Suicide terrorism in Iraq: A preliminary assessment of the quantitative data and documentary evidence

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 591-619

  Hafez, Mohammed M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI KANSAS CITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748482409     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600790878     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. For an excellent overview of the political tendencies represented in the insurgency, see Jaber Habib Jaber, "Who Resists in Iraq? What is Not Said about the Truth of the Iraqi Resistance" (Arabic), Asharq Al-Awsat (London), 12 August 2004
2. Amatzia Baram, "Who are the Insurgents: Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 134 April 2005
3. James Bennet, "The Mystery of the Insurgency," New York Times, 15 May 2005
4. Zaki Chehab, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 2005)
5. Faris Bin Hazam, "The Outsiders Are Not the Majority of Al Qaeda's Cadre in Iraq," (Arabic) Al-Hayat (London), 10 February 2006
6. and Hamam Hassan, "Saddam was the First to Attract Islamic Organizations and Later Regretted it," (Arabic) Al-Hayat (London), 25-26 February 2006, parts 1 and 2.
7. The Islamic Army in Iraq first appeared on the scene in July 2004. It did not issue a political statement, but instead claimed responsibility for several attacks and kidnappings and warned that it will target transport companies working for the coalition occupation forces. It is responsible for a wave of kidnappings against civilian foreign nationals with military presence in Iraq, including Italians, Australians, and Filipinos. Their videos usually depict attacks on U.S. forces, not Iraqi security forces.
8. It was officially formed on 16 July 2003 by Sunni religious clerics associated with the Muslim Scholars Association. These clerics are tied to specific mosques associated with the Committee for Preaching, Guidance, and Religious Rulings headed by Shiekh Mahdi al-Sumayd'i (currently under arrest). Its name reflects a nationalist, anticolonial tendency that harks back to the Iraqi anti-British struggle after World War I. According to its claims of responsibility for attacks, it appears to operate in and near the capital Baghdad and in the provinces of Ninawa, Diyala, and al-Anbar.
9. The Mujahideen Army in Iraq appeared on the scene sometime in early 2005. It is made up of former military personnel from tribal areas and Salafi religious figures. Its leader is Abu Jandal al-Shamri. Its website (www.jaishalmugahideen.net) introduces the group as a salafi group that adopts the "middle" road between the secularist and the takfiris [those who declare Muslims to be apostates]. Although its goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate, it also reaches out to the Ba'athists to repent and join its ranks.
10. It was officially formed on 30 May 2004, although the name of its brigades - Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi - appeared as early as 19 July 1993. In its first communiqué, it declared that "we are not opposed to participating in national politics with the honorable in the political arena, as long as they make opposition to the occupation their priority." Most of its activities take place in the Ninawa and Diyala provinces.
11. Dr. Ibrahim al-Shamari, the spokesman of the Islamic Army in Iraq, made it clear in an interview with Al-Jazeera television that the "farcical" political process will not end the insurgency. Only direct talks between the resistance and the occupation forces will be acceptable to the insurgents. Genuine negotiations and dialogue to end the crisis must be preceded by an official recognition of the resistance as the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people and a direct invitation to the Islamic Army in Iraq to negotiate the withdrawal of occupation forces. The interview aired during the program "Today's Encounter," hosted by Yasser Abu Halalah, on 24 March 2006. This stance was confirmed by the 1920 Revolution Brigades in a communiqué (see al-Hayat, "Iraqi Factions Deny Unification with Al Qaeda" [Arabic], 3 April 2006.
12. Patrick Graham, "Beyond Fallujah: A Year with the Iraqi Resistance," Harper's June 2004.
13. Mujahideen Army has claimed two suicide attacks, both of which were against coalition occupation forces. FBIS, "Mujahidin Army Claims Suicide Operation in Al-Fallujah," 29 December 2005
14. FBIS, "Iraq: Armed Group Claims Car Bombing Against US Patrol in Abu Ghurayb," 26 September 2005. The Islamic Army in Iraq declares in its manifesto that it believes suicide attacks are legitimate if they are (1) approved by an Islamic leader, (2) beneficial to Muslims, (3) motivated by the proper beliefs in God, not despair, and (4) the only way to weaken the enemy. It claimed responsibility for only one suicide attack on 24 March 2005, and two other attacks along with Ansar al-Sunna and the Mujahideen Army on 23 June 2005.
15. The 1920 Revolution Brigades also claimed one suicide attack. FBIS, "1920 Revolution Brigades Claim Suicide Operation against US Officer in Abu-Ghurayb," 29 March 2006.
