http://www.boxun.com, 7 August 2004;
162. and "Six Family Church Leaders in Henan Were Sentenced to Labor Reform", posted at http://bjzc.org/bjs/bc/81/102, accessed on 1 August 2005.
163. See Jae Ho Chung, "Challenging the State: Falun Gong and Regulatory Dilemmas in China", in John D. Montgomery and Nathan Glaser (eds), Sovereignty under Challenge: How Governments Respond (New Brunswick: Transactions, 2002), pp. 87-89;
164. James Tong, "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing", The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002), pp. 636-60;
165. and Hongyi Lai, "The Rise, Spread, and Radicalization of Falun Gong", presented at the Conference on "Religion, Transnationalism and Radicalism", in Leiden and Amsterdam, 20-21 June 2003.
166. He Bingsong, Kongbuzhuyi, xiejiao, heishehui, pp. 273-75.
167. Ying Guang and Su Wenyun, "Dangqian 'Falun Gong' xiejiao huodong de xin tedian ji fangzhi duice" (New Characteristics in Current Activities of the Evil Cult Falun Gong and Remedial Measures), Beijing renmin jingcha xueyuan xuebao (Academic Journal of Beijing People's Police College), Vol. 75, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1-5;
168. Zhongguo falü nianjian 2004 (The Law Yearbook of China, 2004), pp. 610, 657, 666, 707; news report from Ming Pao, Xinhua Net and Asia Times.
169. Jiang Jiasen, Duliu, pp. 57-73, 138-139;
170. and "1999 Zhongguo zongjiao xiaoxi", pp. 2-14.
171. Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. xxiv, xvi-xx;
172. Vivienne Shue, "Legitimacy Crisis in China?" in Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds), State and Society in 21st Century China, pp. 24-49;
173. and Hongyi H. Lai, "Religious Policies in Post-Totalitarian China".
174. Li Houjian, Jiaomie zhongyuan heibang (Exterminate Criminal Groups in the Central Plain) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancha Chubanshe, 2002).
175. Zhang Chenggong, Tianfu zhiguo mo yu dao (Monster and Rule in the State of Heaven) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 1998).
176. See He Ping and Wang Zhaojun, Zhongguo dalu heishehui (The Criminal Underworld in Mainland China) (Taiwan: Shibao wenhua, 1993), p. 43;
177. and Kang Shuhua and Wen Xinwen, You zuzhi fanzui toushi (Perspectives of Organized Crime) (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 143-44.
178. Stephen Feuchtwang, "Religion and Resistance", in Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden (eds), Chinese Society, pp. 161-77;
179. and Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven, pp. 293-97.
180. Xi Shengyang, Ma Ling, Song Qinghua and Chen Xuezhi, "Henan nongcun zongjiao huodong dui jiceng zhengquan de yingxiang ji duice yanjiu" (An Analysis of the Effects of Religious Activities in Rural Henan on Grass-root Authorities and Counter Measures), Luoyang gongxueyuan xuebao (Journal of Luoyang Institute of Technology), Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 42-47;
181. and "Henan Nanyang ezhi xiejiao ji feifa zongjiao huodong" (Nanyang in Henan Contains Evil Cults and Illegal Religious Activities), Liaowang xinwen zhoukan (Outlook News Weekly), No. 32 (6 August 2001), pp. 32-33.
182. For the Chinese leadership's view on this possibility of "collusion", see Renmin ribao, 14 December 2000.
183. Chen Guidi and Chun Tao, Zhongguo nongmin diaocha (Investigations of Peasants in China) (Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe, 2004);
184. and Ye Zhaoqing, Zhu Dayin and Geng Changjun, Laizi zhongguo shehui diceng de baogao (Reports from the Lower Strata of China) (Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi Chubanshe, 2004).
185. For the expanding role of clan organizations in rural China, see Xiao Tangbiao and Shi Tianjian (eds), Dangdai zhongguo nongcun zongzu yu xiangcun zhili (Clans and Rural Governance in Contemporary China) (Xian: Xibei Daxue Chubanshe, 2002).
186. For the involvement of crime organizations, see Yu Jianrong, "Heie shili qinru nongcun jiceng zhengquan de fangshi ji shouduan" (The Methods and Means of Crime Organizations' Infiltration into Rural Political Units), Lingdao canyue, No. 7 (5 March 2002), pp. 10-12.
187. Li Zhao, Kong Xiangtao and Peng Bangfu, Xiejiao, huidaomen, hei shehui (Evil Cults, Superstitious Sects, and Secret Societies) (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 184-213.
188. Yang Zewan, Sannong wenti yu nongcun jingwu, pp. 252-53, 261-65, 296-97.
189. In the former case, via controlling local political and religious
190. Bruce Gilley, Model Rebels: The Rise and Fall of China's Richest Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001);
191. and Li Yan, Hongse "Zhuangzhu" (Red Masters of Manor) (Nanchang: Baihuazhou Wenyi Chubanshe, 1999), section 3.
192. See, for example, David Shambaugh (ed.), Is China Unstable?;
193. special issue on "China's Changing of the Guard", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003);
194. and Yang Zaiping and Xiang Dong, Zhongguo chang bu shuai (China Will Not Perish) (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 37-55.
195. See Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion and Internal Decline (New York: Vintage, 1987);
196. and Z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum", Daedalus, Vol. 199, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 295-344.
197. On China's conscious learning from the failures of the Soviet Union, see Lu Nanquan, Sulian xingwang shilun (History of the Rise and Collapse of the Soviet Union), 2nd ed. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe, 2004);
198. and Cao Changsheng, Zhang Tie and Fan Jianxin (eds), Sulian yanbian jincheng zhongde yishixingtai yanjiu (Study of Consciousness in the Process of Changes in the Soviet Union) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2004), ch. 6.
199. Adapted from Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life", The Antioch Review, No. 13 (1953), pp. 131-54,
200. quoted in Nikos Passas, Organized Crime (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), p. 101.
201. Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven, p. xiv;
202. Peter H. Gries, China's New Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 134;
203. and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Student Protests in Fin-de-Siecle China", New Left Review, No. 237 (September-October 1999), pp. 52-76.
204. See, for instance, Jae Ho Chung, "Assessing the Odds against the Mandate of Heaven: Do the Numbers on Popular Protest Really Matter?", in Jae Ho Chung (ed.), Charting China's Future, ch. 5.
205. Quite a few provinces with high levels of disturbances in terms of frequency during the first half of the 20th century (Henan, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shaanxi) overlap with those with frequent CoPSI occurrences. See Lucien Bianco, Peasants Without the Party: Grass-Roots Movements in Twentieth-Century China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 58.
206. Li Changping, Wo xiang zongli shuo shihua, chs. 9-11;
207. Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation Without Representation, chs. 2-3.
208. See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), chapters 4 and 5;
209. and Eric Harwit, "Spreading Telecommunications to Developing Areas in China: Telephones, the Internet and the Digital Divide", The China Quarterly, No. 180 (December 2004), pp. 1010-30.