16. Edward Cody, "Sunni Resistance to U.S. Presence Hardens," Washington Post, 7 July 2004
17. Hiwa Osman, "What do the Insurgents Want? Different Visions, Same Bloody Tactics," Washington Post, 8 May 2005.
18. Robin Wright, "Series of U.S. Fumbles Blamed for Turmoil in Postwar Iraq," Washington Post, 11 April 2004
19. Baram, "Who are the Insurgents," April 2005.
20. Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru, "Militias on the Rise Across Iraq: Shiite and Kurdish Groups Seizing Control, Instilling Fear in North and South," Washington Post, 21 August 2005
21. Huda Jasim and Ni'aman al-Haimas, "Iraqi Air Force Officers and Military Doctors are Suddenly Killed in their Homes" (Arabic), Asharq Al-Awsat (London), 7 July 2005
22. Dexter Filkins, "Where the Shadows Have Shadows," New York Times, 5 February 2006
23. Sabrina Tavernise, "As Iraqi Shiites Police Sunnis, Rough Justice Feeds Bitterness," New York Times, 6 February 2006.
24. Edward Cody, "To Many, Mission Not Accomplished: Residents Say Occupation's Unkept Promises, Military Tactics Fuel Resistance," Washington Post, 3 June 2004.
25. For Ba'athist communiqués justifying attacks on each of these targets, see Hassan Khalil Ghraib, The Iraqi National Resistance: The Decisive Battle against America (Arabic), Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 2004, pp. 65-72.
26. For claims of suicide attacks by Ba'athists, see FBIS, "Iraq: Group Claims Responsibility for Attacks on US Troops in Al-Fallujah," 6 June 2003
27. FBIS, "The Sixth Communiqué Issued by the 'Higher Command of the Mujahidin in Iraq - Media Branch,'" 7 June 2003
28. FBIS, "Terrorism: Jihadist Chat room on 20 Nov-2 Dec Iraqi Resistance," 12 December 2003
29. FBIS, "Jihadist Bulletin Board Reports on 4-10 Dec Iraqi Resistance," 16 December 2003. See list of communiqués by the Leaders of the Iraqi Resistance and Liberation in Ghraib, The Iraqi National Resistance (Arabic), pp. 187-216.
30. For a clear expression of their views, see the Ba'athist political and strategic program issued on 9 September 2003. "The Political and Strategic Program of the Iraqi Resistance under the Leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party" (Arabic) Al-Majd (Amman), 15 September 2003, p. 5.
31. Interview with Ma'ad Fayadh in Asharq Al-Awsat, 5 January 2005.
32. FBIS, "Iraq's Al-Dari Says Boycott of Elections Final, Discusses 'Resistance' Formation," 17 January 2005.
33. FBIS, "Iraqi Channel Airs 'Confessions' of Muhammad's Army Commander on Syria, Iran Links," 14 January 2005
34. FBIS, "UK Reporters Talk to Iraqi Insurgent Commander Coordinating Suicide Bombers," 9 May 2005.
35. S'udud al-Salihi "Iraqi Ba'ath Party Leader Confirms Cooperation with Islamist Sunni Movements," (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 31 December 2004
36. see interview with General Hussein Ali Kamel, Head of Iraq's internal intelligence service (Ministry of Interior) in Azzaman (London), 5 March 2005.
37. Baram, "Who Are the Insurgents?" April 2005
38. FBIS, "Report Explains Presence of Salafis, Ba'thist Arabs in Iraq before Occupation," 20 May 2005
39. Hamam Hassan, "Saddam was the First to Attract Islamic Organizations and Later Regretted it," (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 26 February 2006, part 2.
40. Basel Rifayah, "The Migration of Jordanian Jihadists to Iraq preceded the Fall of Saddam by Three Years," (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 11 August 2004
41. Hazem al-Amin, arqa Gave Rise to [Ahmad Fadil] al-Khalaylah and [Abu Mohammed] al-Maqdisi; Returnees from Kuwait Revolved around Them" (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 15 December 2004
42. Fuad Husayn, "Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda" (Arabic) Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), 13-30 May 2005, parts 1-15
43. Mashari al-Zaydi, "Jordanian Papers Concerning Fundamentalism and Politics," (Arabic) Asharq al-Awsat, 13 October 2005, part 4 of 5
44. Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005).
45. "Yemeni Volunteers Describe Fighting Experience in Iraq, Fall of Baghdad" (Arabic) Al-Hayat (London), 18 April 2003
46. Hamd al-Jaser, "Kuwaiti Jihadists in the Sunni Triangle" (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 11 August 2004
47. Hazem al-Amin, "Lebanese 'Jihadists' in Iraq: 'Salafis' from Peripheral Regions and Cities" (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 11 August 2004
48. Hazem al-Amin, "Jordanian 'Zarqawis' Visit Their Clerics in Jail and Await the Opportunity to Join Abu Mus'ab [al-Zarqawi] in Iraq" (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 14 December 2004
49. Jean Chichizola, "Four Recruiters for Jihad in Iraq Arrested" (French), Le Figaro (Paris), 26 January 2005
50. Muhammad al-Ashhab, "European Networks for Smuggling Jihadists," Al-Hayat, 11 February 2005
51. Saud al-Sarhan, "Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia ..." (Arabic), Asharq al-Awsat, 20 May 2005
52. Eric Schmitt, "As Africans Join Iraqi Insurgency, U.S. Counters Military Training in their Lands," New York Times, 10 June 2005
53. Peter Beaumont, "Insurgents Trawl Europe for Recruits," The Observer (London), 19 June 2005
54. Ahmed al-Arqam, "The Moroccan Judiciary Sentences to Prison Deportees from Syria on their way to Fight in Iraq," Asharq al-Awsat, 2 July 2005
55. James Glanz, "In Jordanian Case, Hints of Iraq Jihad Networks," New York Times, 29 July 2005
56. and FBIS, "Florence's Sorgane Mosque Identified as Site of Recruitment Cell for Iraq-Bound Suicide Bombers," 29 August 2005
57. Hazim al-Amin, "How Al Qaeda Searched for a Twin State to the Taliban Emirate," (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 10 October 2005
58. Ibrahim Hamaydi, "Islamic Trends Advance in Syria and the Authorities Wage 'Preemptive Operations' Against the Takfiris" (Arabic), Al-Hayat, 4 January 2006
59. Hazem al-Amin, "Strangers Come during 'Al Qaeda Season' to Recruit Suicide Bombers to Iraq," (Arabic) Al-Hayat, 26 January 2006 (part 1) and 27 January 2006 (part 2)
60. Nir Rosen, "Iraq's Jordanian Jihadis" New York Times, 19 February 2006.
61. This statement was made in a 50-minute video montage by Al Qaeda depicting their operations against U.S. forces and Iraqi security services. Sykes-Picot refers to the secret agreement between France and Britain during World War I to divide up the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. It was one of the factors that shaped the contemporary Middle Eastern state system.
62. The Islamic legal committee of the Ansar al-Sunna Army affirmed that jihad has become an individual obligation in Iraq in a fatwa (religious ruling) entitled "The Ruling Concerning Jihad in Iraq," published in the first issue of its monthly online journal Ansar al-Sunna (Shu'aban 1424 September-October 2003, pp. 11-14). Jihad as fard' ayn (individual obligation) is usually contrasted with jihad as fard kifaya (collective obligation). Islamic scholars construe individual obligation to mean that it is the duty of every Muslim to wage jihad in the path of God in defense of Islam, its lands, religious institutions, people, and property. Individual obligation usually arises when Muslim lands are besieged by powerful foes that cannot be easily repelled with a small force. Under these circumstances, jihad is the religious obligation of every Muslim capable of fighting, just as all Muslims are obligated to pray, fast, and pay alms. In contrast, collective obligation means that the duty of jihad on individual Muslims is fulfilled if a sufficient number of Muslims arise to make additional fighters unnecessary for the task. Collective obligation usually applies in campaigns of conquest (futuhat) when Muslims are sufficiently capable of waging war without the need to burden all of society.
63. The report was not dated and it is not clear to whom it was sent in Al Qaeda. Zarqawi's anti-Shi'a rhetoric is found in his video montages and audio recordings. See, for instance, the transcript of a 74-minute recording that his supporters titled "The Descendents of Ibn al-Alqami Are Back" (FBIS, "Al-Zarqawi Justifies Killing of Innocent Muslims, Condemns Shi'a 'Betrayal' of Sunnis," 18 May 2005 and the transcript of a 16-minute and 47-second audio recording that his supporters titled "Here is a Message for Mankind, Let Them Take Warning Therefrom" (FBIS, "Al-Zarqawi Calls for 'All-Out War' Against Shi'a," 14 September 2005).
64. Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru, "Militias on the Rise Across Iraq: Shiite and Kurdish Groups Seizing Control, Instilling Fear in North and South, "Washington Post, 21 August 2005
65. Patrick Cockburn, "On the Frontline: War without End," Independent (London), 18 September 2005
66. Dexter Filkins, "Where the Shadows Have Shadows," New York Times, 5 February 2006
67. Sabrina Tavernise, "Iraq Power Shift Widen a Gap between Sects," New York Times, 18 February 2006
68. Ellen Knickmeyer, "Shiites Told: Leave Home or Be Killed," Washington Post, 1 March 2006
69. Edward Wong and Kirk Semple, "Civilians in Iraq Flee Mixed Areas as Killings Rise," The New York Times, 2 April 2006.
70. 5 January 2006 interview in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with a company commander in the 1st Calvary division who served in Baghdad and North Babel between February 2004 and March 2005. The Major requested anonymity.
71. Asharq al-Awsat (London), 5 February 2004.
72. Azzaman (London), 24 March 2005.
73. 5 January 2006 interview in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with a company commander in the 1st Calvary division who served in Baghdad and North Babel between February 2004 and March 2005. The Major requested anonymity.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. According to a Major in the 130th Engineer Brigade serving in Victory Base (Baghdad) and LSA Anaconda (Balad) since 25 October 2005, "suicide attacks are not effective against US forces.... We do not allow civilian vehicles to get close to our convoys, we are very disciplined about wearing individual protective gear, we have armored vehicles that can protect occupants from most blasts, and we don't allow civilians to intermingle with troop formations. Unfortunately, this has distanced us from the population. It's an unfortunate tradeoff." E-mail correspondence on 28 February 2006. The major requested anonymity.
77. International Crisis Group, "In heir Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," Middle East Report Number 50, 15 February 2006.